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FBIS-SOV-93-071 *15 April 1993*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

G-7 Ministers Meet in Tokyo To Discuss Russian Aid *[ITAR-TASS]* 1
- Moscow Submits Aid Proposals *[ITAR-TASS]* 1
- EC Announces Aid Package *[ITAR-TASS]* 1
- Fedorov Details Hopes for Package *[IZVESTIYA 15 Apr]* 2
- G-7 Sees Aid as Investment *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
- Kozyrev Sees Long-Term Partnership *[ITAR-TASS]* 3
- Fedorov, Kozyrev Welcome Package *[Radio Rossii]* 4

Miyazawa Welcomes Prospective Yeltsin Visit *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Shokhin: Kurils Should Not Hinder Russian-Japanese Ties *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Kozyrev: Russia Aspires to Asian-Pacific Economic Role *[ITAR-TASS]* 4
Commentator Questions Ukrainian Nuclear Intentions *[Moscow International]* 5
Kasatonov Asserts Ukraine Destabilizing Relations *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Commentator Urges 'Unhurried' START II Debate *[PRAVDA 8 Apr]* 5
Commentator Asserts START II Terms 'Patently Unequal' *[PRAVDA 8 Apr]* 7
Stepashin, Germany's Ruehe Discuss Nuclear Security, START *[INTERFAX]* 8
- Ruehe, Grachev Comments on Yugoslavia *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Apr]* 8

Khasbulatov Said to Alter Makeup of Yugoslav Delegation *[INTERFAX]* 9
Ambartsumov Opposes Tougher Sanctions on Serbia *[ITAR-TASS]* 9
Deferment of UN Sanctions Vote Said Unrelated to Referendum *[INTERFAX]* 9
Official Says Yugoslav Peace Process at 'Key Point' *[ITAR-TASS]* 9
Churkin Meets With Milosevic, Karadzic, Cosic *[ITAR-TASS]* 10
Moscow Plans No Increase in Yugoslav Contingent *[Radio Rossii]* 10
Commentary Views Nuclear Cooperation With Iran *[Moscow International]* 10
Zorkin Speaks on Referendum at Meeting With U.S. Group *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 9 Apr]* 11

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin Holds News Conference in Kremlin 14 Apr *[Moscow TV]* 12
Council Heads 'Failed To Back' Appeal for Yeltsin *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 19
Yeltsin Appoints Lobov First Deputy Prime Minister *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Yeltsin Meets Democratic Organization Representatives 20
- Organization To Propose Poll Package *[INTERFAX]* 20
- Cited on Congress Resolution, Court *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
- Notes 'Strained' Times, 'Implacable Opposition' *[Russian TV]* 20
- Asks Organizations for Support *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
- Will Remove Rutskoy From Agriculture *[INTERFAX]* 21
- Rutskoy To Remain Crime Commission Head *[INTERFAX]* 21

'Observers' Comment on Actions Against Rutskoy *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Zorkin, Lipitskiy Comment on Constitution, Rutskoy *[INTERFAX]* 22
Yeltsin Ties Vote for Him With Vote for Constitution *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 15 Apr]* 23
Yeltsin Aide Reveals Details of Draft Constitution *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 14 Apr]* 24
Yeltsin Given New Draft Constitution 10 Apr *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 24
Yuriy Kalmykov Appointed Acting Justice Minister *[INTERFAX]* 24
Communists Announce Program for 'National Vyeche' *[INTERFAX]* 25
'Small-Minded' Khasbulatov Sloganizing Assailed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 13 Apr]* 25
Civic Union 'Beginning To Fall Apart' *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 10 Apr]* 26
DPR Members Quit President's Support Committee *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 27
Zhirinovskiy Calls For '10-Year War' in South *[Moscow TV]* 27

SCSE Trial

State Emergency Committee Trial Continues 27
Defense Intends 'Sensational' Trial *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 14 Apr]* 27
Former Minister Yazov Interviewed *[London TV]* 28
Trial Resumes 15 Apr; Tizyakov Ill *[Moscow TV]* 28
Pavlov Will Not Answer Questions *[INTERFAX]* 29
Trial Postponed Until 16 Apr *[INTERFAX]* 29
Defense Challenges State Prosecutors *[ITAR-TASS]* 29
Yanayev on Gorbachev's Coup Participation *[London TV]* 30

Referendum Issues

Orthodox Church Denies Financing Referendum *[INTERFAX]* 30
Civic Union Unveils Stance, Urges Early Elections *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 31
Social Democrats Divided But Not Split *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 31
More on Armed Forces' Arrangements for Referendum *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 14 Apr]* 31
Referendum Endangering 'Democratic Process' *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 32
Public Opinion Foundation Conducts Survey 33
Referendum, Plebiscite Viewed *[INTERFAX]* 33
Support for Yeltsin, Khasbulatov *[INTERFAX]* 34
Yeltsin's Attitude Toward Parliament *[INTERFAX]* 35
Impeachment of Yeltsin Viewed *[INTERFAX]* 35
Paper Publishes Version of Khasbulatov 9 Apr Speech *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 13 Apr]* 35

Economic Issues

Fedorov on Central Bank, Fighting Inflation *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 7 Apr]* 44
Central Bank, Government Compromise Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 47

Supreme Soviet

Parliament Ratifies CIS Charter 15 April *[ITAR-TASS]* 47
Press Service Attacks Kostikov Criticism of Khasbulatov *[ITAR-TASS]* 48
Khasbulatov Discusses Yeltsin Power Struggle *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 12 Apr]* 48
Deputy Committee Head Recommends 3 Yes Votes, 1 No *[KURANTY 14 Apr]* 50
Defense Committee Appeal on Servicemen's Referendum Role *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Apr]* .. 53
Committee Chairman—Budget Deficit Projected at 15% of GDP *[INTERFAX]* 53
Parliament Resumes Work; Separate Chambers To Meet *[ITAR-TASS]* 53
Report on 13 Apr Supreme Soviet Proceedings *[Russian TV]* 54

Regional Affairs

Government Delegation Tours Stavropol Territory *[ITAR-TASS]* 54
Chernomyrdin Arrives for Visit *[INTERFAX]* 55
Discusses Labor Problems *[ITAR-TASS]* 55
Chubays Meets With Regional Officials in Kurgan 55
'Worst' Economic Trends 'Slowed Down' *[INTERFAX]* 55
Visits Chelyabinsk 15 Apr *[INTERFAX]* 55
Chechen Delegates To Give Yeltsin Message From Dudayev *[INTERFAX]* 56
Further on Accident at Tomsk-7 Nuclear Facility 56
Scientists Assess Clean-Up, Damage *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 56
No Additional Safety Measures Needed *[INTERFAX]* 57
Failure To Protect People Questioned *[Russian TV]* 57
IAEA Commission Arrives *[INTERFAX]* 57
Shokhin on Official Visit of Far East Region 57
Arrives in Sakhalin *[ITAR-TASS]* 57
Government Session Set for 22 Apr *[Moscow TV]* 58
Shokhin Arrives in Vladivostok *[Radio Rossii]* 58
Visits Free Economic Zones *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 15 Apr]* 58
Yeltsin 'Protecting Himself' in Pressuring Mordovia *[PRAVDA 14 Apr]* 59

Official: 106 Million Ton Grain Harvest Expected *[INTERFAX]* 60
Kalmykia's New President Outlines Program *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 13 Apr]* 60
Baltic Force Withdrawn to Kaliningrad With New Status *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Apr]* 60
Presidential Aide Views Impact of Regional Poll Results *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 13 Apr]* 60
Low Turnouts Widespread in Regional Polls *[IZVESTIYA 13 Apr]* 61
Executive Gains Increasing Support in Countryside *[IZVESTIYA 10 Apr]* 62

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Supreme Council Chairman Views START I During PRC Visit *[Kiev International]* 63
Commentary Focuses on U.S. Unwillingness To Receive Kuchma *[KURANTY 13 Apr]* 63
Kravchuk, Shevardnadze Comment on Russia, 'Nuclear Drift' *[INTERFAX]* 63
Deputies Complain to Kravchuk on Black Sea Fleet Issues *[Kiev International]* 64
Russia Accused of Breaking Yalta Agreement *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* 65
Morozov Appoints Commanders to Black Sea Fleet Garrisons *[ITAR-TASS]* 66
More on Morozov's Speech to Officers' Union Congress *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]* 66
Sevastopol Residents Demand Morozov's Resignation *[INTERFAX]* 67
Russian Officers in Sevastopol To Send Cadets to Russia *[UKRINFORM]* 67
Government Establishes Diplomatic Ties With Saudi Arabia *[ITAR-TASS]* 67
New Deals Help To Diversify Energy Supply Sources *[IZVESTIYA 9 Apr]* 68

National Affairs

Kuchma Urges 'Statewide Action' To Beat Economic Ills *[IZVESTIYA 13 Apr]* 68
Government To Step Up Oil, Gas Production in 1994 *[INTERFAX]* 69
Government Decides To Reduce Gas Consumption *[UKRINFORM]* 69
Removal of Kravchuk's Kiev Representative Termed 'Startling' *[UKRINFORM]* 69
Chernobyl Director Comments on Current Operations *[Moscow TV]* 69

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Security, Cooperation Document Signed With Netherlands *[Minsk Radio]* 71
Norwegian Envoy Presents Credentials to Shushkevich *[NARODNAYA GAZETA 19 Mar]* 71

Moldova

Snegur on Support for Yeltsin, Relations With Romania *[INTERFAX]* 71
Talks Begin on 14th Army's Withdrawal from Moldova *[IZVESTIYA 9 Apr]* 71
General Says 14th Army Transfer to Dniester 'Impossible' *[BASAPRESS]* 71
Government Adopts Decision on Hard Currency Fund *[Moscow Radio]* 72

CENTRAL ASIA

Kyrgyzstan

President Discusses Goals of Visit to Japan *[INTERFAX]* 73
First CIS Leader To Visit *[ITAR-TASS]* 73
Visiting Swiss Delegation To Study Economy, Cooperation *[ITAR-TASS]* 73
Government To Raise Bread Prices *[INTERFAX]* 73

Tajikistan

Dushanbe 'Not Satisfied' With Afghanistan Response to Border Situation *[ITAR-TASS]* 74
Russian Commander on Tajik-Afghan Border Situation *[Moscow TV]* 74
Prime Minister on Border Situation, Opposition Activity *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 14 Apr]* ... 74
UN General Secretary To Send Envoy To Help Negotiate *[INTERFAX]* 75

Turkmenistan

Parliament Grants President Right To Adopt Decrees *[INTERFAX]* 75
Uzbek President Arrives for Visit, Meets Niyazov *[Moscow Radio]* 75

CAUCASUS

Armenia

'Reports' Say Turkey Said Sending Troops to Nakhichevan *[Yerevan Radio]* 76
Official Says Turkey 'Dare' Not Interfere in Conflict *[INTERFAX]* 76
Iranian Parliament Wants To Review Relations With Armenia *[ITAR-TASS]* 76
Charge d'Affaires to Iran Recalled After Attack on Embassy *[Yerevan Radio]* 76
Azerbaijan Said Kidnapping Armenians for POW Exchanges *[SNARK]* 76
Yerevan Denies Azerbaijani Media Reports, Updates Situation *[Yerevan International]* 77
CSCE Military Envoys Examine Armenia-Azerbaijan Border *[INTERFAX]* 77
Government To Begin Work To Repair Nuclear Power Plant *[INTERFAX]* 77
Budgets 5 Billion Rubles for Nuclear Plant *[INTERFAX]* 77
Minister Says Reopening Depends on Safety *[Yerevan Radio]* 78

Azerbaijan

Turkey's Ozal Continues Visits, Talks With Kamberov *[ITAR-TASS]* 78
Hints at Force To Reverse Armenian Gains *[Ankara TV]* 78
Views Russian Involvement in Kelbadzhar *[TURAN]* 79
Special Warfare Department Chief Accompanys Ozal *[London TV]* 79
Turkish Paper Reports First Batch of Weapons Dispatched *[ITAR-TASS]* 79
Armenian Forces Said To Order Execution of Azerbaijani Prisoners *[Paris AFP]* 80

Georgia

Shevardnadze Calls Delegation's Visit to Ukraine 'Fruitful' *[INTERFAX]* 80
Shevardnadze Aide Stresses Importance of Ties With Russia *[INTERFAX]* 81
Russian Envoy on Agreements Reached With Georgia *[CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY]* . 81
Shevardnadze, Sigua Deny Israeli Arms Supply *[Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR 15 Apr]* 81
Georgian Forces Reportedly Bombard Abkhazian Positions *[ITAR-TASS]* 82
Abkhazians Resume Shelling of Sukhumi *[ITAR-TASS]* 82
Rally for Gamsakhurdia Dispersed in Tbilisi *[INTERFAX]* 82
Parliament Appoints Advadze Ambassador to Russia *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 18 Apr]* 82
Giorgadze Named Head of Permanent Delegation to Vienna *[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA 9 Apr]* . 82

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Foreign Minister Comments on Ties With Europe *[BALTFAX]* 84
Defense Minister Views Foreign Help With New Armed Forces
[Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH 8 Apr] 84
State Assembly Ratifies Agreements With Hungary, Poland *[BALTFAX]* 84
Government Signs Cooperation Agreement With Finland *[BALTFAX]* 84
Government Adopts Western Border Control Standards *[BALTFAX]* 85

Latvia

Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow *[BALTFAX]* 85
Prime Minister Meets Turkish Envoy, Discusses Relations *[BALTFAX]* 85
Defense Minister Sees Threat From 'Alien' Russian Army *[BNS]* 85
Fifteen Socio-Political Organizations Registered *[BALTFAX]* 86
Environmental Pollution in Kunda 'Unbearable' *[LETA]* 86

Lithuania

Russia Offers Most Favored Nation Trade Status *[BALTFAX]* 86
Landsbergis Views Political Similarities With Russia *[LIETUVOS AIDAS 27 Mar]* 86
Brazauskas Continues Visit to Britain *[Vilnius International]* 87

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G-7 Ministers Meet in Tokyo To Discuss Russian Aid

LD1404162493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1348 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovin]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—The U.S. announced its new initiative in order to provide aid to Russia at the conference of foreign and finance ministers of leading seven ("G-7") industrially developed countries, now underway in Tokyo.

At a joint press conference held during a break between its sessions, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen said that Washington has called on its partners to set up a fund to assist privatization in the Russian Federation for 4 billion dollars and a fund to help destroy nuclear weapons belonging to the former Soviet Union.

This idea has already been approved by President Bill Clinton who is now discussing it with the U.S. congress, Bentsen said. According to him, Washington is ready to allocate 500 million dollars to the assistance fund for the privatization of state enterprises.

Bentsen expects that other "G-7" countries like Japan, Germany, France, England, Italy and Canada will earmark 1.5 billion dollars for these purposes.

The remaining two billion dollars, according to the American plan, will be made available through the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development channels as an independent assistance fund for privatization in Russia. This double structure will play an extremely important role in the modernization of Russian enterprises, Secretary of State Christopher said.

According to the secretary of state, the fund proposed by the U.S. to help destroy nuclear weapons will be opened for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and may be set up promptly, provided other "G-7" countries support the American initiative.

Earlier in April U.S. President Bill Clinton had already announced about the allocation of economic subsidies worth 1.6 billion dollars for Russia. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the "G-7" countries should show to citizens of Russia that leading industrial nations are prepared to provide them not any abstract, but real, earthly and tangible aid.

Moscow Submits Aid Proposals

LD1404195293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1743 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—Moscow has submitted concrete proposals to representatives of G-7 countries in Tokyo on Wednesday suggesting ways of rendering assistance to Russian reforms.

On Wednesday, participants of the G-7 conference have held final consultations, taking into account Russian proposals, ITAR-TASS learned from the Russian delegation to the conference of the G-7 finance and foreign ministers which opened in Tokyo on Wednesday.

A final version of a new programme of aid to Russia is expected to be prepared today to be subsequently endorsed by the conference on Thursday.

A document containing Russian proposals, which was handed over to G-7 delegations, includes a proposal to give aid to Russia in expanding its exports to the leading industrialized countries and take measures to remove customs and other barriers to Russian goods. The document says that one of the main directions of possible aid to Russia is the achievement of financial stabilisation, the implementation of privatisation and organisation of an international forum, whose functions would not be restricted by financial aid only, but would include exchange of experience, training of personnel and technical assistance. It was proposed to set up an international foundation for aid to minor and medium-sized enterprises and work out a concrete mechanism of its work, the same source said.

The present document differs from previous proposals on aid to Russia previously submitted to G-7 countries only in a way that it is more concrete and envisages a more detailed mechanism of providing aid. Nevertheless, a real mechanism of the realization of a new Russian package is to be worked out yet by G-7 countries jointly with Moscow upon completion of this conference.

Experts from the Russian delegation expressed the opinion that a total volume of the new package of aid to Russia can amount to 30-40 billion dollars, as had been previously reported by the Japanese press, and emphasised that Moscow is attaching priority importance not to the size of aid to Russian reforms, but to real efforts made by Western countries aimed at Russia's being most efficiently and rapidly integrated into a complex mechanism of the world economy.

EC Announces Aid Package

LD1404195693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1747 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Bantin]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—The European Community is rendering Russia a new aid package worth 1.8 billion U.S. dollars, an official representative of the European Community announced at a meeting of foreign and finance ministers of the seven leading industrialized nations (G-7) on aid to Russia which opened in Tokyo today.

Apart from giving assistance to Russia, the European Community has made a decision to offer new financial and economic aid to other Commonwealth countries amounting to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars. According to the representative of the European Community, a new aid package to the Commonwealth countries may be used only after they fulfil the terms stipulated by the rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Out of the total 3.0 billion U.S. dollar aid package to the Commonwealth countries, 1.22 billion U.S. dollars are allocated for technical assistance to economic reforms, 1.25 billion U.S. dollars—for credits, and 500 million U.S. dollars—for gratuitous food and medical aid. The specific programme of carrying out the new aid measures has not yet been worked out but it is planned to give credits first of all to those enterprises which are deriving profits.

Fedorov Details Hopes for Package

PM1504082793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "Boris Fedorov Hopes Tokyo Meeting Will Be Productive"]

[Text] A meeting of the finance and foreign ministers of the "G-7" countries began in Tokyo 14 April; its central issue was discussion and elaboration of a package of Western economic aid for Russian reforms.

The meeting, held in Tokyo's Hotel New Otani, was opened by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, the head of the Japanese cabinet, who in his speech defined the fate of Russia's reforms as a major factor in international policy. Miyazawa noted that peace and prosperity throughout the whole world depend to a decisive extent on the success of economic and political transformations in Russia. Pointing to the difficulties facing Yeltsin, the Japanese prime minister called on the international community to support the process of democratic reforms in Russia. At the same time it was stressed that the West's possibilities of granting aid are not unlimited, and that, apart from Russians themselves, there is hardly anyone who can ensure the final success of the transformations.

Miyazawa singled out three fundamental aspects of the question of granting aid to Russia: the efforts should be geared to meeting the people's specific needs and should bring direct returns which people can feel; the aid should work to create the main elements of the market economy on which the success of the reforms depends; and the aid should be clearly coordinated, both between the major donors and between the donors and the recipients. The task of Western aid, as formulated by Miyazawa, thus consists of alleviating the burdens of Russia's transition to the market, increasing the efficiency of reforms in key areas, and ensuring the irreversibility of the transformations themselves. As an illustration of these declarations the head of the Japanese Government announced new Japanese initiatives aimed at Russia—a package of economic measures "weighing in" at $1.82 billion, which includes funds assigned to insure commercial transactions with Russia, new credit lines, and humanitarian, consultative, and technical aid.

But the slogan "Let the West aid Russia as one" was somewhat muted on the first day of the "G-7" ministerial meeting. Following the Japanese premier's introductory speech, participants in the event split into "interest groups"—the heads of foreign policy departments occupied themselves with discussions on global political issues (special attention, according to leaks from behind the closed doors, was devoted to North Korea in connection with its stance over the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to the situation in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and the Near East), while their colleagues from the financial sector got down to debates on the economy (the topics tackled included macroeconomic policy, currency rates, trade, and the Japanese Government's plan for stimulating economic activity adopted the previous.)

The Russian topic, in other words, did not emerge as the chief topic at the first round of sessions. True enough, everyone talks of Bill Clinton's telephone call to Miyazawa yesterday evening—the U.S. President conversed with the Japanese premier for 10 minutes and, rumor has it, informed him of the United States' intention to substantially increase U.S. aid to Russia over and above the initiatives announced at Vancouver. A figure on the order of $2.5 billion in the form of new export credits was cited, but the U.S. delegation has not yet made an official announcement. The total of Western initiatives, however, is the same as before—somewhere between $30 and $40 billion.

Last night Vice Premier Boris Fedorov, head of the Russian delegation, found time for a meeting with the correspondents of IZVESTIYA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, at which he shared his vision of the prospects of the meetings.

Fedorov primarily believes that, when talking of Western aid, one should not be carried away by arithmetic or produce promises of sums with a string of zeros at the end—not everything that is promised can be delivered, not everything that is offered is advantageous or necessary to Russia, and not everything is linked to the needs of Russia's economy. Aid, if it is to be taken, should above all ensure the progress of specific elements of the reforms.

In the vice premier's words, the Russian side has formulated new approaches to the West with regard to Western aid. First is the need to give the government "room to maneuver" and provide it with certain reserves for overcoming the negative social and economic results of the reforms. For this a "special fund for reforms" has been devised, for which Western aid will indeed be appropriate—not export credits, but a clear mechanism and strict responsibility; who should be given how much, for what purposes, and against what guarantees—with mandatory coordination with the G-7 and the major donors. Second, aid efforts should be geared toward

specific Russian enterprises and small and medium firms. This is the so-called "idea of 100,000 credits." Although the sums involved are small (an average of $5,000 each) they will go to those who put the money into action without squandering or wasting it, such that the funding of a necessary project or sector proceeds directly, without red tape, with a clear destination and a deliberate investment purpose.

On this same principle, a conversion fund to tackle conversion not in theory and not on the level of declarations, but through specific plants, associations, and production units and a structuralization fund to invest in jobs creation and expansion of the service sector should be established.

Third—international programs should be linked to the resolution of balance of payments problems and the creation of a strong currency [tverdyye dengi]. Here so-called reserve credits can and should work, and aid channeled through international financial organizations can and should be directed here. The problem of Russia's foreign debt is also in this "basket." And, in addition, if aid is to be expected, restrictions on trade with Russia, Russian access to international markets should be lifted. In the United States, for example, something like 200 restrictive legislative and regulatory acts involving economic contacts with Russia accumulated during the Cold War years. Getting rid of these is aid—and considerable aid at that.

"All these ideas constitute a sort of Russian package, which we have proposed to the G-7," Fedorov said. "We will know as early as today or tomorrow what the answer will be. We do have hopes for a positive response, and they are based primarily on the fact that the current round of discussions about aid for Russia are significantly better prepared, compared with Munich."

G-7 Sees Aid as Investment

LD1404200293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1859 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—Reforms which are being carried out in Russia under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin should not be reversed, and the support of these reforms on the threshold of the 25 April referendum will become an "investment into the future," participants in the conference of foreign and finance ministers of the G-7 industrialized countries unanimously declared on Wednesday, according to officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry who summed up the results of the first day of the conference.

A Japanese diplomat said that participants in the conference voiced the opinion that if Yeltsin was removed, his successor was not likely to have the same positive approach to the implementation of reforms, while a foreign policy course towards cooperation with the West might be changed. The G-7 supports Yeltsin because "he is the best prospect having no alternative," a high-ranking official of the British delegation was quoted as saying.

According to Japanese diplomats, participants in the conference voiced an opinion that the results of the referendum in Russia can necessitate an urgent meeting of the G-7 at the highest or a ministerial level. However, an opinion prevailed that such a meeting would not be needed, because Yeltsin would win a victory, ITAR-TASS learned from Japanese Foreign Ministry officials who were present at the conference.

G-7 ministers share an opinion that aid to Russian reforms, which meets the interests of the international community, should have a most concrete and tangible character. The aid should be provided quickly and "reach real people," Canadian Finance Minister Donald Mazanowsky told journalists. The content and size of a comprehensive package of measures in aid to reforms will be announced on Thursday upon completion of the conference. The total amount of aid is expected to be 35-40 billion U.S. dollars.

According to Japanese diplomats, G-7 ministers have pointed out the importance of Ukraine's and Kazakhstan's joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states as soon as possible. G-7 ministers agreed that the former Soviet republics need aid to utilize nuclear waste. Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto [name as received] was reported to have criticised Russia's practice of dumping nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan.

Kozyrev Sees Long-Term Partnership

LD1504075893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0510 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo, 15 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—A long-term strategy of partnership, built on the principle of moving from giving Moscow assistance to mutually beneficial cooperation, and a maximum mobilization of her own resources for joint cooperation projects—including halting the illegal removal of capital abroad—are essential for the integration of Russia into the world economy. This was stated today by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, speaking in Tokyo at a morning conference of ministers of the "Seven." Kozyrev called for opening up international markets for Russian goods, working out a concrete program for long-term cooperation jointly with the "Seven;" and the creation of a permanent body of representatives of the seven leading countries of the world and of Russia's president.

Russia, stressed Kozyrev, is in favor of developing political dialogue and hopes to see the "group of seven" turn with time into "a group of eight," which would periodically gather to discuss the world's greatest problems, such as the efficient use of energy resources, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and threats to world stability.

The minister stressed that the support for Russian reforms, vividly expressed by the "Seven," shows that events in Russia are perceived as a global problem. The reason for fierce attacks on the course of reforms and the guarantor of them, President Yeltsin, lies in the fact that reforms in Russia have come close to the point of no return. Millions of Russians who have tied their fates to a market economy have acquired the habit of economic freedom and are actually creating a "critical mass" working in favor of profound socioeconomic changes in the country. However, one should not dramatize the situation; the fact that the president has placed the question of confidence in himself on the referendum (something that not one former regime in Russia's history has done), is an indication of the confidence reformist forces have in the common sense of the people and their understanding of their own vital interests.

Fedorov, Kozyrev Welcome Package

LD1504080993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] The conference of foreign and finance ministers of the seven leading industrially developed countries on aid to Russia has ended in Tokyo. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fedorov, who was taking part, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent that he was satisfied with the results of the forum. The G-7 countries have passed an aid package to Russia worth a total of 43.4 billion dollars. As Fedorov noted, the aid package for Russia is in the form we were counting on.

Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev also told ITAR-TASS today that the results of the Tokyo meeting were an important step in the right direction.

Miyazawa Welcomes Prospective Yeltsin Visit

LD1404170793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1639 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa met Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Tokyo on Wednesday. Kozyrev arrived in Japan to take part in a conference of finance and foreign ministers of the Group of Seven industrialized countries on problems of aid to Russia.

During a businesslike and constructive meeting which lasted for one hour and twenty minutes instead of forty minutes as had been scheduled, the head of the Japanese Government expressed his support of reforms carried out in Russia. He acquainted the Russian foreign minister with a new package of economic aid to Russia worth a total of 1.82 billion U.S. dollars, which was officially announced by Tokyo today.

For his part, the Russian foreign minister expressed his gratitude and voiced hope for further strengthening of bilateral ties. The two ministers discussed in a constructive way issues of cooperation between Moscow and the G-7.

During the meeting the Russian side informed Miyazawa of President Yeltsin's intention to visit Japan. Miyazawa welcomed the forthcoming visit of the Russian president. During the talks the sides said that May, 1993 was one of possible periods of time for President Yeltsin to visit Tokyo. A concrete programme of the visit will be discussed during meetings between the foreign ministers of both countries, including at their meeting scheduled in Tokyo on April 15.

Miyazawa and Kozyrev were unanimous that President Yeltsin's visit would be a serious step towards the improvement of Russo-Japanese relations. Both sides believe that the visit should be thoroughly prepared to be a mutual success.

Shokhin: Kurils Should Not Hinder Russian-Japanese Ties

LD1404173093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1211 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evgeni Belovitskiy]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk April 14 TASS—"It is neither in the Russian nor in the Japanese interests to advance the future of Southern Kuril Islands as a precondition for economic rapprochement between the two countries", Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin told reporters on Wednesday after arriving to the Sakhalin Island.

"The language of ultimatums will not move the problem (out of the deadlock)", he added.

Shokhin said the Russian leadership succeeded to make Japan drop the Kuril dispute as a precondition for Russian participation in the G-7 summit in Tokyo in July.

"It is much more important to develop economic cooperation. When we come to know each other better it will be easier to agree", Shokhin said, expressing hope that such an approach will be supported by Sakhalin residents and all Russians.

Kozyrev: Russia Aspires to Asian-Pacific Economic Role

LD1404180793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1723 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakov]

[Text] Tokyo April 14 TASS—Russia's strategic aim is to join the economic processes in the Asian-Pacific region as a normal great power, according to the country's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The Russian minister, who was speaking before specialists in international relations and national security in Tokyo on Wednesday, said Moscow intended to advance towards this goal with its programme of creating a market economy open for international and regional cooperation.

Kozyrev praised Japan for its support of Russian reforms and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin's policy and called for further development of Russo-Japanese relations on the basis of the two countries' commitment to democratic values, their common approach to the main problems, the objective need for expanding economic cooperation and recognizing the principles of legality and justice as the basis for solving the pressing problems.

As regards the meeting of the foreign and finance ministers of the world's seven leading industrialized countries which opened in Tokyo today, Kozyrev stressed that the time is ripe for working out a specific programme of long-term strategy of partnership aimed at a real integration of Russia in the world economy, in which the factor of cooperation between Russia and Japan has a unique role to play.

Commentator Questions Ukrainian Nuclear Intentions

LD1404180093 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton; read by announcer]

[Excerpts] At a briefing on Tuesday the spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry again voiced concern that the situation over nuclear weapons is worsening in Ukraine. Commentary by Yuriy Solton:

Concern is also voiced in other countries. Contrary to its assurances Ukraine does not ratify the START I Treaty, does not join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not hand strategic arms over to Russia for dismantling. They were left on its territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Different political groupings including in the Ukrainian Parliament are more determined to preserve the republican nuclear status. Their actions are not opposed by the Ukrainian leadership. By nuclear potential Ukraine many times surpasses China, France and Britain taken together.

Ukraine has been promised security guarantees if it joins the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is also promised financial aid to help it dismantle nuclear arms, as well as compensation for the nuclear fuel previously produced by Ukraine. But Kiev continues demanding that the world community offer endless guarantees as conditions to fulfill what Ukrainian leaders promised to do earlier.

In its recent statement the Russian Government proposed to Ukraine a concrete program whose materialization lifts [as heard] the concern from the nuclear problem. [passage omitted]

In its response statement Ukraine ignored the Russian proposals and did not put forward her own. The fact that Kiev delayed the solution of the future of the strategic nuclear missiles on its territory raises suspicions that Ukraine, at least in the near future, is not going to move toward a nonnuclear status.

Kiev may lift the suspicions only by concrete deeds, that is by fulfilling its statements and declarations.

Kasatonov Asserts Ukraine Destabilizing Relations

LD1404170393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1435 GMT 14 Apr 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Apr—Admiral Igor Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Russian Navy, issued a statement today, as an ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed in the navy press center. The statement says that in recent speeches by Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, "one and the same goal has been followed—the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is taking up a position to completely destabilize relations between Ukraine and Russia and unilaterally repeal the Yalta and Dagomys agreements." According to Admiral Kasatonov, this is a matter of "the physical elimination of the Black Sea Fleet." Such an unambiguous position by the Ukrainian ministry, in his opinion, "cannot be viewed other than as provocative in character." "Evidently a calm and businesslike tone in discussions of the problems of the fleet on the basis of previously achieved agreements does not suit the Ukrainian defense minister," the statement notes.

In the opinion of Admiral Kasatonov, Ukraine forgets that "ignoring the situation which has arisen and stirring up nationalist hysteria around the question of the future of the Black Sea Fleet may lead to the most unpredictable consequences, all responsibility for which will be borne exclusively by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry."

Commentator Urges 'Unhurried' START II Debate

PM1404092193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by political scientist Sergey Kazennov: "Cuts Without Trust?"]

[Text] The START II Treaty has been generating different responses during its debate in the Supreme Soviet. Some people claim that it increases Russia's military security, while others take a diametrically opposite view. The same variety of opinions is apparent regarding the economic consequences of the agreement.

I think, though, that during any examination of the START II Treaty—like other similar documents—attention should be drawn to two factors. The first is the "autonomous" importance of the treaty in light of the strategic nuclear arms race and disarmament. Unfortunately, thanks to our own and Western specialists, this

problem has of late been reduced to simplified "star wars" computer games—who can "cover" whom how many times. This approach has pushed into the background the second but no less important, if not more important factor: how the treaty fits into the overall picture of current and future Russo-U.S. relations.

This "political" aspect is currently very painful for us. I think this is because talks on defense problems used to take place within a foreign and domestic political situation that was far more stable for the USSR. They were not associated with the wholesale reduction of military strength, the collapse of the state and unified armed forces, the growth of new military threats, or the very uncertain nature of future relations with other countries.

In the current situation we have to try to "calm the waters" [dut na vodu], as they say. All the more so as there is plenty of reason to. After all, the main background problem to the debate on the START II Treaty is whether it is a treaty between partners or between geopolitical opponents. Are we going to delude ourselves about America's role in destroying not a "communist empire" but a great power that had been known as the USSR for the past seven decades? It is now clear that this policy of theirs was shortsighted and damaging, because of the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons and the destabilization of the world as a whole.

U.S. approaches have been unconstructive in other areas too. Iraq—first it was not monitored, scenarios were not worked out, and then a "storm" had to be raised. They failed to understand the Balkans and plunged into another Yugoslav crisis, which will now take some untangling. They have been cramped in their African policy, uncertain in southern Asia, and found the negotiating process in the Near East deadlocked. That is the "infallibility" of U.S. geopolitics for you! Can it be trusted? Does it have any concept of a world order at all—or just a desire to impose belated and often erroneous strong-arm solutions? And if there is such a concept, is it in line with Russian interests?

As for us, how many times has A. Kozyrev himself "apologized" for the dilettantism of the current Russian Foreign Ministry, admitting that decisions reached and recommendations made—even regarding Yugoslavia—have not been "ideal." His "clowning" in Stockholm, which was in no way worthy of the foreign minister of a great power, is still remembered. Nor have people forgotten the statements to the effect that Russia has no national interests. So why should we believe him when he says that the Russian Foreign Ministry's work on this treaty, signed in terrible haste, was the best of all possible options?

Nothing in this respect changes the official support for the START II Treaty from the Russian Defense Ministry. The Army is too involved in its own problems and highly dependent on ruling politicians for its views and decisions.

The Russian parliament has been criticized for wanting to link the START II Treaty to the entire range of Russo-U.S. relations. But this practice of linkage exists worldwide—it has been repeatedly employed in the U.S. Congress.

And the supposed "irreproachability" of the START II Treaty from the military-technical and economic standpoints cannot overshadow the serious problems that exist in Russian-U.S. relations. In this respect it is extremely important to clarify the role that the "world community" and, primarily, the United States intend Russia to play now and in the future. Will these be relations between a metropolis and a raw-materials colony, between senior and junior partners, or between potential allies in achieving stability and justice in the world? Judging by the Washington administration's open interference in Russia's internal affairs, America is clearly leaning toward the first option.

Yet there should be clarity on this issue. After all, nobody would dream of calculating "parities" in warheads between France and the United States. For all their complexities, their relations are those of partners and allies. If relations between Russia and America were different (the "fraternization" between the top establishment on both sides does not count—they have long enjoyed complete mutual understanding), we would not now be having to analyze the correlation between rivets on Russian and U.S. missile casings. People distrust each other not because they are armed, U.S. President R. Reagan liked to say; they are armed because they distrust each other.

That is why America's attitude to the nature of Russian reforms and to current Russian power structures is of paramount importance for the fate of START II. There is no need to make any secret of the fact that the START II Treaty has to a certain extent become hostage to Russian contradictions—or, rather, to the differing views of Russia's foreign and domestic policy and to the holders of those views. So it is no secret that A. Kozyrev's continuation in the post of foreign minister will merely create additional problems for the START II Treaty in the Russian Supreme Soviet.

And the Russian parliament should not be made out to be a monster that is allegedly undermining the foundations of Russian-U.S. relations. We recall the fuss and the convulsions that accompanied the last accords before the signing of the START II Treaty. Quite simply this had absolutely nothing to do with the interests of Russian-U.S. ties. G. Bush was trying to solve his own problems in a desire for a "grand exit" in the halo of triumphant peacemaker, and B. Yeltsin was also trying to solve his own problems. He is essentially copying to the letter M. Gorbachev's approach—the more lamentable things are inside the country, the greater the desire to please people "over there."

People overseas seem now to be starting to grasp the fact that shock reforms mean "universal" political and military destabilization for Russia, which is clearly not in the interests of the United States itself. But, at the same time, America officially continues to toast B. Yeltsin as the main standard-bearer of those reforms.

I believe that for this reason the fate of the START II Treaty and the speed with which it proceeds through the Russian parliament could be two different things. And it is hardly necessary to raise in a tough and confrontational manner the question of expediting ratification of the treaty or rejecting it from the outset. There is a third way too—to "make haste slowly" while the interested forces and life itself bring the necessary clarity to this exceptionally crucial affair. The fate of the fatherland's nuclear shield is too important in itself. It cannot be allowed to fall victim to the wholesale measures that have been typical in recent years of the sphere of cuts in and redeployments [peremeshcheniye] of Soviet and Russian Armed Forces.

Perhaps we need to pause in the process of debating the treaty until the current U.S. Administration really works out and demonstrates its "new course" in relation to Russia and its interests, and until politicians take the helm in our country who are responsible, upright, and patriotic professionals.

Admittedly, people are trying to convince us that it is Russia that should hasten to ratify the START II Treaty. Allegedly it alone needs the treaty—it would have to unilaterally cut its obsolescent missile armaments anyway. It is supposedly better to do so in conjunction with the United States. It this actually the case? The West is no less interested, and is actually even more interested than we are in radical cuts—particularly now, at a time of total destabilization and in the context of sharply increased unpredictability in the actions of certain world political entities. In nuclear terms today's world is more explosive owing to the collapse of the USSR and the growth of nuclear instability within its borders.

The opponents of an "unhurried" and cautious approach to Russia's examination of the START II Treaty reasonably point to the fact that, in this event, the United States could express its dissatisfaction in the most varied and—for Russia—highly painful forms. Yes, it could. In this game of cards, unfortunately, the cards have already been dealt—and most of the "trump cards" are held by America. But "most" does not yet mean "all." Even over there people should realize that games aimed at destabilizing and wounding Russia—let alone games over the nuclear magazines—will inevitably boomerang on those who concocted them.

Commentator Asserts START II Terms 'Patently Unequal'

PM1404081593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by Colonel (Reserve) V. Dmitriyev, former delegation expert at the Soviet-U.S. START talks: "To the Fatherland's Detriment"]

[Text] The United States currently has approximately twice as many nuclear warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles as Russia. (The United States has 13,706, Russia 7,700). Further cuts in these arms are envisaged by the START II Treaty.

1. The treaty requires a radical change in the structure of Russian strategic offensive weapons, brought about by the specifics of our military and geographic conditions. ICBM's and MIRVed warheads—including heavy versions which have immense potential for overcoming ABM defenses, are virtually invulnerable to conventional weapons, and are highly effective in a retaliatory strike—are to be eliminated. Missile-carrying submarines, which will be very expensive and highly vulnerable given the U.S. development [sozdaniye] of a global monitoring system, are to constitute the main arsenal. Powerful conventional naval forces and the deployment of highly complex backup systems will be required to ensure their survivability, and this is something that Russia will clearly be unable to afford in the foreseeable future. In other words, spending on strategic offensive weapons will have little effect.

The restructuring of Russia's strategic offensive weapons within the framework of the treaty will require the costly deployment of more than 600 single-warhead ICBM's at a time when a huge quantity of reliable and effective systems will be being cut.

2. The accord permits cuts in weapons [boyezaryad] by means of the simple removal of part of the warhead from the missile. The consequences of such cuts are clearly destabilizing, since the warheads would be stockpiled and could be rapidly replaced were the international situation to deteriorate. And U.S. capabilities under such a buildup would be substantially greater (Russia with 2,000 weapons, the United States with 4,000).

3. The treaty does not in practice impede implementation of the U.S. program for the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), in which the United States has a clear advantage. (It plans to deploy up to 4,000 such missiles, whereas Russia hardly has more than 100-200).

4. The terms of the treaty allow the Americans not to count 95 state-of-the-art B-1B strategic bombers capable of carrying 1,520 nuclear weapons. The one-sidedness of this condition was determined by the virtual nonexistence of any modern strategic aircraft in Russia (the 15 Tu-160 heavy bombers are located on Ukrainian territory).

For these reasons, the actual correlation of the sides' strategic nuclear potentials following the arms cuts could be 1:(1.7-2.4) [as published] in favor of the United States. This correlation of forces will allow the Americans to exert pressure that could have very dangerous consequences during a deterioration in the international situation.

Moreover, the patently unequal nature of the treaty will to all intents and purposes lead to the undermining of Russia's strategic might.

Stepashin, Germany's Ruehe Discuss Nuclear Security, START

OW1404140093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1343 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian army will not be used "by the political forces for settling the current political crisis," Chairman of the Russian parliament's Committee for Defense and Security Sergey Stepashin and Russia's First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin confirmed during their talks in Moscow with German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe.

Stepashin told INTERFAX that the talks dealt with control over the strategic nuclear weapons. The Russian delegation stated that "technically, there is no danger of nuclear weapons being used by Russia or other CIS countries without prior consultations." The talks also dealt with the servicing of the nuclear facilities in Ukraine, as Kiev has no specialists in this field, while "permanent control by Russian experts has become complicated." To quote Stepashin, "the recent political developments in Russia have slowed down the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue in this field." The two parties also discussed the possibility of increasing the participation of Russian military bodies in peace-keeping efforts, including the peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia.

In May 1993, during the session of the North Atlantic Assembly, to be held in Germany, Russia intends to discuss its gradual integration into the system of European collective security, said Stepashin.

Asked about prospects for the ratification of the START-2 Treaty by the Russian parliament, Stepashin said that although the committee had to suspend the parliamentary hearings on the issue pending the referendum, the discussion would be continued. "A professional approach must gradually supplant momentary considerations," he said. "Every deputy should think about the losses which Russia may suffer if this treaty is not ratified," he added.

Ruehe, Grachev Comments on Yugoslavia

PM1504103393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 93 p 3

[Report by Sergey Sidorov: "Press Conference at the Russian Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] "Russia strictly adheres to the schedule for the withdrawal of its troops from Germany, and Germany honors its commitments as regards financing the withdrawal," Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, declared at a meeting with journalists following talks with his German counterpart Volker Ruehe. "The soldiers departing from Germany must leave with dignity—this would be the main investment in future Russian-German relations," Ruehe emphasized in his statement.

During their talks, the two countries' defense ministers signed an agreement on cooperation in the military sphere. Speaking of its main aspects, Army Gen. P. Grachev singled out the exchange of information on questions of security, arms control, and cooperation in the spheres of military law and cadre training.

According to the FRG minister of defense, considerable attention at the talks was devoted to examining "crisis situations in Europe." In this context, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent asked the minister to appraise the situation in the Balkans and the prospects for settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

Minister V. Ruehe noted in particular the dangerous trend toward "Islamicizing" the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and condemned the practice of "ethnic cleansing." In his opinion, the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan could slow down the expansion of the crisis. The German minister emphasized that guaranteeing the rights of ethnic minorities in former Yugoslavia would be of utmost importance for Europe's future. Minorities, including Germans in Russia and Poland, V. Ruehe said, can and must play the role of bridges.

For his part, Army Gen. P. Grachev expressed commitment to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis exclusively by political means and emphasized the restrained approach toward operations to close the air space above Bosnia and Herzegovina now being carried out by NATO forces.

"This is attributable to the fact that we foresee the possible negative consequences of the use of combat helicopters, including the danger of involving foreign troops in the civil war," P. Grachev said.

According to Army Gen. P. Grachev, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense does not plan to increase the numerical strength of the Russian contingent in the UN forces in Yugoslavia; he considers the presence of one battalion to be adequate. As regards the possibility of Russian military aircraft dropping humanitarian cargo to the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this question is at the discussion stage.

FRG Minister of Defense V. Ruehe, who is on an official visit to Russia, visited a motorized rifle brigade in the Moscow Military District 14 April. The German visitor saw for himself the Russian servicemen's living conditions and attended technical study exercises.

Khasbulatov Said to Alter Makeup of Yugoslav Delegation

OW1404143993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1340 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov had reshuffled the delegation of Russian parliamentarians, who began their official tour of former Yugoslav republics on Wednesday [14 April], INTERFAX learned from the secretariat of the Parliamentary Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations.

In particular, the speaker prevented Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry experts from accompanying the delegation. He crossed out of the list of delegates at different stages the names of several MPs such as Nikolay Arzhannikov, the Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, and Sergey Sirotkin, a member of that committee.

Ambartsumov Opposes Tougher Sanctions on Serbia

LD1404165193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1618 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Apr—A Russian Supreme Soviet delegation, which has set off on a visit to the former Yugoslav republics, arrived in Zagreb, capital of Croatia, today.

The Russian parliamentarians intend to have consultations with all the sides involved in the Yugoslav crisis and to contribute in any way they can to the search for ways toward resolving it. Following its stay in Zagreb, the delegation, headed by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, plans to visit Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Pristina, as well as the Russian battalion which is part of the UN forces in Croatia.

Replying to journalists' questions following his arrival, Ambartsumov expressed a negative attitude to the plans to toughen sanctions against Serbia. He stated that a political dialogue is the only possble way to achieve a settlement of the conflict.

Deferment of UN Sanctions Vote Said Unrelated to Referendum

OW1404191793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1838 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Moscow's wish to get the Security Council to delay a resolution on tougher sanctions against the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) until April 26 is not linked to Russia's referendum the day before, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy told a news briefing for Russian reporters in Moscow on Wednesday [14 April].

He said members of the Russian Unity faction who were concerned about "the President's seat" more than the Yugoslav problem were deliberately seeking to try to link the two questions. Yastrzhembskiy said there was neither cunning nor diplomatic game in foreign ministry actions.

Director of the Department for International Agencies Aleksandr Gorelik said that, strictly speaking, Russia was going it alone in seeking the resolution's delay, but it was largely due to U.S understanding of Russia's argument and a new spirit of partnership that Moscow had finally got the resolution being postponed until April 26.

Gorelik made it clear that the Russian government was still undecided whether it would accept all of the draft resolution's points.

For his part, the deputy in charge of the ministry's third European department Aleksey Nikiforov said Moscow could not say with total certainty whether the Bosnian Serbs would agree to the Vance-Owen plan during a breathing space before April 26, but it would be wrong not to see that certain progress was made. He said the Serbs were ready to cede a large part of the territory under their control as part of compromise.

On the chance of arrival in Moscow by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadjic, Nikiforov said this would be untimely at the moment. "I would welcome his arrival after he signs the Bosnian peace plan", said the Russian diplomat.

Official Says Yugoslav Peace Process at 'Key Point'

LD1404191793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1629 GMT 14 Apr 93

[by ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Apr—The process of settling the Yugoslav crisis has reached "a key point." Either peacemaking operations based on the Vance-Owen plan are going to start, or it should be acknowledged that the process is at an impasse, something that is fraught with the most serious consequences—particularly the spreading of the crisis into the southern Balkans. This appraisal of the current state of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was given by senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry at a briefing for Russian journalists chaired by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the ministry's information and press department.

In the diplomats' view, the Vance-Owen settlement plan "was close" to being adopted recently. Bosnian Serbs accept its provisions, though not all of them. Talks, "although very difficult," are in progress, and their potential has not been exhausted, which makes a successful outcome possible. The well-known resolution of

the UN Security Council on a no-fly zone over Bosnia came into force last Monday; "a fragile truce" is being maintained there, and international contacts with the sides are continuing. It is against this background that the Security Council has tabled a new resolution strengthening sanctions against the present-day Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (It was to have been examined last Monday but was postponed till 26 April).

The Russian side's position was earlier made absolutely clear: it believes that the Security Council should not table for discussion such "explosive" resolutions for the time being. In connection with this, the draft document prepared by France and other co-authors was, in a certain sense, a "surprise" for Russia.

In the present conditions, when not all opportunities offered by the talks process have been exhausted and when there is a chance that an agreement can be reached, discussion of additional sanctions is inappropriate, the diplomats believe.

With regard to the Security Council's deferment of the resolution, Yastrzhembskiy termed assertions that the deferment was linked to the 25 April Russian referendum "groundless." "This is a completely artificial deduction; the delay was in no way determined by Russia's internal problems," he stressed. "When we suggest delaying the sitting of the Security Council, this has to do first and foremost with the development of events around Yugoslavia. The Russian referendum was not a factor during talks at the Security Council." While there is no assurance that a "breakthrough" in the crisis will now be achieved, there have been some positive developments, and we must use all opportunities to achieve a political settlement, he stressed.

Yastrzhembskiy also said the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not initiate the invitation to Moscow of Bosnian Serb Leader Karadzic, calling the visit "untimely" given the current "intricate and difficult moment" in settling the crisis. The invitation came from Russian Supreme Soviet deputies, deputies of a "certain tendency," and had very specific political goals, he said.

Churkin Meets With Milosevic, Karadzic, Cosic

LD1404194593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1902 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[Text] Belgrade April 14 TASS—Vitaliy Churkin, the Russian president's special representative and deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, conducted a regular round of talks with the leadership of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade today. During his meetings with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic, all parties concerned continued to search for the ways of resolving the Bosnian conflict on the basis of the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Vitaliy Churkin also had a short consultative meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton's special envoy on former Yugoslavia Reginald Bartholomew to discuss peace efforts.

The situation remains complicated but we do not lose the hope that we will manage to find a way out and not allow the turbulent stream of events to carry us away to a whirlpool of a big conflict the threat of which is still existing both in Bosnia and on the Balkans as a whole, the Russian diplomat told ITAR-TASS.

Now the Bosnian Serbs are facing the most difficult choice for whom the Vance-Owen plan is creating certain problems. They should find enough courage to make extremely difficult decisions, once again analyse the situation and clearly formulate what is really most important to them, and give up secondary issues. Then, I believe, a decision can be found after additional elaboration with co-chairmen of the peace process and other sides. I am not losing the hope that such a settlement can be achieved in the near future, the Russian deputy foreign minister pointed out.

In reply to a question about the results of his meeting with Reginald Bartholomew and the possibility of advancing any new proposals by U.S. President's special envoy, Vitaliy Churkin said that it was not a matter of putting any new Russian, American or joint initiative at the present time. There is the Vance-Owen peace plan now which is creating serious problems for Bosnian Serbs. I am trying to find a way of resolving these problems which could satisfy co-chairmen and other sides—Moslems and Croatians, and, of course, Bosnian Serbs. If their proposals and needs are not taken into consideration, though to a minimal degree, there will be no agreement, the Russian diplomat stressed.

Moscow Plans No Increase in Yugoslav Contingent

LD1504081793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry is not planning to increase the size of the Russian contribution to the UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, according to Defense Minister Pavel Grachev at a meeting with journalists in Moscow. He noted that the presence of one battalion was sufficient. The minister said the Yugoslav crisis must be resolved by exclusively political means, and he stressed the restrained approach by NATO air forces in the operation to close down the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina

Commentary Views Nuclear Cooperation With Iran

NC1504082993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Persian 1330 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Vladimir Pronin commentary]

10

[Text] Yesterday, the Iranian Majles ratified the pact on cooperation with Russia in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Our commentator Vladimir Pronin writes in relation to this:

Dear listeners, the Russian-Iranian pact on the peaceful use of atomic energy was signed during the official visit by Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Moscow in July 1989. Now this document has become law after being ratified by the Majles.

It is too soon to view the discussions on this pact in the Russian Parliament, but it is very likely that this document will not meet serious opposition by Russian deputies.

This pact is very significant for Iran. The West's seven industrial countries have boycotted the export to Iran of technology that the seven believe might be used to manufacture nuclear arms.

Understandably, under such conditions, Tehran shows great interest in cooperating with Russia and other countries in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Incidentally, in tandem with the Iranian-Russian pact, the Iranian Majles also approved a similar pact with the People's Republic of China.

During his recent visit to Tehran, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev pointed out that nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran should not cause Western countries particular concern. This cooperation is strictly within the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and will be under the constant supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

Russia knows the West's suspicions about the peaceful nature of Tehran's nuclear programs. But, expressing its wish to cooperate with Iran on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Russia relied not on probabilities, but on realities. These are that Tehran has not stated a wish to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Repeated inspections of nuclear installations in Iran by IAEA inspectors have revealed no violations that might be seen as a sign that Iran is avoiding its commitments.

Now that the Iranian Majles has approved a 10-point pact on cooperation with Russia on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we can confidently say that this pact will remove any doubt about the strictly peaceful nature of this cooperation. Within its framework, Russia will deliver two nuclear reactors with a capacity of 440 megawatts for a nuclear power plant in Iran. As Vice President Reza Amrollahi, who also heads the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said, the production of electricity is the main goal of Iran's nuclear program. According to Amrollahi, 10 years ago, [words indistinct] and Russia, with its rich experience in this field, could extend real assistance to Iran.

Zorkin Speaks on Referendum at Meeting With U.S. Group

PM1304130893 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Apr 93 First Edition p 7

[ITAR-TASS report under the general heading: "Official Meetings: Foreign Guests in Moscow"]

[Text] "It is necessary to submit to the will of the people in a referendum; I see no other option," Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin said yesterday at a meeting of Constitutional Court judges and a U.S. Congress delegation. At the same time he voiced the fear that interpreting the results of the referendum might lead to political confrontation.

Valeriy Zorkin rejected the idea that today's fundamental law is the "Brezhnevian Constitution." "It contains all the fundamental principles inherent in the constitutions of all civilized countries, but also contains elements that bear witness to its origins," he stressed.

When asked about the advisability of adopting a new Constitution, Valeriy Zorkin noted that a "new better Constitution is never an impediment, but there is the question of when and at what price."

Political Issues

Yeltsin Holds News Conference in Kremlin 14 Apr

LD1504004893 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1545 GMT on 14 Apr

[News conference with President Boris Yeltsin; moderated by press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov; with foreign and domestic correspondents in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] [Yeltsin] Esteemed journalists, much is being written in the mass media about the referendum. Indeed, there is just a few days left, and so I deemed it necessary to meet you face to face, without mediators and interpreters.

The principal question that has to be answered is what is the point of the referendum. What made the president turn to the citizens of the Russian Federation at this difficult moment of Russia's history? Why did the majority at the Congress not dare to bury the referendum once again, even though they do not need it, and moreover, it is dangerous for them? The first reason is that the political crisis has been exacerbated to the limit. It has reached an extremely dangerous point, a point from which it can easily fall into an abyss. Outwardly, this is manifested in central authorities in the country—the legislature and the executive, the president, the government, the Congress, the Supreme Soviet—falling out among themselves, unable to come to any agreement. But in reality, everything is much deeper and more serious.

In essence, it is a confrontation between two irreconcilable positions with regard to Russia's past, present, and future. This is where the main crisis lies. It is not about Yeltsin and Khasbulatov.

Economic reform has brought us all to the point where a decision ought to be made on a crucial issue in the life of society, the issue of property.

The old system, firmly rooted in the apparatus of officialdom and previous structures, does not wish to let go of it and does not want to yield ownership to the citizens of Russia. The farther this confrontation goes, the harder and more devious it becomes. It literally paralyzes all the efforts of the presidency and structures of executive power.

Congresses of deputies gather together more and more often for counteraction. The congresses endlessly write and rewrite the long-suffering Russian Constitution. The congresses have literally drowned the Constitutional Court in issues of current politics.

The opponents of reform declare that they know precisely what to do, how to organize Russia's life, but the prescriptions that are offered us are well-known. Russia was treated with them for more than 70 years and was treated to death.

If we return to that road, the results can be summed up: Russia is finished, it can be written off: world development, world politics, and economy, world balance of forces.

Let all who consider themselves patriots of Russia think on this. The referendum is necessary in order to reject forever that ruinous path.

The Russians' right to do this is constitutionally enshrined in the form of the all-people's vote. I believe that the citizens of Russia will be able, behind the crafty wording of the questions that the Congress thought up, understand what choice they are making and for what they are really voting. I believe this test of civic maturity will be won.

Our country is at the very beginning of its transformations. So far not much has been done, but we have nevertheless advanced forward on the road of democracy and freedom. The life of the majority of our compatriots is not easy, it is even excruciating. The rise in prices, the disorganization of everyday life, crime, and backwardness have become the reality of our days, but this is not all. People are quickly becoming accustomed to freedom, to independence. They have shaken off their fear and are gaining dignity. There is no humiliation now.

I was in the Kuzbass yesterday. People told me plainly that they did not experience that humiliation when they go shopping, from long queues and empty shelves. Although, of course, prices are seriously biting.

Today I am convinced that our freedom will no longer fit the totalitarian past. The yoke can be placed on man again only with the aid of unlimited, inhuman force, only with the aid of unprecedented repression, but even they will not turn back history. I believe that all together we will not permit that.

Now about the questions which are being put to referendum: I will say plainly that the Congress which ratified them...[pauses, talking and laughter in background] I will say right away that the Congress that ratified them did everything to conceal the true scale and significance of the choice being made.

The first question of the referendum on confidence in the president of Russia. I understand it this way: first of all, it is a question of confidence in a man whom in 1991 the Russians, for the first time in history, themselves elected to the country's supreme state office.

Yes, there have been mistakes in my work as president, but on the other hand, much has been done in that time. Even though with difficulties, the country is nonetheless transferring to market economy, to a normal federal system, to compliance with state interests and the needs of society, to one law for the people and the authorities. Everyone can see the difficulties of the transition. Everyone realizes that this is a task for years and decades. I see my aim in advancing these processes as far forward as possible. It is Russia's citizens who are to judge my performance as head of state. Let every citizen of Russia assess, think, and determine whether I should carry the burden of reform any further or not.

There is another aspect in this question. I refer to the attitude to the institution of presidency in Russia. One can often hear that the presidency is not in line with Russia's traditions, that a general presidential election is an excess, that even if the post is to be preserved, the president should be elected by the Congress or by parliament. I should like Russia's citizens to bear this in mind too when they answer the first question at the referendum. I admit that I count on Russian people to confirm their trust [in me], but the reason I need it is not to retain my seat as president.

My concern is not my personal fate, but the fate of the reforms and transformation in our country. I need the trust of Russian citizens, not for the sake of staying in my post, but for the sake of the cause.

The scheme behind tabling it for the referendum is simple. By speculating on the real difficulties and inevitable mistakes of the initial stage of reform, to discredit the president and the government, and the executive power, in the eyes of the people.

Reform is the only true way to a normal society; it cannot happen without a healthy economy. The old system of administration has been a failure. This was realized even by party leaders when they risked embarking on perestroyka because they could see no other way. But a healthy market economy must be based on private ownership of land, on the privatization of a considerable part of state property, and on a monetary system that works.

In January of last year, we embarked upon the most difficult job—the political and economic reorganization of Russia. Its consequences—and mistakes—can already be seen. The main thing is that too often there was hesitation, too much stepping backward. As a result, the tempo of the reforms slowed down appreciably. Prices were released from administrative diktat. The mortal grip of a general deficit of goods [tovarnyy defitsit] became noticeably weakened, but high, open inflation has taken the place of a total deficit [totalnyy defitsit] [sentence as heard].

It is having an effect on people's prosperity and holding back production. It is devaluing money, the wages and savings of citizens. It is making investment in industry unprofitable. Being the middleman is becoming the most attractive area of business.

Our main problem is the battle against inflation, and we will deal with it. I have already given the figures, when I was speaking to the students, but you may not all have heard them. The monthly inflation indices this year are: January 27 percent, February 25 percent, March 17 percent. The most interesting is March: whereas it was 5.6 percent in the first five days, in the final five days it was 2.6 percent. That is, the trend is perfectly evident.

Of course, for the time being, curbing inflation can only slow down the price increases a little. There is one conclusion: we must act more consistently and strictly and then we will resolve this problem, which means stabilizing the standard of living.

Now, finally, after long disputes, you know that we have agreed with the Central Bank on the level of emission. This matter is being firmly resolved by the two bodies, the government and the Central Bank, and a document is being drawn up. This level is not more than 30 percent, it will therefore be half that of last year.

Wide-scale privatization is under way in the country. In one year, 60,000 private enterprises and 5,000 joint-stock companies have sprung up. There has been no drop in output. Conversion is gathering pace. It is unprecedented in scale, and has so far been proceeding with difficulties. But contrary to pessimistic forecasts, conversion has caused neither massive job losses, nor social catastrophe and I am certain that it will not cause either. We actually discussed this issue yesterday, with regard to Kuzbass. There, at the enterprises where defense industry products used to account for 70 to 80 percent of their output, the figure is now down to 3, 4, 5, or 6 percent.

There is a myth circulating in the country at present, and the time has come to dispel it. I refer to the so-called avalanche slump in production. I have already mentioned the fact that there has been no slump in the past few months, with the exception of January, when there was a drop, but in February and March output stabilized again.

At the same time, we have yet to formulate a legal basis necessary for a stable market economy in Russia, for supporting enterprise in Russia. There are, of course, objective difficulties that very much hinder our progress, but there are also reasons of a different kind.

To a large extent, it is the legislature that is responsible for the hardships associated with reforms. Despite the fact that millions of signatures of the Russian people were collected, the Supreme Soviet has not enacted any regulations relating to private ownership of land. Soviets in the provinces are putting artificial obstacles in the way of allocating land to individuals.

Yesterday, there were also masses of questions on this question of division of land.

Whatever things have been like, in the year a substantial amount of economic transformations have been carried out and there is a basis for getting out of the crisis. There will not be a second shock like the one that has taken place, especially in the first half of last year. We are entering a more moderate, assured, consistent, predictable stage of implementation of the transformations. The main task will be ensuring due order alike in the economy and in society as a whole. Consequently the burden on the state will grow. The confidence of the electors in the president and government is necessary in order to implement a number of urgent measures.

The Russian market economy desperately needs a stable legislative and normative basis and so the ministries and government and Supreme Soviet alike must put in some work here.

Now we can and must boost the reforms from below, in the localities, and give its first tangible results directly to the citizens.

First and foremost, this concerns the property issue, giving it a legal structure as quickly as possible, giving state guarantees of the right to private property and protecting it against officials and mafia structures, providing the opportunity for it to be used effectively in support of small businesses.

We must keep state finances away from the disruption of inflation, because this is the guarantee of real, and not paper, prosperity for the Russians. Everyone who wishes to test themselves in independent business will get support. This means simplifying the setting up procedures, the allocation of land, and access to state capital. A decree has been prepared prohibiting state bodies from demanding any more paperwork and documents than the established legal minimum. We will guarantee the interests of the largest number of those taking part in the market, the immense army of consumers. This means state support for consumer societies, which frequently are more effective than state bodies in exposing monopolists and those producing sub-standard goods.

The battle against economic crime is to be stepped up, from toughening up sentences for racketeering to bringing in criminal liability for concealing hard currency earnings abroad. All this will require a redistribution of financial resources in favor of those state bodies responsible for the lives and property of citizens and ensuring law and order.

We have to raise the prestige and material welfare of militia, the staff of the procuracy, and judges. This work is now under way. Interior Ministry bodies and administrative bodies in the provinces will be reinforced by demobilized officers. The state will ensure that they are retrained and receive solid financial support to resettle in new places. A package of measures will be enacted to legalize the position of assets, including housing and plots of land, used and owned by citizens, without any complicated legal procedures or levies on the part of the state. All plots of land now being used by citizens will be recognized as property.

All citizens of Russia will also be able to exercise their right to have a plot of land by means of land privatization checks, which will be introduced. Tough measures will be taken to sort out customs, currency, and credit relations with the former Soviet Republics. I would note that the exodus of Russian goods in exchange for rubles obtained from Russia now accounts for roughly one-third of all inflation.

We need a strong social policy. It can only be based on a healthy economy and an increase in material resources, including financial ones. The efforts of the president and the government are directed at this. A yes answer to the second referendum question will make it possible to continue the policy of economic reform, purged of mistakes, and adjusted in the manner which I have outlined.

The third referendum question refers to early presidential elections. It overlaps the first question; therefore, I will refrain from comment and move on to the fourth question.

However, before I do so, I will repeat the moral position that I have stated before. I believe that a yes answer should be given to all four questions. This is my personal, moral viewpoint, but it is up to citizens to decide how they are going to vote. It is also up to the organizations that are going to campaign to decide how precisely they go about this.

The fourth question refers to early parliamentary elections. Were the original bolsheviks wrong in opposing parliamentarism in all its forms but, at the same time, calling for all power to the soviets?

I do not think so. The soviets were one of the reliable instruments used to impose a dictatorial regime. It was through the soviets, and thanks to them, that the Bolsheviks' policy was enforced in Russia. This was party dictatorship. No Parliament would ever have allowed them to do this. After all, Parliaments have clearly delineated powers. They can only operate effectively when there is a real separation of powers. The principle underlying the working of the Soviets is omnipotence and monopoly power.

We need a completely different mechanism of representative power at a time when market relations are developing on the basis of private ownership, when regions are winning ever greater economic independence. Today's soviets, both on a federal and a regional level, are imitating the old bolshevik model. Whenever there is a dispute or contradiction, the other side must be destroyed. Since March last year, the Congress of People's Deputies has been used exclusively as a battering-ram for attacks, first on a reforming Government, then on the pernicious entourage supposed to be surrounding the president and, finally, on the institution of presidential power itself.

We have observed similar processes in the republics and regions of Russia. The recent developments in Mordovia are a vivid example of this. Preparations are under way in the Mari republic and in other regions. If they succeed, then the political freedoms and the citizens' economic independence which have been achieved through great effort, will become the next target for attack.

At the moment, soviets at all levels are trying to strengthen their positions at the expense of executive bodies. Russia's history has shown before that this means concentration of power in the hands of some third force. What sort of force is it going to be, a new CPSU or

another organization? We can only guess. Already it is evident that the all-powerful soviets—which are at the same time powerless, i.e. only capable of running the country through voting—will by all means claim to be such a force. Therefore, a yes vote on the fourth question means supporting deep-going reform of the system of representative power in Russia, and one involving all levels at that. This will make it possible to create a strong legislative power in the country.

Esteemed media workers! Through you, I am addressing all Russian nationals. Make your choice, vote on your own behalf, for the sake of our children and of our country. By voting at the referendum, you will not just express your attitude to a constitutional, law-governed, and democratic future for Russia, but will also make a real contribution to building it up. I also believe that those who have not made up their minds yet will also come and voice their opinion. After all, the referendum questions are all about what sort of country Russia is to become tomorrow. Thank you.

[Kostikov] The first question—IZVESTIYA, Vasiliy Kononenko.

[Kononenko] Boris Nikolayevich, you have spoken more than once lately on the need to adopt a new Constitution. Taking into account all the past events, the congresses and the situation in the country, could you please list its main tenets and principles as you see them and tell us in what way this constitution could be adopted? Thank you.

[Yeltsin] I consider it to be the central issue, because the republics where reforms are being implemented—other countries, for example—and which have succeeded in promptly adopting a new, reformed constitution are now going faster along the road of reforms. They did not have any political crises.

What is the situation with our new constitution? Its role is to be a special state and political platform determining the main areas and plans for development of the Russian society, uniting and providing harmony between all constructive political forces in the country, Russia's nations and nationalities. It must be clear to everyone from the constitution what society we are progressing toward, what political and social values our society professes, what an individual can get from such a society and such a constitution. After the Congress refused—please recall that—after the Congress refused to put to vote at the referendum the draft constitution that had been worked on for almost two years, or one and a half at least—yes, one and a half—and which it had approved itself, the question arose, what should we do next?

Then an idea suggested itself to assemble Russia's best lawyers and people with special training and create a new constitution of this kind. They, too, worked for a long time, several months, and now this draft constitution has been worked out, it exists—a draft constitution based on new principles. On some of the constitution's specific features.

First of all, this is a constitution declaring human rights and freedoms in accordance with international standards. It protects the human dignity of an individual, his rights and freedoms. Along with personal rights and freedoms, personal inviolability, and security, the draft adds to the human rights section the economic freedom and ownership rights of citizens and their associations. This was not the case before.

Second, this is the constitution of a full-blooded federation, and all the nations and ethnic minorities, all the subjects of the Federation have extensive independence, sovereign rights. The upper chamber of the common federal parliament becomes a subject of the Federation.

Third, this is a constitution of developed parliamentarianism. Legislation is the exclusive right of parliament or the federal assembly. While supreme parliamentary control, including the appointment and presentation of the president, the head of government, and the supreme federal judges, is concentrated in its upper chamber, the Soviet of the Federation, the other chamber, the state duma, will concentrate in its hands the prerogatives regarding legislative work.

The functions of the two chambers are precisely separated.

Fourth, this is a constitution of stable, firm, effective state power. In accordance with the draft constitution, an efficiently operating, executive vertical structure is to be created. The government should be of great independent significance.

Fifth, this is a constitution of independent, strong justice. According to the draft constitution, law and justice capable of resisting the arbitrary rule of the authorities, of protecting human rights and freedoms, and of ensuring the law's supremacy and incontestability are to become the highest values in Russia. In keeping with the draft constitution, all three types of supreme courts—constitutional, supreme and arbitation courts—will be retained. At the same time, taking into account the experience of the last congress, to provide for a unity of justice, a supreme judicial presence is being formed, headed by the chairmen of those courts.

According to the draft, the Russian Federation is to become a presidential republic—this was decided by a popular referendum at some point in the past. Here we must reject, resolutely and categorically, ill-intentioned allegations to the effect that a presidential republic is equivalent to dictatorial rule. Presidential rule should be established in Russia, along with a democratic system, within the framework of a democratic—I stress, democratic—republic. This means, together with a well-developed parliamentarism, a well-developed system of local self-government, where human rights and freedoms are a priority and the legal system is strong. What, then, does the meaning and purpose of the institute of the presidency consist of?

In the following: in the conditions of such a vast and multinational country like the Russian Federation and especially in the present critical and sometimes explosive situation of a transitional stage when there is a great need for implementing democratic reforms in a firm manner, there is basically no other constitutional structure apart from presidential rule, which could ensure stability and effectiveness of the Russian state system.

Now, about adopting it. First of all, this draft constitution should be sent to all subjects of the Federation for consideration. Then, a Federation Council should be convened to discuss how the constitution should be adopted. There are several possibilities here—a direct referendum, a referendum on the guiding principles [referendum po printsipam], a constitutional assembly, and a federation council. This again is an interesting point and many jurists and lawyers are in favor of just this decision as the federation council is to include representatives of all federations [as heard] to whom the right to adopt the constitution will be delegated.

[Kostikov] I have here a whole package of questions connected to the possibility of a trip to Japan. You mentioned this here recently. There are questions from the newspapers ASAHI, NIHON KEIZAI from the KYODO Tsushin agency, from Voice of America. I think that we will not offend anyone from these newspapers. It is simply clear that the question to the president is this: does Boris Nikolayevich intend to go to Japan and if he does then the essence of these questions is when? What can be expected from this trip?

[Yeltsin] The possibility of making a trip, an official visit, to Japan, is now emerging since Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa has stated quite unambiguously that there will be no direct clash between the two questions, between the question of our economic cooperation and territorial questions.

As far as concerns the dates, when Kozyrev flew off to Tokyo to discuss this question, he took with him the possibility of the end of May, simply as a possible variant for discussion, but please do not misinterpret this.

[Kostikov] Vyacheslav Terekov of INTERFAX, please.

[Terekov] Boris Nikolayevich, as you have asked for advice, as well as questions, if I may, I will give two pieces of advice. Please remove the word developed from your new program, which you have just told us about—from the Constitution. I think that my colleagues will understand me and support me and that you will, too.

[Yeltsin] I fully agree.

[Terekov] The second thing. Incidentally, will the Council of the Federation include representatives not only from the republics but also from entities that are not republics but purely Russian territories of the Federation?

[Yeltsin] Of course, all 88 territories are subjects of the Federation.

[Terekov] And now my question is this: Boris Nikolayevich, you have just given us what was virtually an account of the presidential program at the present stage—an extensive, economic, and political and even juridical and legal program. But we recall a different program, that of 20 March when you spoke on television. Could you please tell us about that program—has it been consigned to history, the incipient history of our Russia, or will it find some further continuation.

[Yeltsin] Well, unfortunately the Congress did not adopt or support that program. It is understandable that it could not be adopted by such a Congress. But I consider that, nevertheless, there is much that is rational in that program and it, as they say, lived, lives, and will live, including in a new program.

[Kostikov] Boris Nikolayevich, there are several more written questions from our foreign colleagues, from the foreigners in the president's environment, connected to the fact that today, as you know, the trial of the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency opens. A correspondent from the Unita newspaper, the U.S. television company CBS—the essence of the question is: now that the passions of August 1991 have quietened down, what is your attitude toward the accused and what do you expect from the trial of the State Committee for the State of Emergency members?

[Yeltsin] I think that I do not have to make the mistake Stepankov [Russian procurator general] made when he wrote his book and beforehand, so to speak, virtually carried out a sentence. I do not have to do this. Therefore, the court decides.

It is a different matter as to what troubles me about this—the fact that from 14 to 25 [April], for 10 days, it coincides with the time when preparations are being made for the referendum and the referendum will be held. But I have the hope that there are so many questions of pure protocol before the court that they will discuss these questions for 10 days and not the essence of the matter.

[Kostikov] Russian Television Agency, Mikhail Beglov, this is the first time he is asking us a question. We give him the floor.

[Beglov] Thank you. Boris Nikolayevich, on 16 April you are flying to Minsk for what has been called an extraordinary CIS states summit meeting. What is the reason for this meeting? What will you be taking with you? What results do you expect from this meeting? Do you have concrete proposals for those taking part?

[Yeltsin] It is not entirely extraordinary. It should have happened in Yerevan, but everybody simply decided [to hold it] in Minsk. But essentially, this will be an unusual council of the heads of the republics. We decided not to put forward 15 or 20 questions for discussion, but to discuss one question: the future of the CIS. How far will we go toward integration? And when will this integration come about? Who will join this integrated community?

Everybody, or not everybody? These are the fundamental questions, practically one question.

You see, in Yerevan a question comes up right away: Azerbaijan, Baku. If we held it there, there would be a certain envy and tension. Vice versa and the same thing would happen. So we will probably take advice and change the venue for the next meeting.

[Kostikov] Here is a question from Klara Abrama from Georgia. The question is: The Sochi negotiations did not produce the expected results. Now all hope lies in the meeting between the president of Russia and the head of state of Georgia. Is such a meeting planned?

[Yeltsin] ...[pauses] Of course, the situation in Georgia is difficult. Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Adzharia, nowhere is it peaceful, and the most important thing is that these republics are making decisions about joining Russia. We do not need that, we are for Georgian integrity. Nonetheless, a war is going on.

If, let's say, I felt that Shevardnadze would provide for withdrawing his troops from Abkhazia, which were introduced there additionally, I would agree to a meeting with him.

[Krotkov] Boris Nikolayevich, my question is this. If your positions are really so irreconcilably opposed to those of the Supreme Soviet as you say, then why are some of your latest economic decisions so similar? I am thinking of the decisions to raise the minimum wage and to protect savings and some others. But if, however, the differences on the economy are not so large, then what stops you from entering into a coalition, of course not with your irreconcilable opponents, of course not with the communists, but with the center, with the Civic Union? Thank you.

[Yeltsin] In my opinion, I have entered into an alliance with them. We are already in an alliance. I have had meetings with them. There was one, there was a second. I had meetings with the leadership. A few days ago I had a meeting with a group of them—Volskiy, Vladislavlev. So, I am conducting this dialogue, and I agree with you that I must certainly conduct this dialogue with the center. The ultra, extremist, wings on the right and on the left are dangerous, but the center is normal. It occupies a position which is somewhat different from what one would like it to be but, nonetheless, one can reach agreement with them, and this is very important.

[Correspondent Zaripov] Zaripov of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Boris Nikolayevich, recalling the well-known expression: When comrades disagree, affairs do not go well. I would like to return to the referendum, it contains a question about trust in the president, but it does not say a word about his right-hand man, as he is usually in all countries. So, tell me please, if you get the four yeses you spoke about: First, how do you expect the situation to develop? What is your forecast? You must have thoughts over this question with your advisers. All the same, I had a reason for beginning with that saying because, indeed, the impression is being created that one can observe no agreement between the president and the vice president. Can you comment on this please?

[Yeltsin] Yes. Unfortunately, despite great attempts to somehow settle this question—he is most likely a centrist—he nevertheless categorically disagrees with the reforms. Well, how can a vice president work when he disagrees with the reforms pursued by the president? Perhaps it is time for him simply to make up his mind?

[Kostikov] Nikolay Tarasenko, EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN newspaper, please.

[Tarasenko] Boris Nikolayevich, we have already seen in the press that the IMF is preparing new aid programs for Russia, specifically providing credit for our reforms. There is one very interesting point: for example, it is assumed that if Russia raises its prices for oil for delivery to the former Soviet Union republics, the IMF will take upon itself a part of the expense for delivering this oil. How would you comment on that point? Thank you.

[Yeltsin] We have quite a firm intention to go over to world prices for fuel in relations between the republics of the former Soviet Union. I believe that this is correct, since we are constantly losing very large amounts on this. I was with the coalminers yesterday.

They demand that the price of coal be released—you cannot raise it. What does releasing the price of coal mean? It means raising the price of everything today by several times. Bread, milk, sausage, meat, goods, absolutely everything. It is impossible. I convinced the miners. There were about 500 people in the hall, you see. I persuaded them for a long time, that it is impossible and we will not agree to it. Not yet, at any rate.

So the question is about giving subsidies. All right, subsidies within Russia, to the republics or to some regions or other, that I can understand. Not every oblast and every region or republic can provide for itself. But why should we give subsidies to republics outside Russia? Once again you get a situation where, just as in the former Soviet Union, Russia feeds the other republics. It may be by a slightly different lever and a different method, but it is effectively the same money.

As regards the IMF proposals, this is the republics' problem. If they agree that the IMF will take a part of this world price upon itself and pay for it, let it not be from Russia's credits, but from theirs. In that case, why not?

[Kostikov] We have a lot of new newspapers, and in particular, one of the newspapers that has appeared recently is simply called HOLD THE FRONT PAGE! [Srochno v nomer, literally "into the issue urgently"]. This is the Economic Freedom Party newspaper. The question is this: Boris Nikolayevich, the multi- millionaire Kirsan Ilyumzhanov won the presidential elections in Kalmykia. A man of a completely new type has come to power: an entrepreneur, a capitalist you might say.

17

How do you assess that? What is it? Is it pure chance, or is it the beginning of a new phenomenon connected with our economic reforms?

[Yeltsin] We will have to look at that.

[Kostikov] Our colleague, please, yes, you, please.

[Osipov] Osipov, Radio Russia Information Service. Boris Nikolayevich, in your address today you set out a further two promises clearest of all: Transferring all land allotments to private property, and that there will not be a second shock. During your working visit to Kemerovo oblast yesterday, a range of oblast leaders accused you of not carrying out the promises you made earlier. What and who do you think sometimes prevents a Russian leader from fulfilling these promises, and how do you see the Russian problem of the promise and the leader as a whole?

[Yeltsin] Nobody, not one person, accused me yesterday, from six in the morning until the evening when I flew away at night, of not carrying out what I promised during the previous trip exactly two years ago in April, 30 April 1991. I carried out everything. So, are you withdrawing the question? What were you driving at? That you have been accused of...

[Osipov, interrupting] Of not fulfilling...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Nobody accused me.

[Osipov] Aman Tuleyev, chairman of the oblast executive committee, said openly to journalists that...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] I don't know.

[Kostikov] Aman Tuleyev...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] He does not say things openly. He only says things hiding somewhere. I met thousands of people. He did not say a single word, not a single word for or against.

[Kostikov] Then, if we remember Tuleyev's speech from the last congress, he accused the president of practically everything. I think there was a whole volume of accusations. Boris Nikolayevich, a case in point happened in our press recently. Tretyakov, editor in chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, wrote you a huge open letter across a whole page, and waited for an answer. No answer came. He wrote an answer himself in your name and published it in the newspaper. In general, it is a slightly unusual precedent.

A correspondent of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is present here—perhaps he can explain this to us, if he is brave enough; and second, I think he has a question to ask. [laughter]

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reporter] Yes, I am brave enough, because, despite Boris Nikolayevich's excellent relations with the media, it would be a good thing for him sometimes to give the interviews he has agreed upon beforehand. I am saying this simply to repeat the request of our editorial board and to explain some points. As for the second question, it is connected with the current state of affairs—what are your relations with the parliament now? The chairman of the parliament has introduced the term collective Rasputin, while my colleagues have introduced the term collective Imranovich [Khasbulatov's patronymic, applied to the parliament as a whole]—tags are being used. What attitude toward this should be adopted? Thanks.

[Yeltsin] I would not say that I have irreconcilable disagreements with the Supreme Soviet and so on. I did not say that in my today's speech either, please do not accuse me of it. That was not stated in my speeches. This part was read into my speech. Like yesterday, when journalists said all the time, now tell us, is the Supreme Soviet to blame for this? Is it the Supreme Soviet's fault that the miners still have not got what they ought to be getting? I told them, do not push me into further confrontation with the Supreme Soviet, do not push me!

[Correspondent Semenov] Radio Mayak, Yuliy Semenov—also Russian but not quite Russian [Radio Mayak belongs to Ostankino system]. Boris Nikolayevich, it appears that a wave of re-elections of administration heads is gaining momentum Russia-wide. These elections have different results, but what could you say about this tendency on the whole?

[Yeltsin] No, it has not grown into an avalanche. The number is the same, and has stopped at that, and now I think there will be no more [elections] before the 25th. As for the results of elections that have already taken place, well, there can be no definite answer, because what sort of elections were they and what are their results? It is impossible to characterize them, to sum them up, because one or two of them were re-elected to their posts, two or three of the people were those whom we wanted to appoint anyway; and two I think were elected somewhat unexpectedly for us. Therefore, I would not undertake to sum up the results of these elections. I think on three occasions we quickly settled the issue with the soviet—I suggested a candidate whom we know quite well, in Tyumen, for example, and they also liked him; they tabled the nomination at a session of the soviet, the soviet approved, I signed the decree.

I think this form of work is prompt, efficient, and based on mutual respect, and it offers a solution how we should act in future.

[NEWSWEEK correspondent] A question from an activist [as heard] from the American NEWSWEEK magazine. A very simple question. What do you intend to do if you lose the referendum? Have you got a plan?

[Yeltsin] Is it a simple question? [laughter] You see, I believe that we will have preterm elections in the autumn. Not in spring 1994, but in autumn 1993. That means there will be just three months left. There must not be some kind of anarchy [bezvlastiye] in that period. Therefore, until new elections are held, the president ought to continue working. Until new elections. The

elections will show. If the referendum gives support, the presidents' actions will be more resolute.

[Kostikov] Are you happy with the answer, NEWSWEEK? Thank you. Our colleague in the second row. Introduce yourself, please.

[Gurevich] Mikhail Gurevich, of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. Boris Nikolayevich, I would like to talk about winning for now. I think a situation is quite possible in which...

[Kostikov, interrupting] More slowly, please, Mikhail.

[Gurevich] A situation is entirely possible in which a referendum will give the answers the president and his team await. It is entirely possible that the Supreme Soviet immediately, on 26 April, will begin, and will put...[pauses] well, to put it mildly, will not look very kindly on it. We already know that a draft document is being worked on by the Supreme Soviet by which the first two questions will be recognized as for information only [oznakomitelnyye] and not having any juridical force. It is entirely possible that at the Tenth Extraordinary Congress, somewhere around 1 May, in the best proletarian traditions... [pauses] What will the president's actions be in this case?

[Yeltsin] The president also has prepared a whole package for 26 April if confidence is expressed. This package neutralizes such negative actions by the Supreme Soviet.

[Kostikov] Gentlemen, on the whole, we only have a little time left, so let us be ready for the fact that we are asking our final questions. Our colleague in the third row—yes, you.

[Stenverd] Stenverd, of Norwegian television. There is a third variant on 25 April, Boris Nikolayevich: A stalemate situation. What will you do if you end up in such an impasse as a result of the referendum?

[Kostikov] What do you mean by a stalemate situation?

[Stenverd] There could be a stalemate situation if the Congress claims that it has won, and you have the possibility of interpreting the result as your victory. What would actually happen in the country then?

[Yeltsin] I do not know. The Congress is not mentioned at all in the questions. There is only the re-election of parliament, the Supreme Soviet. If one supposes—developing your stalemate situation—that there would be a no to the first question about support for the president, and that there also would be a no to the fourth question on the re-election of parliament—that is no re-election of parliament and no confidence in the president—then the president would resign.

[Kostikov] Boris Nikolayevich, we already have some traditions on how we round off news conferences.

[Yeltsin] With women.

[Kostikov] Yes. [laughter] Therefore, we will have a question from our young colleague. One moment, please. Someone will bring you the microphone in a moment.

[Correspondent Kutsilo] Veronika Kutsilo from KOMMERSANT-DAILY. Boris Nikolayevich, Ruslan Khasbulatov said yesterday that he feared that the results of the ballot could be rigged. Do you have similar apprehensions, especially as the chairman of the Central Tellers' Commission is always making political statements in support of the Supreme Soviet's position? Thank you.

[Yeltsin] I have such apprehensions, and I therefore rely on the committees in support of the president, which are now being set up or, practically, have already been set up everywhere in localities. They will monitor very strictly the vote-counting procedure. I would also say on this subject that, for instance, Tuleyev came up with the following. A committee in defense of the president was set up with its own fund, naturally. The fund has a certain sum. Tuleyev said, first, that the fund had 32 million—it would be more likely, in my view, if there were just 32 rubles—and he said that it is from you, poor old people, that the president had taken away this money. You see, there will be, of course, more than enough of political speculators, especially up to 25 April. But I am used to this tough struggle, as the saying goes. Thank you.

[Kostikov] Thank you very much.

[Yeltsin] Good bye.

Council Heads 'Failed To Back' Appeal for Yeltsin

PM1404195993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 93 p 1

["Own information" report: "Council of Heads of Republics Fails To Back Yeltsin"]

[Text] We have learned from reliable sources that the overwhelming majority of participants in the 14 April Council of Heads of Republics meeting failed to back a point in its address containing an appeal to support Russian President B. Yeltsin in the coming referendum. Only two people were in favor of the point—M. Nikolayev of the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia, and V. Guslyannikov, the ex-president of Mordovia.

Yeltsin Appoints Lobov First Deputy Prime Minister

LD1504123293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1208 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin has appointed Oleg Lobov to the post of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers-government of Russia. In connection with this, Lobov has been released from his post as chairman of the Council of Experts of the president of the Russian

Federation. According to a report from the president's press service, the relevant decrees were signed by the president today.

Yeltsin Meets Democratic Organization Representatives

Organization To Propose Poll Package

OW1404195493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1840 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Public Committee of Democratic Organisations of Russia, PCDOR, plans to make a range of proposals during its meeting with President Yeltsin on Thursday [15 April]. Russian Deputy Marina Salie says the committee wants a poll to be held concurrently with the referendum on three questions: the future of the Congress of People's Deputies, a Constituent Assembly to adopt a new constitution and legislation on private ownership of the land. The democrats are also expected to offer Yeltsin a comprehensive document on guarantees of further democracy.

Salie speaking at a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [14 April] said the PCDOR also had a package of proposals on personnel policies following reports by the headquarters for preparing the referendum that many of Yeltsin's representatives and regional chief administrators were opposed to him. The committee also wants to hammer out a common position with Yeltsin on the referendum third question about early presidential elections. Yeltsin wants a Yes vote on this, but the committee prefers a No vote.

Salie believes that it is far more important to win a Yes vote on early presidential and parliamentary elections rather than the first two questions about support to Yeltsin and his reform policy.

Democratic Russia [DR] Movement Activist Mikhail Schneider told Intefax that DR had invited about 50 observers from the U.S., Germany and Japan to oversee the referendum despite objections from Chairman of the Central Election Commission Vasiliy Kazakov. He said that in the event of a commission refusal, DR would itself hand over appropriate mandates to the international observers.

Cited on Congress Resolution, Court

LD1504084393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0812 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr—Russian President Boris Yeltsin met today with Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin. The president disclosed this when he met representatives of democratic organizations in the Kremlin. "I told him that during the Congress the authority of the Constitutional Court had fallen in my eyes," the president remarked. "I will not refer anything to the Constitutional Court, and that includes the counting of referendum votes." He recalled that a group of people's deputies have appealed to the Constitutional Court. It will be heard on 20 April.

"After 20 April," Boris Yeltsin stressed, "I will issue a decree in which I will say that the Congress resolution was a flagrant violation of the Constitution and the Referendum Law, and therefore the votes must be counted in accordance with the Referendum Law." It cannot be ruled out, the president noted, that if the referendum conditions are amended, the Supreme Soviet will try to stop it from being held for purely formalistic reasons. "This must not be allowed to happen. The machine has been started. I can tell from my many trips around the country that the mood of Russia's citizens is all right," Boris Yeltsin said.

Notes 'Strained' Times, 'Implacable Opposition'

LD1504111993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Boris Yeltsin met with representatives of the public committees of democratic parties and organizations in the Kremlin today.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] We are going through the most strained time since the democratic reforms started to be implemented. Never has there been such united, implacable opposition, treachery, or as they say, such disorder and instability in the democratic movement or weariness and disillusionment among sections of the population. [end recording]

However, the reforms have become a reality. The number of entrepreneurs and private farmers is rising, becoming a middle class in Russia wanting to live in conditions of democracy and liberty. Yet the democratic movement itself, in Yeltsin's words, is continuing to operate in the old regime, still not having created a durable political bloc and, moreover, in places cohesion is subject to visible corrosion.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] The referendum is not an aim in itself. It is an essential stage in a qualitatively new political campaign, incorporating the adoption of a new Constitution and new elections. It is madness when 320 amendments are made to a constitution at one Congress. [end recording]

The president said that in two or three days' time he will be sending all subjects of the Federation, political movements, and organizations a composite draft constitution, incorporating both the Federal Treaty and the Declaration on Human Rights and the institution of the presidency. The referendum, in his words, has already been supported by the Council of Heads of the Republics.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] And we can only have one slogan: It is either us, or them. That is how it is. They will implement their threats—if we lose. [end recording]

Asks Organizations for Support

LD1504112193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1013 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr—"Since the beginning of democratic reforms, these are the most complex times we have yet had to experience and we must now face the most dangerous trial," Boris Yeltsin said at a meeting with representatives of democratic organizations at the Kremlin today. On 25 April, the Russian president noted, "We will be putting to a test not a prospective program but a real policy, the real policy of reform."

"In all countries it assumes extremely painful forms and its first positive fruit will not be evident at once by any means. And nevertheless popular support is still running high," Boris Yeltsin stressed. "I felt it everywhere when I toured the country. People want not only to vote but also to help in some way."

"The referendum," the president said, "is not an end itself. It is a necessary stage in the qualitatively new political campaign, which includes both the new constitution and the next elections." Boris Yeltsin said that in the next few days the composite draft of the constitution that has been prepared will be sent to all the subjects of the Federation, political organizations, and parties. The procedure for adopting the constitution, he said, will in many ways clarify the forthcoming referendum. "If I get the people's vote of confidence," Boris Yeltsin stressed, "my hands will be free for more energetic actions."

The president thinks that in current conditions as never before, much depends on democratic public organizations. Their great potential has, unfortunately, not been completely realized. In many respects, the democratic movement, he believes, is continuing to work in an old mode. No stable progressive political bloc geared to reform has yet been established—a bloc that could include reformist organizations of the "center." Moreover, the democratic movement has perceptibly developed rust. The parties spend time in arguing between themselves about trivialities and nuances, yet much more unites us than divides us. "Your unity, your strength," Boris Yeltsin said, addressing representatives of democratic organizations, "will be needed to fight this prolonged and hard battle. Without your political pressure on the representative power we will not be able to achieve any radical change. Instead we will ruin both reforms and Russia."

The president reminded that at the meeting of the council of heads of republics, an address was unanimously adopted to citizens of Russia urging them to take active part in the referendum. We have a chance, he said. But we have little time left. We can have just one kind of slogan: "If we do not win, they will," Boris Yeltsin said.

Will Remove Rutskoy From Agriculture

OW1504103893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1023 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Thursday [15 April], President Yeltsin told the Public Committee of Russia's Democratic Organizations that in a couple of days he would free Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy from his duties of supervisor of agriculture. He announced this news after a participant in the meeting asked him to comment on Rutskoy's statement to the effect that "in Russia private farming is a historical mistake which must be corrected."

The president's press service told INTERFAX that it had no information suggesting that Rutskoy was deprived of his chauffeur-driven car and personal doctor, or that the number of his body guards had been reduced.

Rutskoy To Remain Crime Commission Head

OW1504105193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1024 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Before April 25, Boris Yeltsin is not planning to remove Aleksandr Rutskoy from his post of chairman of the Commission for Combating Crime. "We are against sharp movements in this complicated period," Yeltsin told representatives of Russia's democratic organizations on Thursday [15 April].

At the end of the meeting, Boris Yeltsin said that the democratic movement must gain a second wind. "We shall not surrender Russia to the neo-communists," he added.

The president's Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov told INTERFAX that the "property-related" moves in relation to Rutskoy were just an attempt to bring what a vice president ought to have to a "reasonable level". He said that according to his sources, the vice president had too many Mercedez cars and an enormous suite.

The president's security service told INTERFAX that Rutskoy had not been deprived of any privileges or comforts he ought to have according to the law. Only the extras have been taken away from him, this service stated.

'Observers' Comment on Actions Against Rutskoy

LD1504103993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0915 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Vice President, Aleksandr Rutskoy was today "deprived of

his service car which provided the necessary level of personal security for him." In addition to this "his bodyguard has practically been completely cut and the post of his personal physician abolished." This was reported today by the Russian Federation vice president's press service. A press release signed by the Russian Federation vice president's councillor, Andrey Federov, which ITAR-TASS has received, stresses that all of this was done "without any reasons being explained."

Political observers link this decision with the deepening divergences in the positions of the vice president and Boris Yeltsin. So, for example, the Russian president, speaking at a news conference in Moscow yesterday, noted with regret that Aleksandr Rutskoy "categorically disagrees with the reforms," and stated that it is time for the vice president "to make up his mind." Responding then to questions from journalists on whether these words are "an invitation to resign," Boris Yeltsin said: "For ethical considerations I must not state this publicly, but to him personally, which I shall do." However, it is unlikely that today's measures taken in regard to Aleksandr Rutskoy came directly on the instructions of the Russian president, observers believe. Moreover, even the vice president's press service report does not place responsibility for this decision on Boris Yeltsin himself, but on the people around him.

Zorkin, Lipitskiy Comment on Constitution, Rutskoy

OW1404185693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1836 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Civic Union leader Vasiliy Lipitsky who is also a close associate of the Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy speaking at the press club of his Free Russia Party in Moscow on Wednesday [14 April] said Rutskoy wanted to continue "to discharge his constitutional duty". He said Rutskoy did not believe the situation to be as dramatic as Yeltsin tried to make it appear at a news conference on April 14. Lipitsky said the vice-president was still supportive of reform although critical about ways in which it was being implemented.

Yeltsin speaking at the news conference on Wednesday said the vice-president was fully opposed to his reforms and that he would ask Rutskoy to resign at their next meeting.

Lipitsky said the president had again fallen victim to deliberate misinformation which "may lead him to further abuse of the constitution and laws". He said Rutskoy was elected by popular vote and nothing short of an apppropriate law will be able to terminate his duties.

For his part, Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin was strongly opposed to what he described as a "president-bestowed constitution". He warned against attempts to try to abolish the existing constitution saying this would be destructive and dangerous at a time of deep social crisis and growing left and right wing radicalism. He expressed doubt that the Yeltsin-bestowed constitution would meet the society's needs better than the existing one.

"If we do not change our attitude towards the Constitution," he continued, "it will be nothing more than outrage against the existing Constitution and an attempt to change the constitutional system," the chairman of the Constitutional Court believes. He noted that if the president called the present constitution with the amendments an unconstitutional one then this would set a dangerous precedent as other citizens could not fulfill the constitution. "There appear to be attempts from the right and from the left to protect one's understanding of the constitution and this cannot but lead to a civil war," Zorkin said. An attempt to liquidate one constitution and to develop another one was, he said, an attempt "to make the constitution fit appropriate presidential reforms, consequently, and one can ascertain that an explosion of the constitutional space will certainly take place in this nation."

In response to the question about his attitude towards the attempts to persuade the vice-president to resign, Zorkin declared that "depriving the vice-president of power should be conducted on analogy with the dismissal of the president himself. All other ways are nothing more but thrusting one's will instead of the constitution," he underlined. The chairman of the Constitutional Court was convinced that if the president believed that the vice- president should resign then he should prove that the latter had violated the constitution."

Zorkin also declared that "one cannot at all times and in all places accuse the president's circles of everything." "The president himself is the creator of his entourage and I understand this as an attempt to preserve loyalty to the president. But the president must also meet us half-way. Otherwise we are destined to live "between an icon and an axe."

Zorkin said that "if the president pursues a policy of tough measures after the referendum this will lead to Russia's collapse."

Zorkin Supports 'Presidential Republic'

LD1504090193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0826 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr—Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin has expressed support for Boris Yeltsin's position that "the Russian Federation must become a presidential republic." At a meeting on 14 April with journalists at the press club of the People's Party of Free Russia, he stressed that "at a time of instability, the country needs a strong executive branch." The option of a parliamentary republic, he believes, is

unacceptable at the moment. This is because the situation in parliament will be constantly changing as a result of the deputies' shifting party loyalties.

At the same time, Valeriy Zorkin criticized the president's pronouncements on "the unconstitutionality of the existing constitution." He feels the "basic values" of the present constitution must remain unchanged, but individual "elements" of the text can be amended.

The head of the Constitutional Court warned politicians against harboring illusions that "a sick and conformational society" can be healed "by the ideal text for a shining constitutional future." Furthermore, in his view, "attempts are being made to force through an ideal constitution against the wishes of the legislative branch, thereby discrediting the existing judicial authorities, or the Constitutional Court at the very least."

Referring to the forthcoming referendum, Valeriy Zorkin expressed fear that "the sides involved may start interpreting the voting results in a political way."

Yeltsin Ties Vote for Him With Vote for Constitution

MK1504095093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Apr 93 p 9

[Veronika Kutsyllo report under "Authorities in Approach to Referendum" rubric: "Boris Yeltsin Puts New Constitution to Federation Council"]

[Text] The two meetings—with mass media representatives and the Council of Heads of Republics which make up Russia—which the president held yesterday within the framework of preparations for the referendum confirmed the intention of Boris Yeltsin's team to regard "confidence" in the president as confidence in the presidential draft constitution. Here the president is not inclined to tie the draft's fate tightly to the voting results, and he is banking on the Federation Council, which in his opinion has to adopt the constitution. At the moment, however, it is too hard to judge from yesterday's reaction of the heads of republics whether they will support the new draft.

Judging from the virtually verbatim exposition of the main provisions of the draft of the new constitution at both of yesterday's meetings, it can be assumed that the subject of the constitution will be one of the main subjects at all subsequent agitation meetings that the president will hold before 25 April. In the event of a referendum outcome which is negative for the president, Yeltsin could (given the support of the Federation's subjects for the new constitution) ignore parliament's demands for his resignation, if they follow. Especially as Yeltsin noted again yesterday that he cannot "permit anarchy" in the country before early elections. One gets the impression that the existing parliament's position after 25 April is of little interest to the president.

Yeltsin's proposal about the procedure for adopting the constitution differs somewhat from the opinion of Sergey Filatov, leader of the president's administration. While on 13 April the latter spoke in favor of compulsory nationwide voting, Yeltsin is proposing that the constitution be adopted "in camera"—by the Federation Council. KOMMERSANT-DAILY observers believe that either route is possible, because the main thing the presidential team's members want to achieve now (apart from precise regulation of the constitutional system) is to "protect the constitution from endless amendments." If it is borne in mind that, under the draft, the Federation Council will not engage in lawmaking activity while the lower chamber will most likely be deprived of the opportunity of changing the constitution at its own discretion, the presidential version is quite capable of "protecting" the Basic Law.

For the time being, however, the Council of Heads of State is evidently inclined to treat the presidential draft fairly cautiously, as is, for example, Mintimer Shaymiyev, who evidently seriously fears that the Federation Council's legalization could lead to a new slogan—"all power to all subjects of the Federation." Naturally, legalization could substantially decrease the influence of republics' leaders on the general political and economic processes in the country. The "cool" attitude of many members of the Council of Heads of Republics toward the draft constitution is evidenced by the fact that they refused to side with the president publicly and omitted a call to support Yeltsin in the referendum from a draft Appeal to the People they adopted yesterday.

Despite the attempt of the heads of republics to demonstrate their independence, however, Yeltsin obtained from them the most important thing—an assurance that the referendum will take place in all Russian regions (except Chechnya).

[The following appears as boxed text under the headline:]

Main provisions of the draft of the new constitution, as set out by Boris Yeltsin

The constitution, providing for the establishment of a presidential republic in Russia, will consist of three parts: human rights and the foundations of the Russian Federation state system; the Federation Treaty; and a concluding part (transitional provisions).

Parliament's upper chamber will be the Federation Council (legislative control, appointment following the president's representations of the head of government and of the most senior federal judges), the lower chamber will be the State Duma (lawmaking).

The most senior judges of three courts (the Constitutional, Supreme, and Arbitration Courts) will constitute the Supreme Judicial Office.

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Yeltsin Aide Reveals Details of Draft Constitution

MK1504075093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 9

[Nika Stark report: "Sergey Filatov: Only New Constitution Is Able To Resolve Crisis"]

[Text] The presidential team considers it possible to interpret the answer to the first question of the 25 April referendum—on confidence in the president—as expressing confidence or no-confidence in the new draft Constitution. This was stated yesterday by Sergey Filatov, chief of the president's administration, at his press conference. According to Filatov, it is not the immediate adoption of the Constitution that is at issue, but the confidence in its essence, which will entitle the president to organize a review of the draft Constitution in the post-referendum period and to submit it to the whole people for consideration.

Sergey Filatov said yesterday that the new draft Constitution is ready, and that its full text (and not selected provisions, as Boris Yeltsin promised) would be published before 25 April.

According to unofficial information, the draft calls for the creation of a two-chamber parliament, the "upper chamber" of which will be the Council of the Federation, and the "lower" one—a Duma made of deputies to be elected on a district basis. The first chamber will handle general political, personnel, and other similar matters, whereas the second one will have only lawmaking to deal with. The president will be entitled to dissolve parliament—particularly if his choice for the head of government is twice rejected by the deputies.

Sergey Filatov believes that the last two questions of the referendum "should give a fillip" to the adoption of a new Constitution in the period before early elections, if they are called. At the same time, the question of a new Constitution should be raised, in Filatov's view, regardless of whether the president wins the requisite number of confidence votes or not. A positive outcome of the voting for Yeltsin will "merely boost the political will to produce a Constitution not in a compromise version but as an integral whole."

Thus, although the president's supporters keep demonstrating their confidence that the referendum will be a success for Yeltsin (yesterday, Filatov reaffirmed "a certain measure of confidence" that the Constitutional Court would declare the procedure for counting the votes cast for or against the first two questions unconstitutional), members of the presidential team appear to be willing to agree with the parliament's draft decree on the referendum suggesting that decisions on the confidence in the president and his policies be treated as "informational" ones. To all appearances, however, the two sides have different interpretations of what this means.

Yeltsin Given New Draft Constitution 10 Apr

MK1404104693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 1

["NG" report under the rubric "In Brief": "New Version of Draft Constitution Passed on to President"]

[Text] A new draft of Russia's Constitution was handed over to President Yeltsin on 10 April. Incorporating 20 amendments made by the president, it was passed some time ago by the Congress of People's Deputies, and approved by the Constitutional Commission. According to information from knowledgeable sources, this version also received a good rating from head of government V. Chernomyrdin.

It is still unknown, however, from which draft Boris Yeltsin is going to publish the key propositions shortly before the referendum. Three alternatives are possible: the Constitutional Commission's version which is the case in point [as published—first paragraph would suggest that this "case in point" should apply to the next alternative]; the Constitutional Commission's version as altered by the president; and a "third version," unknown to anybody except the president and some of his staff, whose real or imagined contents Sergey Filatov began to reveal yesterday.

Yuriy Kalmykov Appointed Acting Justice Minister

OW1504110093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1023 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Thursday [15 April], 58-year-old Doctor of Law Yuriy Kalmykov assumed the duties of Russia's acting minister of justice, this ministry's press service informed INTERFAX. On April 13, the decree on his appointment was signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Besides acting as Russia's Minister of Justice Kalmykov will also perform the duties of first deputy minister of justice.

Sources in this ministry told INTERFAX that Kalmykov will be acting as minister of justice until the results of the April referendum are summed up. After the referendum, it will become clear whether he will become the minister or leave this post altogether, they said.

The Ministry of Justice's press service described Kalmykov as a person sharing "moderately centrist views".

In 1990-91, before the disbandment of the Soviet parliament, Kalmykov chaired the Soviet parliament's committee for legislation.

Communists Announce Program for 'National Vyeche'

OW1404161593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1544 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Communist Working Party (RKRP), the "Working Russia" movement, regional organizations of the National Salvation Front and other oppositionary groups will hold a "National Vyeche" in Moscow on April 17. The organizers forecast that some 100 to 200 thousand people will take part. Despite the fact that the Mayor of Moscow only allowed the procession to move from Oktyabrskaya Square to the Central Artists' House on Krimsky Val, the participants intend to gather on the Red Square, according to one of the leaders of the "Working Russia" and the Russian Communist Working Party Viktor Anpilov at a press conference on Wednesday [14 April].

On the same day the Congress of Soviet Women, a "Working Russia" initiative, will start in Moscow, and, from April 16-18 a "Festival of Youth Resistance", which will be attended by young supporters of the RKRP. Both actions pursue the goal of restoring the USSR and renouncing the course of "capitalization" of the nation.

A draft of the new Soviet Constitution prepared by the Russian Federation People's Deputy Yuriy Slobodkin and based on the principle "he who does not work does not eat" is expected to be approved at the April 17 Vyeche, Anpilov said. "An Act of National No-confidence" in Boris Yeltsin should also be accepted by the assembly and handed over to the president personally.

'Small-Minded' Khasbulatov Sloganizing Assailed

PM1404145793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 1

[Nikita Vaynonen report: "What Comrade Khasbulatov Is Teaching Us... The Supreme Soviet Chairman Would Like to Treat Television Viewers as Blockheads in His Political Card Game"]

[Text] During the 10 April television broadcast entitled "Good Evening, Moscow!", Ruslan Khasbulatov spoke so charmingly to Anelya Markulova, he spoke so openly that it was verging on "very warmly." And how Ruslan Imranovich laughed. It is a long time since we heard him laugh. He even described himself as "by nature a merry person, always considered someone who smiles a lot." And his interlocutor was charmingly insistent—why are we all "snarling" when it would be far better if the speaker and the president "smiled more often" and created a kind of "aura"...

But a minute before this R. Khasbulatov had stated that enterprises and even the Church are extorting money in support of four "yeses" for the president, that this is a "state racket," that there is a plan to "fling" all these "hundreds of billions" into "bribing people."

It takes a certain skill to make three accusations of criminal acts straight off against the country's president in one tirade: "extortion," "racket," "bribery"! And not one single bit of proof.

We must not reassure ourselves that no one will believe such things. In such cases, it is not so much "information" that sticks in your brain (that can be rejected), as a certain emotional stereotype: There is nothing to eat as it is, people will say, and they are paying for this chaos with our money! By stirring up irritation, you can swipe another 100 or 2,000 votes from the president.

"But listen!" Khasbulatov drawls persuasively. "Who is opposed to reforms? That is ridiculous! But we should oppose stupid reforms together!..." But which reforms are the intelligent ones? Did he say even one word about this? Do this teacher and his consultants really know the secret of how to leap between the Scylla of hyperinflation and the Charybdis of production decline? When in 1917 the Bolsheviks claimed that the bourgeoisie was to blame for everything, at least they had the justification that they were firmly convinced of this. But even they, simplifying reality to a class diagram, did not resort to anything as small-minded and primitive as this: "The slump in industry and the destruction of productive forces," according to Khasbulatov, are apparently happening because "a collective Rasputin has declared war on reforms, on democratic transformations, and on his own people." On the eve of the February revolution many people, distinguished people, even intelligent people, also thought that "all the evil was in Grishka [Rasputin]." And if the garish formula about a "collective Rasputin" did not just serve as a label calculated to tarnish a specific group of individuals, you could even suspect Khasbulatov of gentry-style romanticism, rather than bolshevkik romanticism. He knows perfectly well that there is no such "collective" monster and that there are plenty of differences of opinion and disputes both in the government and in Yeltsin's entourage, and indeed the president himself is not made of putty. But in the political boxing ring, only a noble fighter is capable of not taking advantage of an effective but dishonorable ploy.

And the label is exactly such a ploy. It is purely a communist party trick. Running through the entire history of bolshevism, the loud and frequent repetition of a nickname is all the more effective, the coarser and more absurd it is. "Social betrayers," "cadet scum," "physicians-poisoners," "occupation government," are all the same type of thing. But there is a secret. Obvious nonsense could not work. In order to be convincing, it must possess an imaginary obviousness.

It is far harder to reject something suggested than something proven, and therefore proof is replaced by invocations. Khasbulatov has the following favorite variety: "Well, you can see for yourselves!"; "Well, it is obvious

to everyone!" After which he presents as obvious something like, for example, the idea that "the people surrounding the president" are seeking an enemy in the soviets, in order to place the responsibility for the reforms that they have apparently messed up themselves on the shoulders of someone else, and that they want to destroy representative power.

Is this plausible? Entirely. Dogmatic people are not interested in explanations, they need someone to blame. And along comes the speaker with his deductions.

I think that the people directly affected by this discussion have a reason to put their self-esteem, which would force them not to respond to the dirty tricks, away in their pocket, and to defend honor—not just their own, but primarily that of the television viewers, whom the Supreme Soviet chairman would like to treat as blockheads in his political card game.

Civic Union 'Beginning To Fall Apart'

PM1404140393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Apr 93 p 2

[Petr Akopov article: "Civic Union—Has It Fallen Apart? It Looks Like Volskiy Is Leaving a Sinking Ship"]

[Text] What many political scientists predicted a long time ago has come to pass. Civic Union, that headline grabber and darling of journalists, is to all appearances beginning to fall apart. The differences of opinion which have existed between Civic Union's many members from the very moment of its formation and which its leaders have for a long time made great efforts to hide, have surfaced and developed into a public discussion of Civic Union's policies. The parliamentary faction "Smena" began this when it announced at the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies its dissatisfaction at the coalition partners' completely uncoordinated actions. Indeed, several parliamentary factions which are members of or support Civic Union—"Free Russia," "Left Center," "Smena,"—voted "either for Civic Union or for somebody else." During the Congress, not even a joint conference was held for Civic Union's factions. As a result of this, when there was a vote on the main question—the president's impeachment—the "allies" split in two. More than half of the deputies from the "Democratic Center" bloc (to which the bulk of Civic Union factions belong) appear to have voted against impeachment and they did this despite the fact that their leader Vice President Rutskoy completely unequivocally staked his claim to the position of president when he spoke out against Yeltsin on the night of 20-21 March and delivered what was to all intents and purposes an election campaign speech on the first day of the Ninth Congress. However, a section of the centrist leaders apparently preferred to maintain the status quo at the level at which it was at that time. The centrists could not help but understand that in getting rid of Yeltsin by relying on the congress's right-wing majority, they were becoming the unwilling allies of the communist-patriotic opposition. But despite all their ambitions, the centrists have a lot more in common with the democrats than the right wing. The centrists are first and foremost interested in coming to power, but they are still not prepared to do this at any price.

Despite the often repeated assertions that there were no winners and losers at the Ninth Congress, there was nonetheless one loser at the Congress. The "center" lost. The centrists, first and foremost Civic Union, to all intents and purposes disappeared among the well supported ranks of the right-wing opposition. Having lost their own identity, they found themselves cut off both from the irreconcilable opposition, which does not recognize them as their own, and the democrats, who do not trust such unreliable allies.

As a result Civic Union to all intents and purposes became transformed into a bloc of two parties—The People's Party of Free Russia [PPFR] and the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR]—supporters of Rutskoy and Travkin. This union, however, will most likely not be long-lived. Leaving aside the extremely grave situation within the ranks of the DPR, which is threatening to split, the situation in the PPFR is also uncertain. Apart from this, there is quite serious friction between the PPFR and the DPR which without doubt will get worse as we approach the elections.

Today Vasiliy Lipitskiy, who leads the PPFR and Civic Union's executive committee simultaneously, is being put forward to play the part of Civic Union's leader. Having concentrated the apparatuses of both structures in his hands, V. Lipitskiy "pushed out" Arkadiy Volskiy, who embodied Civic Union in the mass consciousness. The public skirmish between Lipitskiy and Volskiy on the expediency of a coalition government only accelerated a rift which had taken shape long ago. According to information in our possession, Volskiy will any moment now announce his departure from the ranks of Civic Union and the All-Russian "Renewal" Union (the party on whose basis Civic Union was formed). V. Lipitskiy announced the possibility of the "Smena" faction leaving Civic Union in an interview to INTERFAX. However, Andrey Golovin, the faction's coordinator, commenting on Lipitskiy's statement in an interview to ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, said that the executive committee chairman's statements express only his own personal opinion. Golovin considers Lipitskiy's hints that Civic Union's executive committee may make a harsh decision with regard to "Smena" as not being serious: "I do not see there being any problems; such a decision is impossible." According to Golovin, "Smena" cannot leave Civic Union as it is one of its founders.

Despite such optimistic forecasts by Andrey Golovin, you can expect a continuation of Civic Union's internal shakeup. The showdown between the parties belonging to Civic Union, especially between their leaders, first and foremost reflects the situation in the parties themselves. The age of all our post-Communist parties is two to three years, and not one of them has managed over

this period to genuinely become an all-Russian force capable of fighting for the electorate's votes in elections.

DPR Members Quit President's Support Committee

MK1504075693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 2

[Indira Dunayeva report under the "Scandal" rubric: "Democratic Party of Russia Recalls Its Members From Presidential Support Committee"]

[Text] Ilya Roytman, a leader of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], told a press conference yesterday that he and other DPR members were leaving the committee for the support of the president that was set up in March 1993. According to Roytman, this public committee has in been effect turned into a part of the presidential office. People from the president's administration have begun to emerge in its top positions at a stage when a large amount of work for setting up similar committees in Russian regions has been completed and regular liaison established with them. "An old-style apparatus intrigue has been played out following Central Committee traditions," Roytman's colleague Nikolay Zarochentsev believes.

Upon his return from a three-day visit to Brussels, Roytman discovered that the committee had new people and new chiefs. Following that, the party's board concluded that their leader played the role of a mid-level clerk in the committee and judged it necessary to recall its members. A large number of committee members left after them, and as a result the committee, according to Roytman, effectively broke down.

Despite this unethical—in DPR members' view—conduct of the Russian president's men, Ilya Borisovich plans to support the president, but this time only with his vote at the referendum.

Like all DPR members, Roytman may only ponder over the first two questions of the referendum. As for the last two, the Travkinists were one of the first to speak about the need for early elections of both the Russian president and the Supreme Soviet, hence the answer to them is quite clear.

Zhirinovskiy Calls For '10-Year War' in South

LD1404193893 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Video report from Moscow by correspondent Vladimir Lenskiy—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Irina Mishina] As 25 April approaches, various public forces, parties and organizations—each in its own way—are stepping up their fight for votes.

[Lenskiy] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy held a news conference in the Strela cinema in Moscow today. The leader of the Liberal Democrats has big plans for the end of April. He has decided to hold the fourth congress of his party on 25 April and at the same time, not to waste time, to celebrate his birthday, which is also, coincidentally, on 25 April. Vladimir Volfovich wants to celebrate it in a restaurant in the company of journalists and politicians of various orientations. Zhirinovskiy intends to invite Khasbulatov, Yeltsin, Rutskoy, Yakovlev, Gorbachev, Sazhi Umalatova, and the State Committee for State of Emergency members, whose trial the Liberal Democratic Party leader termed unrealistic. According to him, only Gorbachev could make Yanayev resign for exceeding his powers as vice president.

As for the current political and economic crisis, in Zhirinovskiy's opinion, a 10-year war in the south of the former USSR would help to overcome it. While others are fighting, Russia, not taking part in the fighting, will sell arms to everyone. According to Zhirinovskiy, the war will considerably strengthen and enrich Russia and weaken the republics of the former USSR. As a result there will be no CIS and no sovereign states. Instead new borders will appear, with a normal Russian state system. According to Zhirinovskiy's terminology, this strategy is called a shock political therapy.

SCSE Trial

State Emergency Committee Trial Continues

Defense Intends 'Sensational' Trial

MK1504073493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 14

["Crime Desk" report: "Trial of State Committee for the State of Emergency Members. Defense Intends Sensational Start to Trial"]

[Text] Today at 1000 the Russian Supreme Court opens hearings of the case of the so-called State Committee for the State of Emergency. Yesterday, on the eve of the trial, KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondents met with representatives of the defense and the prosecution and asked them to give their points of view on the upcoming trial. KOMMERSANT-DAILY will be covering it daily.

Lawyers for the accused are confident of victory on one condition: "Provided the trial is legal." This is precisely what Dmitriy Yazov's lawyer Lev Abeldiyev said. He also told KOMMERSANT-DAILY: "I can explain, in just five minutes, to anyone wishing to hear me out, that there was no corpus delicti in Yazov's actions. High treason implies a premeditated crime to benefit another state, to inflict damage on the country. If the defendants' only ambition was to preserve the Union from disintegration, can this be called treason?"

Genrikh Padva, Anatoliy Lukyanov's lawyer, disclosed in an interview for KOMMERSANT-DAILY that he was going to come forward right at the start of the trial with an appeal and a statement of a "sensational nature."

About his client, the lawyer said the following: "All this time Lukyanov has been waking early to prepare for the trial." Padva is confident that in his evidence Lukyanov would be able to "refute the accusation," and "the public prosecutors will have to pay for it." As for Gennadiy Yanayev's lawyer Abdulla Khamzayev, he generally thinks that it would be just right to pass all the materials of the State of Emergency Committee case on to the Prosecutor's Office for further inquiry because "proof of the main charges has not been collected" in the case.

Both relations and lawyers of the defendants are seriously worried about how the trial will be covered. Viktor Pavlenok, a representative of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of Russia, revealed that access to the trial had been granted to the "Respublika" program of Russian TV, the news agencies ITAR-TASS, RIA, INTERFAX, and also to the newspapers IZVESTIYA, TRUD, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, and YURIDICHESKAYA GAZETA. According to Pavlenok, "these are newspapers of different views and positions." The others were refused access because, in Pavlenok's phrase, the auditorium is a bit too small, and one would like that the "trial be held in a businesslike situation." Lawyer Khamzayev said apropos of this that the trial is of special interest for foreign mass media (that have been denied access.) "Right from the start, they were getting slanted information from the Prosecutor's Office that discredited rather than exonerated our clients. The moment of truth is possible only at the trial. One can well imagine the sort of commentary from over there."

Oleg Shenin's wife, Tamara, told KOMMERSANT-DAILY that the wives of the accused were in favor of having their husbands, who have military ranks, face the court in their military uniforms with all their decorations "so as to show who they are daring to try," but they finally agreed to dress in civilian clothes.

Former Minister Yazov Interviewed

NC1404205293 London Kanal-6 Television in Turkish 1630 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Former Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov was one of the prominent leaders of the unsuccessful coup in Russia. Yazov, who headed the Red Army which at the time terrified the entire world, is now sitting in the chair of the accused.

Kanal-6's Moscow correspondent Hakan Aksay met with Dmitriy Yazov:

[Begin recording] [Aksay] Mr. Yazov, is your health and morale good after being held for a year and half and prior to the trial?

[Yazov, in Russian with superimposed Turkish translation] I cannot say that my morale is that good. They are charging a person like me, who served in the Soviet Army for 50 years and got wounded twice during World War II, with treason against his own country. They are confiscating my military honors. I wonder if this will be a just trial. But, the people will ask for an account from those who fragmented our centuries-old state, brought destitution to the country, and who now are trying to place all the blame on us. A day will come when the people will put both Gorbachev and the present administration on trial.

[Aksay] If it was possible to return to 19 August 1991, would you do the same thing?

[Yazov] In my view, our mistake was that we were late by a year. Another important mistake on our part was that we had not fully realized Gorbachev's slipperiness and pinned too much hope on him. Gorbachev is the real culprit behind the present destitution and the breakup of the country. He must be put on trial. The ongoing economic reforms are not being made for the people, but for the well-being of a small minority. But, I think that all this is transient. I believe the Communists will regroup.

[Aksay] Do you think the Communists will regain power and the Soviet Union reestablished?

[Yazov] I do not just think it, I am sure of it. This might not happen today or tomorrow, but it will happen eventually. Socialism is equality, free education, and free health services. Such ideas do not go out of fashion. Those who now want to destroy socialism and set up a savage capitalism dependent on the United States and the West will one day be brought before the people's court. [end recording]

Trial Resumes 15 Apr; Tizyakov Ill

LD1504100693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The court hearing in the case of the State Committee for the State of Emergency resumed today.

[Begin correspondent Aleksandr Ukhov recording] The accused Aleksandr Tizyakov did not appear in court today. According to a statement from his lawyer, this was because he was about to have a heart attack. The state prosecutors proposed that the court hearing be adjourned until Tizyakov recovers. The accused, in the person of Pavlov, proposed that it should be continued.

Having made a decision on the spot, Anatoliy Ukolov, who was presiding over the court, decided to allow the lawyers of the accused to finish the speeches started yesterday on challenging the state's accusations, and then to determine the possibility of continuing the trial until Tizyakov recovers.

Yanayev's lawyer (Khazayev) started his speech with condolences to the relatives of all those who died in the August days of 1991. Then he, like all the lawyers who spoke, replied to the state prosecutor and the procuracy of Russia as a whole. The reasons for the objections were

the same as yesterday—the personal interest of Prosecutor General Stepankov and his deputy Lysov. The book "Kremlin Conspiracy" ["Kremlevskiy Zagovor"], a version of the accusations that was sent to the press on 7 July 1992, was cited. Lukyanov's lawyer (Gapshteyn) established the fact that the state prosecutors are subordinated to the prosecutor general of Russia.

Yazov's lawyer (Abeldayev) supplemented this with another objection—the personal interest in this case of the supreme leaders of Russia. [end recording]

A recess has now been announced in the court hearing.

Pavlov Will Not Answer Questions

OW1504091193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0843 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The former Soviet prime minister Valentin Pavlov has reaffirmed that he does not intend to answer the questions of public prosecutors, if the court does not accept the appeal from Gennadiy Yanayev confirmed by the other defendants to reject the entire prosecution. "I am absolutely serious and plan to act accordingly," he said. Anatoliy Lukyanov and Oleg Shenin will also not answer questions put by these public prosecutors.

Valentin Varennikov said he does not doubt the lawfulness of the appeal. In his opinion, if the appeal is not accepted, the trial will undoubtedly come to face many difficulties. He said the former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev should be one of the main witnesses in the trial because he was in the know of all the details of the developments. If the former president does not appear in court, Varennikov said, it will not be an asset to Gorbachev or the country as a whole.

Trial Postponed Until 16 Apr

OW1504111693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1103 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] General Anatoliy Ukolov, who chairs the trial of the 1991 coup leaders in Moscow, announced a break until 10 AM [0600 GMT] April 16 in view of the fact that two lawyers were absent for unknown reasons.

On the morning of April 15, Genri Reznik, the lawyer of former chief of the KGB's Security Guards Department Yuriy Plekhanov, challenged the ability of the chief prosecuter in the trial, Eduard Denisov, to handle the case. He supported his protest with the fact that Denisov, a prosecutor from Tver, had been appointed deputy general prosecutor on April 5 and had only 9 days at his disposal to read the 145 files of the investigation and 5 volumes of the indictment. All this violates the judicial provision which obliges the state prosecutor to study the case thoroughly.

Genri Reznik also described Denisov's actions as a manifestation of personal interest in supporting the state charges and in the outcome of the trial "with which he links his future career".

He expressed his condolences to the relatives of those killed during the events in August 1991 and expressed hope that they would not be guided by the "feeling of revenge".

Meanwhile, Yelena Lvova, the lawyer of defendant Vyacheslav Generalov, the former deputy head of the KGB's Security Guards Department, said that legal action might be started against General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov "for disclosing the materials of the preliminary investigation to the Spiegel magazine and in the well-known book, entitled 'The Kremlin Conspiracy: Investigators' Version'." Yelena Lvova announced that a corresponding appeal had been sent to the court. Similar appeals will be made in relation to the media which reprinted or broadcast excerpts from the book "The Kremlin Conspiracy".

Defense Challenges State Prosecutors

LD1504113793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1112 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By CRIME-PRESS for TASS]

[Text] Moscow April 15 TASS—During the morning session at the coup plotters' trial on Thursday [15 April], defence lawyers supported the defendants' challenge to the state prosecutors.

The lawyer of Anatoliy Lukyanov dwelt on the book entitled "The Kremlin Conspiracy", published by the Russian prosecutor-general. The lawyer said the book had been in the works ever since criminal proceedings had been instituted and was signed for publication on August 26, 1992, long before the prosecutor-general signed the indictment.

This makes it possible to draw a conclusion that "investigation results were being made fit to suit a charge version put forward in advance, the defence lawyer stated, supporting his client's proposal that the prosecutor-general should resign and that a new, independent attorney should be appointed to examine anew all the investigation documents and draw a conclusion as to the rightness of the charge and the advisability of referring the case to a law- court.

The lawyer of Vladimir Kryuchkov, said Eduard Denisov, deputy prosecutor-general who heads the prosecution team, had been appointed to the post only ten days before. The lawyer wondered whether the appointment was connected with Denisov's readiness to support the indictment.

Besides, the lawyer said the hasty inclusion of Denisov in the prosecution team did not allow him duly to get acquainted with the 145 volumes of materials connected with the case.

The lawyer drew attention to repeated changes of the wording of the charge during the preliminary investigation. At first an investigation team directed by Lisov closed the case when the charge was a "betrayal of the motherland", because the investigators could not find corpus delicti, or facts of the crime, under the respective article. After that, Lisov was debarred by the Russian prosecutor-general from carrying on the investigation which was continued in view of another wording of the charge—the seizure of power for the purpose of a coup d'etat.

The lawyer of Yuriy Plekhanov stated a personal challenge to Eduard Denisov who, he said, was appointed acting deputy prosecutor- general on April 5 and was just physically impossible for him to study the 145 volumes of the case. Under such conditions, Denisov, in the opinion of the defence lawyer, cannot impartially judge the circumstances of the case and should be replaced.

The lawyer of Aleksandr Tizyakov told CRIME-PRESS during a break in the morning session that his client was still in a resuscitation ward. The lawyer made a supposition that the court would soon announce a recess or postpone the examination of the case until Tizyakov would be able to resume his participation in the court proceedings.

Yanayev on Gorbachev's Coup Participation

LD1504121493

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1800 GMT on 14 April broadcasts the "Channel 4 News" program, which carries an 8-minute report by Ian Williams in Moscow on the trial of the officials involved in the State Committee for the State of Emergency coup attempt.

The report opens with shots of the defendants being welcomed by a small crowd outside the Supreme Court in Moscow. Former Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov is identified. Lukyanov speaks in Russian with English subtitles: "I think the government is no longer interested in this trial. But we are. We'll tell people the truth, I've no doubt. We were struggling for the Soviet Union."

The report continues, showing former USSR Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev at his home.

Yanayev begins speaking, in Russian with English subtitles: "My biggest political mistake was the assumption that Gorbachev would join us a few days later. All other mistakes followed from that one."

Williams asks: "What precisely was the role of President Gorbachev?"

Yanayev answers: "As for the August events, he was aware of everything. At the cabinet meeting of August 3, 1991, Gorbachev said it would be impossible to avoid declaring a state of emergency. When comrades flew to him in the Crimea on August 18th and proposed that he declare a state of emergency, he agreed. He said: I think this decision should be taken to the Supreme Soviet."

Yanayev continues: "I would say he provoked us to take these actions because during the whole of 1991 he gave us duties to work out four possibilities. Firstly, presidential rule throughout the whole country. Secondly, presidential rule in separate regions. Thirdly, a state of emergency in the entire country. Finally, a state of emergency in separate regions. Those were the four main directions of his policy. So we wanted to implement one of his ideas."

Yanayev continues: "We thought that we could reach an agreement with him [Gorbachev], that we could find some common ground. I told him over the phone: Don't worry, nothing serious will happen, I'll explain everything to you later. Let's think together how to prevent negative results in the country."

Yanayev continues: "So now, when people say these idiots couldn't even carry out a putsch properly, I assure you the people sitting beside me were real professionals who had done serious things in their time, let alone storming the White House. That would have been a piece of cake for them. So it's not that they couldn't carry it out properly, it's because their political objectives were different."

Referendum Issues

Orthodox Church Denies Financing Referendum

OW1404190493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1838 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Orthodox Church is politically unbiased towards the national referendum on April 25, a Moscow Patriachy press release said on Wednesday [14 April]. The Patriachy denies allegations of financing the referendum or of a special tax levied on the Church to raise money for the referendum fund.

The press release says it is up to the people to express their will on Russia's future. The Patriachy said "our Church calls for an early consensus between government structures and public peace to prevent the country from plunging into civil unrest and to help it follow a hard, but purifying road towards recovery".

Parliamentary Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov in a televised interview in Moscow last Saturday spoke of taxes being imposed on "all businesses and even the Church to bribe the electorate". Khasbulatov also alleged that his own telephone and that of the Constitutional Court Chairman were being tapped.

Civic Union Unveils Stance, Urges Early Elections

MK1404105493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 2

[Yevgeniy Krasnikov report: "Centrists State Their Stance, Brace Themselves for Election Campaign"]

[Text] The Political and Consultative Council of Civic Union has held a meeting at President Hotel that focused on the stance to be taken by this centrist bloc vis-a-vis the upcoming referendum. Apart from the leaders of the parties and movements that are part of Civic Union, the council meeting was attended by Igor Klochkov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, and Dmitriy Rogozin, leader of the Union for Russia's Revival.

Civic Union's most influential forces—the People's Party-Free Russia [PPFR], the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR], and the "Renewal" Union—have decided at recent meetings of their respective political councils to refrain from making recommendations on the first and second questions of the referendum and to limit themselves to calling on the voters to vote for early general elections.

To all appearances, the leaders of Civic Union are inclined to view the upcoming referendum as a rehearsal for a future election campaign. It is for this reason that DPR and PPFR have already made decisions on setting up their election staffs. Aleksandr Rutskoy, speaking at the political council meeting, recommended to Civic Union experts that they publish their analytical materials in the press more often and, in particular, prepare a detailed forecast regarding possible referendum outcomes. For his part, Rutskoy said that he had completed the drawing up of his national concept for Russia, which will be sent to the printers in the near future.

In the remaining days leading up to the referendum the centrist parties plan to carry out a number of political actions. According to Dmitriy Rogozin, leader of the Union for Russia's Revival [URR], they have already sent an appeal to President Yeltsin and Parliament Speaker Khasbulatov calling on them to permit 25 million Russians living outside Russia to take part in the upcoming referendum. (At the same time, the URR filed a petition at the Constitutional Court requesting that the lawfulness of the decisions to dissolve the USSR and create the CIS be checked.) For his part, Vasiliy Lipitskiy, chairman of Civic Union's Executive Committee, told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that a few days before the referendum the centrist bloc plans to hold an extended meeting of its supporters.

Social Democrats Divided But Not Split

MK1404104093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 2

[Olga Odintsova report under the rubric "Politics": "Social Democrats Had Their Say About Referendum. Views Diverged"]

[Text] It took the plenum of the Social Democratic Party board nearly two days work to decide finally on the party's attitude to the 25 April referendum. After numerous speeches and long debate, however, no resolution on the matter was passed. The main reason for that is the lack of cohesion between regional organizations of the Social Democratic Party which at times adhere to totally opposite political positions.

For example, the Petersburg regional organization adheres to clearly pro-Yeltsin views calling for open propaganda in support of the president. Social Democrats in Arkhangelsk, on the contrary, decided against voting for the president and his economic policy, whereas members of the Moscow organization took the most guarded position and agitated for boycotting the referendum: "We do not wish to take part in this Nanaian boys' wrestling," [a circus act where one performer wrestles with a dummy] explained Yuriy Voronov, leader of the Social Democratic Party's Moscow branch.

Given as diverse positions as these, no agreement could have been reached of course, especially as Social Democratic Party rules do not say that regional branches are obliged to implement efficiently all decisions made by the board. Even had a resolution been adopted, it would not have resulted in practical action. The only point on which agreement could be reached was the attitude to the second question (on the economic policy being pursued by the president). Nearly all board members were unanimous in their negative attitude to the current reforms.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think that the party showed a tendency toward a split precisely in connection with the referendum. It is only perhaps an occasion for deepening such tendencies (Oleg Rumyantsev left the party several months ago to create his own Social Democratic Center.) For this reason, party leaders tried their best not to exacerbate the question of the attitude toward the referendum, and finally passed it on for consideration by the regions. "This question is not so important as to cause a split in the party over it," said Pavel Kudyukin, leader of the Social Democratic Party, when commenting on the situation that has taken shape in the party.

More on Armed Forces' Arrangements for Referendum

PM1504092193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI In Russian 14 Apr 93 p 7

[Roman Zadunayskiy report: "How the Army Will Vote"]

[Text] Apart from one Black Sea Fleet military unit stationed on Russian territory, not all of whose members have taken the Ukrainian oath, the Black Sea Fleet will not take part in the 25 April referendum. This has been stated by Colonel General Valeriy Mironov, Russian deputy defense minister.

Orders have been issued to the troops that all commanders, chiefs, and organs in charge of work with the personnel should in the course of their daily work inform all servicemen of the requirements of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree on the participation of the Russian Armed Forces personnel in the 25 April referendum, elucidate the referendum questions to them, and explain the voting procedure. Under the Russian Federation Law "On Defense," there is not, nor will be any campaigning by commanders and chiefs or organs in charge of work with personnel. No campaigning is or will be permitted in military units from outside either, Gen. Mironov stressed. He noted that there have been attempts to do this, but efforts are being made to stop them.

Denying reports which have appeared in the press, the general stated that he was unaware of any instances of Dmitriy Volkogonov, the Russian Federation president's adviser on defense and security issues, doing campaigning working among troops.

In accordance with the parliamentary decree, he said, restricted-access polling stations are being organized wherever necessary, particularly among troops stationed abroad. They are being fitted out with all essentials, including communications.

Mironov noted that around 260,000 men in Russian Federation military units stationed outside Russia will vote. Officers, NCO's, warrant officers and members of their families stationed on Russian territory will vote in public polling stations, while inducted senior NCO's and enlisted men will do so in restricted-access polling stations located in their military units.

The Russian Federation deputy defense minister also noted that officers and NCO's in possession of residence permits in neighboring foreign countries may vote there on the additional questions included on the ballot paper by those countries' authorities. As far as inducted servicemen are concerned, we have raised this matter with the Central Electoral Commission.

Referendum Endangering 'Democratic Process'

PM1404160193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 Single Edition pp 1,2

["Commentary" by Political Observer Aleksey Vorobyev: "Tripping Yourself Up. And the Institution of Power"]

[Text] There is currently no law in Russia protecting the honor and dignity of its president. This is of particular concern today, since the top post in the structure of state power must be safeguarded very carefully at the moment. If an appropriate document is adopted, the first person who will be affected by its strict sanctions will most likely be Boris Yeltsin. Because scarcely anyone is currently capable of doing greater damage to presidential authority than Boris Nikolayevich himself.

Unfortunately there is more than sufficient reason to make such a claim.

Let us examine the visit to Vancouver. No matter how breathlessly delighted certain mass media were with the results of the talks with B. Clinton, serious Western politicians could not help being filled with skepticism.

And the point is not even that B. Yeltsin was put into an embarrassing position again, that the ideas behind his delicate dinner speeches were lost or deliberately slipped to journalists. It was just that the sum of money which the Russian president "earned" for his citizens with such pomp did not correspond in any way either to the dimensions or to the world role of a state which at one time considered itself great.

Particularly since the West is well aware that, with the connivance of the executive, in the past year alone sums of money ten times greater than the aid haggled from Clinton have escaped from Russia. Of course, it is far easier to go around the world with outstretched hand than it is to patch the holes through which national wealth is plundered. But it is entirely within the capabilities of the worldly-wise Western establishment to assess such actions. Not that anyone is in a hurry to utter these assessments aloud.

To make up for it, Boris Nikolayevich is publicly making them to himself. At the concluding joint press conference he stated: They say that there is no alternative to Yeltsin in Russia today. He glanced triumphantly at his American colleague. And the latter nodded in agreement.

I think that at that moment it was not only many Russians who felt ashamed of their country, which has not managed to produce at least one other leader as worthy as its current president.

Paraphrasing the well-known saw that when a god wants to punish someone, the first thing he does is to deprive them of reason, you could note that this punishment is due to the person who rashly permits himself to be drawn into the struggle for victory in the referendum. How many social blessings B. Yeltsin has promised the people in the past week, how many meetings he has scheduled with the "ordinary workers"! Experts and analysts are calling these actions populism.

In actual fact, the too obviously planned nature of the president's steps, their too obvious aim, which Boris Nikolayevich unwittingly revealed himself when he called on his fellow citizens not to reflect too much and to answer all the referendum questions in the affirmative, stop you from calling such things populism. This, it was said, will be clear even to an 80-year-old woman.

Now this is not only clear disrespect for the thinking capacities of his people, but it is also highly speculative advice to trust blindly in the president without bothering about any comparison of facts. That is how a peasant blindly and boundlessly trusts his master.

The results of this propaganda exercise could be observed in the past few days in certain towns in the Moscow region. Housewives have bought up all the food they could find at a more or less accessible price. They gave the following explanation: If Yeltsin wins the referendum, then he will decide that he is allowed to do anything, and prices will immediately shoot up sky-high. The people of long-suffering Russia have alas acquired a rich and bitter experience of relations with the authorities, and use this experience as they know how.

The most alarming thing is that the inappropriate acts committed by the head of the central executive power have resulted in mistrust of that power in many regions. The situation concerning the Mordovian president is fairly typical and instructive.

Members of the Constitutional Court recently reported that, right after Boris Yeltsin's 20 March television address, the parliament of the Tuva Republic adopted virtually unanimously an amendment to its Constitution, which it had long refrained from passing, envisaging the possibility of the republic's separation from Russia. Very dangerous precedents have been set, and such examples could incite other subjects of the Federation to similar political moves. Somehow, B. Yeltsin does not seem to have had any opportunity to stop these processes so far.

"Democratic Russia" chose the following idea as one of the postulates of its propaganda campaign geared to victory in the referendum: It is Yeltsin, elected "for the first time and by all the people," who personifies the Russian presidency. But the radical democrats have thus thrown a boomerang capable of hitting both them and their leader. After all, thanks to this mass propaganda, all Boris Nikolayevich's recent awkward moves are in fact being associated with the presidency, both among the people and among deputies at various levels. Trying to protect itself against these blunders, society may unwittingly turn its dissatisfaction against the institution of the presidency itself.

The parliamentary opposition has already made such an attempt by proposing amendments to the constitution prepared by V. Isakov, which turn the Russian president into a ceremonial figure like the British queen.

All this leads in the direction of a disintegration of the structure of state power and actual Russian statehood. And if the central presidential power, which today rests mainly on the prestige of this top official, cracks or totters, then the edifice of Russian parliamentarianism will tilt dangerously in its wake. A threat will hang over the whole democratic process in the country. Because then a certain third force will break out into the political arena. Can we now predict what it will bring the people? No doubt, it is high time for those who rushed into the skirmish of the referendum with excitement worthy of better application to reflect on the price which will have to be paid to obtain victory here, and to be shocked at the price. And to stop before it is too late.

Public Opinion Foundation Conducts Survey

Referendum, Plebiscite Viewed

OW1504081993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0725 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; materials prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] **About the Referendum Which Is Three Weeks Apart From a Plebiscite**

The referendum set on the 25th April this year on the issues advanced by the 9th Congress remains to be in the focus of both professional politicians and the broad public. And it is absolutely clear why it is so—without any exaggeration, the event can shape the destiny of the nation, determine its likely future course of development.

The Public Opinion Foundation has already asked Russians about their attitude towards a plebiscite. For example, the poll carried out on 13 February showed that only 31% of the population were in favor of the conduct of the referendum. However, as time went on, the number of its advocates grew.

At the end of March the stage was set as follows: 21% of Russians did not plan to participate in voting, 40% of respondents were about to back Boris Yeltsin and 18% of the citizens of the RF [Russian Federation] planned to vote against him; the other polled respondents (21%) were undecided.

A week later, after this opinion poll, another one was held and that one was of special interest, for the respondents (from various parts of Russia) were asked to answer the questions set for the very referendum. And not to forget it was only three weeks prior to the date for which the referendum was set. The results given below are substantive enough to draw certain conclusions about its likely outcome.

The first question "Do you trust President Boris Yeltsin?" got an affirmative answer from 53% of respondents. "No" was given by 30%, and 17% found it difficult to answer.

And as to the second and most controversial question "Do you approve of the social and economic policy carried out by the President of the RF and the government of the RF since 1992?" quite of a sudden it got a massive "yes" response from 39% of those polled. "No" was given by 38%, and 23% had no definite answer.

"Do you think it is necessary to carry out the elections of the President of the RF ahead of schedule?" As it was pointed out by experts many times, the question is formulated in a very poor way, for actually it is a repetition of the first question. And it is not accidental that the eventual response is very similar—for 53% of the respondents the elections do not seem to be necessary. 32% back them up, and 15% of the citizens of the RF are not sure about their answer.

As to the fourth question "Do you think it is necessary to carry out the election of the people's deputies of the RF?", 63% of the citizens asked gave an affirmative answer. 21% went against it, and 16% were undecided.

The next question presented here will not be put for the referendum, though it seems quite logical to include it: "Do you have faith in the Congress of the People's Deputies of the RF?" It doesn't seem difficult to forecast a kind of answer one can get here, if one takes into account the afore-given responses to the four questions. Only 16% of respondents gave an affirmative answer. The Congress does not get an approval from 66% of the respondents, while 18% find it difficult to answer.

On the whole, the typical picture of Boris Yeltsin's electorate is as follows: these are the individuals with college education (51%), in age bracket from 25 to 54 (42%). Going against the President are people who are over 55 years old (27%) or who have incomplete secondary education (22%).

Support for Yeltsin, Khasbulatov

OW1504082193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0726 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; materials prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] 'Credibility Scale' for High-Ranking Officials of Russia

The analysis of the results of the response of Russians on social questionnaires regarding Boris Yeltsin that were carried out recently show a drastic drop of those who found it difficult to respond. This is certainly the case when a certain event or personality leave almost nobody impassive.

Even in stable states which are not going through such economic or political turbulences, as it is the case with Russia now, a President's rating may fluctuate at various states of his activity, and sometimes this fluctuation may be quite substantial. And it is definitely the case with the President engaged in radical reforms, especially in that country which only now begins to realize what sort of burden it has to carry.

At the end of March poll, as the Fund reports, as many as 1228 persons from various cities and towns of Russia were given the questions to answer: absolutely no faith in the President - 14% of those asked and have more mistrust than trust - 10%. 9% of the respondents rather mistrust than trust. So equally trust and mistrust - 17% of the Russians. 16% reported that they would rather trust than mistrust and an exactly the same number of people said that to a greater extent they were with the President. Yeltsin enjoyed absolute trust among 9% of the citizens of the RF [Russian Federation], and for another 9% it was a difficult question to answer.

For purposes of comparison, we would like to report here that President trusting respondents made up 32% in January, while 40% showed lack of trust. The curious thing about it all is that the indicated results are at much variance with those that were given above on the first question put for the referendum.

Another question that was also put at the end of March showed that Ruslan Khasbulatov, the speaker of the Supreme Soviet and main opponent of the President, enjoys trust of various degree only among 11% of the citizens of the RF, while 60% have no trust in him.

A similar question with reference to Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin gave the following results: 18% were among those trusting him and 32% among those mistrusting.

Commentary From the Public Opinion Foundation

The above reported facts demonstrate that in spite of certain differences in the mass evaluation of the qualities of the primary political figures of the nation by and large the Russian branches of authorities are in deep crisis. In the middle of January the Fund tried already to ascertain what kind of trust the President of the nation and the new Premier had. Even at that time it was quite clear that citizens were far away from the representatives of Russian power. That found an expression in the fact that a considerable portion of the respondents did not trust Boris Yeltsin enough. The same was true of the just appointed Prime Minister.

The data obtained in the course of a new polling revealed certain new elements. Firstly, it turned out that it was Ruslan Khasbulatov who had the least trust among the population. And it seems likely that it is not only the attitude towards the personality but also an attitude towards the branch of authority he represents.

Secondly, the data reported show that the level of trust (or lack of trust) for Mr Yeltsin cannot change substantially for that period. it is interesting that trust in the President is the least among the businessmen (40% - are "against", 29% are "in favor") and workers (44% and 27% correspondingly) and among the individuals with college-level education (33% and 41%).

As to Viktor Chernomyrdin, the poll conducted indicated certain changes in the public opinion. True though, that neither marked a reduction in the level of trust towards the new Prime Minister (31% in January and 32% at the end of March), nor any growth among those who trusted him (17% in January and 18% in March).

However, because many people "learnt" more about the head of the new government, the portion of those who could not determine their attitude towards him went down from 37% to 31%. It is interesting that the social group which is least inclined to trust Mr Chernomyrdin are the managers of state-owned enterprises (11%).

Yeltsin's Attitude Toward Parliament

OW1504083493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0728 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; materials prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] **What About Yeltsin's Attitude Towards Parliament?**

Only during the first quarter of this year the television devoted more than 97 hours of air time to the broadcasting of the sittings of the Congress of the people's deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Thus we see that Russians had enough opportunities to draw their own conclusions on the work of the bodies of the legislative power of the RF [Russian Federation].

It is quite curious to learn in this case that the advice of the electorate to Boris Yeltsin regarding the parliament is as follows. "In your opinion, how should the President behave in his relations with Russia's parliament under the circumstances?" Yeltsin should take a firm position - this is the piece of advice of 36% of those polled. 31% think that his position should be that of compromise and consensus with legislators. 11% stick to that point of view that Yeltsin should execute all the decisions of the parliament and 22% could not answer the question at all.

Commentary from the Public Opinion Foundation

In a situation when a conflict between the President and the parliament seems to have reached its peak, only one fifth of the respondents has no view on this. As to the other segments of the population, their standing is quite definite. Pay attention to a three-fold difference among those who are in favor of execution of all decisions of the Supreme Soviet by the President (11%) and those who are actively against this kind of behavior. They make up 36%. The last group of respondents is primarily made up of men (41%) with college-level education (43%) being at the age from 25 to 54 (39%). For them, who are educated, in the bloom of strength, it is not good to be undecided if you speak about the President or, in other words, they frown upon what is now called "the art of political maneuvering".

Impeachment of Yeltsin Viewed

OW1504083193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0727 GMT 15 Apr 93

[From the "Viewpoint" feature; materials prepared by the Public Opinion Foundation—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] **And What Is Your Attitude Towards the Congress's Attempt To Remove the President of Russia From Office?**

In view of the professional politicians, the major outcome of the 9th Congress of the People's Deputies is a relative Victory of Boris Yeltsin in a definite situation of defeat - in the situation when the opposition which considerably outnumbered Yeltsin's advocates at the Congress could not deprive the elected-by-the-public President of power.

Most of the voters, however, as the results of the poll show (the poll carried out immediately after the Congress session), are negative about the impeachment attempt regarding the President that was made by the people's deputies of the RF [Russian Federation]. At least that was the opinion of the 51% of the respondents out of 1228 polled. 25% of Russians expressed their positive feelings about the removal of Boris Yeltsin from office. And almost the same number - 24% found it difficult to give an answer, or they said that it was all the same to them.

Commentary From the Public Opinion Foundation

It was quite natural that the unprecedented attacks of Russia's Supreme Soviet and its Chairman against the President, the attacks that were openly made before the citizens of the RF in the course of the television broadcasting of the sittings of the Congress, caused a certain feeling of protest among the majority of population. In the situation when Boris Yeltsin faced a threat of removal from office the number of those people who backed him in one way or another considerably grew. The recently published record figure of 51% of those who did not approve of the impeachment says that in ordinary life the people may be critical of their President and be displeased with him for one reason or another, but on the whole they are drastically against the intention of the deputy corps to strip Boris Yeltsin of political power.

For the three fourths of the Russians their standing is quite clear-cut: every second individual is against an impeachment and only every fourth person would like to see Russia without Yeltsin. The striking thing is the equal backing given to the President both by the managers of state-owned enterprises (64%) and by the new guild of free entrepreneurs, and after them - by the Army and the legal bodies (50%). These are those strata of society that are quite realistic about the ruination of any attempts to upset the fragile stability in the nation, not even speaking about such radical measures as removal of the head of state from power.

Paper Publishes Version of Khasbulatov 9 Apr Speech

PM1404133093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Apr 93 First Edition pp 3, 4

[Unattributed account of speech by Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, at

the 9 April conference of local soviet deputies in Moscow: "Ruslan Khasbulatov: Russia—Concerns and Hopes"]

[Text] 1. Representative Power and the Nature of Political Contradictions in Society

Esteemed conference participants!

I would like to say straightaway that we had been planning for a long time now to hold a conference of representative organs of power. But all our time was taken by complex political processes evolving into conflicts, and therefore this long-planned and perfectly justified conference kept being put off. Nonetheless, we finally succeeded in bringing you together. You, officials of soviets—the representative organs of representative power, are very well aware that to speak of democracy outside the representative organs of power is nothing but a daydream, and therefore any attempts, camouflaged beneath diverse political moods, to destroy representative power are a direct return to some variety of totalitarianism.

We have not allowed this and will not allow it. This must be made obvious to everyone once and for all times. At this point in time, really crucial for the fatherland's future, we have not assembled to launch some campaign but to conduct a very serious conversation about the problems which exist in reality and which you are the first to encounter. Some of these problems are purely matters of daily life, they are objective and largely associated with the current and very complex transitional state of our society. Problems in the second group are alien [nanosnyy] and artificial, they are the consequences of political games, they are the consequences of ambitions and confrontation, of everything that our society really does not need, of everything that society as a whole rejects.

Our task is to highlight that which has to be resolved, to determine our strength and potential for coping with these objective difficulties, and to identify that which we have to reject.

Of course, each region has its own specific problems, but there are also some common and complex tasks. It seems to me that we can exchange opinions and experience and draw conclusions for ourselves, for the Supreme Soviet, and for other central authorities. This is very important since Russia is a vast federal country and, unless it relies on the regions, on the local authorities, and on the population, any reform would be doomed to failure. This is what happened in the past, and this lamentable experience must not be repeated.

Unfortunately, however, even though these ideas have been shared by everyone in the recent past, they have largely remained on paper. In practical terms, there has been no switch of the center of gravity to the regions. The blame for this lies with the Supreme Soviet, with the federal government, and with the vast bureaucracy which has found its own field for self-development and expansion. It certainly does not need a strong and effective power at the center, let alone any expression of the people's will. On the whole, the problem of federalism needs special attention and serious study.

Esteemed conference participants!

Democratic institutions in our society are only just emerging and, moreover, this process is accompanied by difficulties and conflicts. A role in this is certainly played by inclinations toward autocracy not only among the broad strata of the population (this is a fact, and you are aware of it) but also in the heads of those in power, especially the so-called fathers of Russian democracy.

The foundation of democracy comprises primarily the state's representative organs, through which the people directly exercise rule by the people. This is the representative nature of these organs of power. A truly representative power in the shape of the soviets is only just emerging, no matter how paradoxical this might sound. At present not only is there no question of all power being in the hands of the soviets—even though this has become a hackneyed expression—but they, the soviets, lack even the traditional and meaningful functions which have been performed for centuries by municipalities and communes in countries which we traditionally describe as democratic.

Therefore the main avenue of our development (maybe we were not especially loud in saying this) over the last two years has been to municipalize the soviets and give them an opportunity to exercise genuine rule by the people. These are the positions from which we are looking at the present conference which, as I already mentioned, has been under preparation for a long time now and is not geared to any specific event. I think that we will be able to have a thorough discussion of our problems, exchange experience, and draw conclusions.

Of course, real life is leaving its imprint on our meeting. Expectation and concern—these are the prevalent feelings in the public mind today. The events of the last few months, which culminated in the Seventh, Eighth, and then the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies, testify that to this day society has been unable to find a way out of the crisis situation. The main task in these conditions—and the Ninth Congress accomplished it in general terms—is not to let events get off the constitutional tracks. But the congress failed to completely eliminate this threat. This is understandable, because the deep-rooted causes of our society's crisis situation are to be found in the current state of the economy, the results of the socioeconomic policy being pursued, and the catastrophic decline of trust in all institutions of state power.

Way back in April last year, the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies emphasized that a turnabout was needed in socioeconomic policy. Instead of this, unfortunately, we experienced first a disregard for the decisions made by this congress, and subsequently an open policy of dissolution of legislative and representative

organs of power, an attempt to establish control over the judiciary and prosecutors' supervision, and tough press censorship.

Quite recently, during the second half of March, we came up against a scenario that had been programmed in advance and whose last act would have meant the onset of a new totalitarian system and a complete retreat from the democratic gains of the eighties and nineties. Historical similarities come to mind: The failures of the Stalinist regime's economic policy, conditioned by the rejection of NEP [Lenin's New Economic Policy], provoked mass dissatisfaction among people. At that time, and in response to this, the political regime abandoned the tender shoots of democracy which had started sprouting in the NEP conditions, and openly switched to a policy of repressions. And so, today, eminent Democratic Russia member Mironov has already compiled and signed a list of Russian people's deputies, including the Supreme Soviet chairman, who must be interned.

In today's scenario all the talk about referendum, compromises, and accord is nothing but a ruse, a smokescreen to conceal the true intentions of the forces banking on finally discrediting the supreme organs of power—the congress of deputies and the Supreme Soviet; they are banking on driving these organs outside the legal area and the area where the state's domestic, foreign, and defense policies are shaped, on establishing a regime of personal power.

2. On Socioeconomic Policy

What is the socioeconomic situation, what is the socioeconomic policy at present? The next, the 10th Congress will obviously have to discuss in detail the problems of the progress of economic transformations. You know that we have set the date—June 1993. We firmly intend to stick to convening the 10th Congress actually in June.

Of course, the new government has obviously not been at work for long enough to justify any expectations of serious changes for the better in the sphere of socioeconomic results. At the same time, however, at this time of great urgency, three months are perfectly long enough to figure out: Have the lessons of the collapse of the initial period of reform been learned, have there been any positive changes or a turnabout in the economic transformations mapped out by the decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Congress of People's Deputies?

Today it is hardly possible to answer these question in the affirmative. Nor is there any need for special evidence—the situation is obvious enough. The economy is sinking deeper and deeper into a destructive stage of its development. People's living standards are declining, and you are better aware of this than we are. Enterprise directors find it increasingly more difficult to maintain production, to pay wages to workers and their families, and to provide kindergartens and nurseries for their children. Honest entrepreneurs are in a state of confusion and shock. The majority of workers in the spheres of culture, science, education, and health care are in a state of despair.

The Supreme Soviet is striving to ease the situation for people. It introduced a system of reviewing wages, pensions, allowances, and grants in line with inflation. The Supreme Soviet is trying to halt the destructive processes in industry, which threaten to evolve into chaos.

An analysis of the true state of affairs in the economy shows that the abyss which the country entered in early 1992 is getting deeper. The crisis has hit the entire social and economic system. The decline of industrial production in 1991-92 and in early 1993 has now reached a total of about 40 percent, in other words a total that exceeds the entire decline of production in the first year of the war.

First, there is a catastrophic growth of inflation which destroys the ruble's value. The upward spiral of prices is gathering pace. Consumer prices in January-March increased almost ninefold against the corresponding period last year. Wholesale prices rose even faster. This totally blocks the investment process, bringing it down to zero.

Second, the disappearance of vitally important categories of output is in essence under way. How else are we to interpret the scale of the decline of production. The decline in January-March this year, compared with the corresponding period last year, was 45 percent for footwear and 64 percent for cotton textiles. The decline of production in light industry as a whole was 40 percent. And this is happening while these goods are constantly in short supply.

Third, the country's scientific potential is being rapidly destroyed. Scientists, the elite of science, are leaving Russia. Science and production collectives, capable of producing output up to world standards, are standing idle. Science cities have found themselves in an extremely difficult position.

Destructive blows are still being dealt in all spheres of man's life and work. You know that people's nutrition has sharply deteriorated and is still deteriorating. The population's mortality rate is higher than the birth rate. The foundations of the community of man are being destroyed, morality is declining, and the meaning of honor is being devalued. Everything can be bought and sold. It is just a question of price. Deprived of numerous moral and ethical mainstays, a sizeable proportion of society has found itself on the brink of degradation and decay. The bulk of the population is in the grips of disillusionment; faith in the reformers has been lost.

Mighty blows have been dealt to society by crime, the struggle against which is being conducted very, very timidly. The growing number of suicides is alarming. Mortality is growing fastest among adolescents, and this is directly associated with the spread of alcoholism and

drug addiction, with the sense of despair and loss. If the level of mortality remains as high in the foreseeable future, then one-third of the generation of teenagers who are 16 years old today will not live until the age of 60. Against this background of mass impoverishment and degradation taking terrifying and barbarian forms, we are witnessing the enrichment of a handful of newly emerged bigwigs who are closely associated with the political regime and provide its main social support. This is, of course, very far removed from the interests of Russia's economic, political, social, and moral revival.

The conclusion is obvious: The chosen methods and means for economic changes, and primarily the monetarist mechanism for achieving the set goals, are part of the same old scheme which still dominates the thinking of the newly formed government and its ideological leaders. The heartless pursuit of this concept in an environment which is not suitable for it could, of course, have even graver consequences than its amateurish implementation in the past.

This can be bluntly said in the wake of the extremely alarming and dangerous actions and statements by the new minister of finance, who has already been involved in the failures of Silayev's government. What could be the likely costs of, say, the blind application of prescriptions involving rigid curbs on the growth of credit and money supply? Of the problem of nonpayments which was successfully resolved last year under pressure by the Supreme Soviet on the government and the Central Bank? Today this could turn into an uncontrollable chain reaction of bankruptcy and the destruction of production.

Unfortunately, we have not learned our lessons. In essence, the government has not been renewed, the premier is not exercising his legitimate powers, the course of reforms remains virtually unmodified, it has not even been determined. In these conditions, to speak of the congress and the Supreme Soviet being all-powerful is, to say the least, simply improper. This is rather a sign of the weakness of the congress and the Supreme Soviet, of their inability to force the executive power to apply the laws. Here we have an obvious imbalance of power. If anyone or anything should be boosted, then it should be primarily the supreme legislative power and representative power as a whole, its ability to achieve fulfillment of decisions that have been adopted.

There is another dogma which has the government in its powerful grip: The rejection of large-scale production, of modern forms for organizing it, and of state regulation, under the pretext of struggling against monopolism. We are witnessing the literal uprooting of the most technologically advanced shops and subunits from the structure of major associations, as a result of which all these production units are virtually sentenced to death.

The result of arbitrary rule and chaos in the economy beneath slogans about privatization for the people is that the country's national wealth has been devalued by a factor of 20-25. This is blatantly evident from the ruble's exchange rate which has actually been reduced by a factor of 20-25, from the numerous cases—of which you are well aware—when enterprises have been virtually given away.

Dangerous processes are under way in the countryside. Take the following question: Today we are forced to reduce livestock numbers, often including pedigree livestock, something that was not allowed even at critical times in our fatherland's history. This has already led to a sharp decline in the production of meat and milk, which have always been in short supply, let alone the current prices for these products. Why pursue this long-discredited course in economic policy? This is evidently due to the fact that the new government leaders have failed to take advantage of the opportunity for change given to them by the Seventh Congress.

At the same time it is obvious that, at the present period, it is necessary to apply the idea of strong federal government which is really capable of improving the state of the economy and can be really held responsible for the state of affairs in the country.

If the situation is not changed, if the executive power remains torpid and not accountable to parliament, nothing will change in the country, the situation will deteriorate. The government must be responsible exclusively to parliament, otherwise the "collective Rasputin," as one of the Ninth Congress speakers figuratively described the president's present entourage, will bring about Russia's collapse and disintegration, it will bring about the fatherland's demise. Is this not obvious to our fellow-citizens today?

By introducing the necessary amendments to the Constitution, the Seventh Congress expanded the federal government's powers. The executive power acquired virtually everything it was after for the implementation of economic reform. But for some reason this fact is being passed over in silence. It is obvious why—there are no positive results.

Parliament is prepared for constructive and businesslike work so that certain successes may be achieved by the time the June congress is convened, especially in the socioeconomic sphere. We are adopting the laws necessary for reform, we are improving previously adopted laws—all that is needed is an intelligent and professional application of these laws by the president and the government. This is what should be done instead of engaging in parallel and often inept lawmaking by means of the notorious edicts of Gorbachev's time. We are pinning some hope on the continued work of the "roundtable" formed by joint decision of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Russian Federation Government on instructions from the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies. The first sittings of the "roundtable" proved the readiness of its participants to seek accord. Work is being done at present on a kind of economic pact of

accord, a framework agreement between the main forces in society on the question of the mechanism for implementing economic reform.

We need an accountable government of popular trust and accord, we need a government which does not strive to divide us, citizens of Russia, into "whites," "reds," "blacks," "yellows," and so on. The formation of a government on the principles of nationwide accord will be an important prerequisite for the effectiveness of economic transformations in the country. This is exactly what was said at the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies. Judging by the initial reaction, this failed to elicit understanding from the executive power, even though this idea was confirmed by the president himself in his speech to the congress. I have no doubt that life will bring about the necessity for its practical implementation—provided, of course, that we wish to deepen accord rather than to deepen confrontation. The point is that many influential forces want conflicts and provoke conflicts, which is why I address you and our fellow-citizens: People, be alert and vigilant, do not let yourselves be either intimidated or defrauded! There are far too many lies in our society today, never before have there been so many lies. Of course, the formation of a coalition government, a government of nationwide accord until elections are held on a multiparty basis is not an easy task, but those who reject this idea in principle are deliberately blocking the attainment of accord. Obviously, some of the present leaders have no understanding of Russia, and this is why they are constantly looking far beyond its borders.

3. Constitution and Democracy

As you know, the Constitution is the legislative backbone which dictates to each and every citizen of any country to subordinate his behavior to the Basic Law. This is axiomatic. How can a criminal fail to find an excuse when top officials start openly deriding the Basic Law! This is why the idea of the Constitution has been triumphant for centuries.

The Constitution was essentially ignored under communist rule. Interesting! What comes to mind is a conclusion about the genetic relationship between our supreme political regime and the forces which rejected the Constitution as a basic law.

It was the problems of observing the Russian Federation Constitution that emerged at the center of political life at the beginning of this year. Two congresses of people's deputies held in March—the Eighth, followed by the Ninth (Extraordinary)—especially considered and adopted a decision on immediate measures to preserve the constitutional system. What was the reason for addressing the questions of observing the Constitution? You know that the Supreme Soviet, and then the Congress of People's Deputies, were forced to tackle the questions of observing the Constitution as a result of the increasingly frequent breaches of the Constitution by organs of power at all levels and by top officials, as well as the frontal attack on the present Constitution by party leaders calling themselves democrats. But in actual fact they are applying the tactics of the bolsheviks with their unbridled desire to sweep aside, crush, and destroy all doubters and waverers, let alone the rivals. This flow has also carried away the state's supreme official.

Until the beginning of 1993 the Constitution currently in force was being criticized more or less moderately, from the position of awareness that it would take time to thoroughly prepare a draft new constitution. It was said that it should be adopted without haste, with calm and consideration, while simultaneously renewing the Constitution currently in force. This is what we were doing.

But in January we suddenly saw a statement that the Constitution currently in force is totally useless, that the president never took the oath on this Constitution, that it has become completely different as a result of numerous additions and amendments. Furthermore, there were increasingly frequent direct breaches of the Constitution and of constitutional legality.

By now matters have gone beyond the Constitution's flaws and the fact that it fails to address the realities of our transitional period and the requirements of reforms. What is happening is that the Constitution currently in force is rejected as a whole, as being almost the main obstacle blocking Russia's renewal. In essence, the goal that has been set is to fully discredit the Constitution currently in force and the Constitutional Court, to de facto abolish the Constitution and introduce a regime of presidential rule in the country. This is yet another of Gorbachev's failed ideas.

Let me repeat that all this is being done, of course, primarily in order to divert people's attention away from the economic policy's failures and pin the blame for them on the soviets. We are witnessing a desire to monopolize power in order to force this experiment on the country and to "gag" the press and all who are dissatisfied.

Unfortunately, it must be frankly said that we, the Supreme Soviet's leadership and its chairman, committed a gross mistake at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies. We believed that the decree on the stabilization of the situation in the country which was adopted at that time was a display of good will, a political compromise capable of easing the conflicts. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

At that congress we committed a serious deviation from the Constitution, since our decree seriously curbed the rights of the Supreme Soviet and the government while consolidating the president's personal power. For example, the government was deprived of the right to initiate legislation, a right which the president perceived as giving the government an opportunity to pull away from his personal leadership. In its turn, the Supreme Soviet's rights were curtailed as regards the formation of the government, the monitoring of executive power, and the chance of holding the president responsible for any

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anticonstitutional actions. Of course, all this breached the principle of sensible separation of powers, their normal collaboration, and the consolidation of the integrity and unity of power.

But let me repeat that, at that time, we looked upon these decisions first as being a temporary phenomenon, and second as being indeed a sign of good will, a sign of accord. But these deviations from the Constitution were assessed by the presidential power as a sign of the legislators' weakness. Attacks on the Supreme Soviet intensified, and constant breaches of constitutional legality by officials from the government and the president's administration became the norm.

An especially dangerous and explosive charge against the Constitution was contained in the actions outlined in the president's 20 March address to the people. According to the Constitutional Court's conclusion, this address contains about a dozen gross violations of the Constitution, violations which would in essence mean a change of the political system and state structure, a shift away from democracy toward primitive authoritarianism, and restoration of the worst form of the administrative edict system for running the state. As for the statement that the president no longer feels himself bound by his oath of loyalty to the Constitution since the latter has undergone serious changes, this is simply absurd. Would it have been better to preserve the Constitution as it was in the spring of 1990 or in 1991? Incidentally, at that time the right to private property was not enshrined in it, the principles of federalism were missing, provisions about expanding the autonomy of local self-administration organs were missing, human rights were not enshrined in it, and so on. How could this old Constitution have better served the reforms?

Take another example. We all were elected Russian Federation people's deputies, the president was elected, the Constitutional Court was elected, but the Constitution made absolutely no mention of any of this. Thus, as you can see, if we were to examine specific matters we would realize that, in general, there is only a single step separating the sublime from the ridiculous—had all this not been so tragic.

Let me say this once more: It is simply a joke to condemn every single correction and amendment introduced in the Constitution in 1990-91. If we were to criticize, then it is necessary to analyze what was useful and what was unnecessary. And maybe what was even harmful.

For example, did we parliamentarians have to create an omnipotent president who could disregard even the Basic Law! And yet constitutional amendments were introduced by every single congress since the First Congress of People's Deputies—even at the time when the incumbent president was chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, more than 200 of the 330 amendments concern the president. Furthermore, more than 70 percent of all substantive amendments were actually submitted by the president's side.

If this is so—and it really is so—then why wring one's hands and go into hysterics because the Constitution has changed? Had it not changed, many of the reforms would have been simply impossible, especially matters concerning the changes in forms of ownership and the positive processes in society. Of course, this does not mean that there is no need to improve the mechanism for introducing amendments to the Constitution. Nonetheless, this should not halt the actual lawmaking constitutional process—we will do everything to elaborate and adopt a new constitution.

But no matter what hopes are pinned on the new constitution, a democratic society cannot be built by ignoring the Constitution currently in force. Society will have to realize this sooner or later. The harsh realities of the Eighth and Ninth Congresses of People's Deputies and the sharp reaction to breaches of the Constitution were an expression of the fact that public opinion is becoming aware of this truth.

Despite the similarity of the problems affecting the Constitution which were examined, the Eighth and Ninth Congresses certainly did not duplicate each other's work. There are fundamental differences between the two congresses.

The Eighth Congress of People's Deputies was a kind of watershed between the time of a clear tendency to scorn the Constitution and the time of realizing the need for all officials, institutions of power, and citizens to strictly observe its requirements. In essence, the congress paved the way to a normal constitutional process. Different organs of power, including legislative organs, became more clearly aware of the importance of decisions made by the representative power.

But those who would have liked to carry on destroying the foundations of the constitutional system, and to "demolish" the soviets in particular, were so badly scared by the awareness of the need to obey the principles of constitutional legality that they actually embarked on desperate unlawful steps. As you know, this made it necessary to convene the Ninth (Extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies.

The Ninth Congress, even though it has been dubbed a bad congress, was a kind of savior of the fatherland. Had it not been for that congress, I would not be so sure that we would still have a united Russian fatherland. The Ninth Congress deserves credit for the fact that it not only protected the Constitution but also—for the first time ever in Russia's history—forestalled the executive power's anticonstitutional actions which were already being virtually taken. By the way, their progress has not been finally halted.

The supreme organ of power sharply criticized the anticonstitutional actions, gave a political appraisal of these dangerous steps, and put on the agenda the question of removing the president from office for breaching the

Constitution on the basis of the conclusions by the Constitutional Court, which displayed great courage and principledness.

4. On the Referendum

The Ninth Congress also adopted a whole series of decisions, including the decision to hold a referendum throughout Russia's territory on 25 April.

This is quite a complex question. Today we will be addressed by Vasiliy Ivanovich Kazakov, chairman of the Central Commission for Holding the All-Russian Referendum; he will answer numerous questions. We must consult about ways to organize the holding of the referendum so that each citizen could actually be given a real opportunity to express his own opinion. Nonetheless, I would like to make several remarks here.

Of course, the different political, social, and trade union forces must be guaranteed equal opportunities during the preparations for the referendum. It would be impermissible for any single branch of power of sociopolitical association to be put in a privileged position. This applies to the use of mass media, the opportunities for contacts with people, and the provision of financial, material, technical, and other resources by the state through some different unofficial channels.

Unfortunately, we are receiving reports claiming that, for example, economic organizations, entrepreneurs, and even churches have been forced to contribute tens of millions of rubles for the creation of some strange foundations to support certain groups of people or, to put it more simply, to bribe people and get them to cast four "yes" votes. This is racketeering by the state. There must be a mandatory public monitoring through the soviets and political movements, and prosecutors' oversight must be stepped up.

It must be noted that the political situation in the country was noticeably exacerbated following the adoption of the referendum decision. As a matter of fact, I have had to say this on numerous occasions. Indeed, heightened tension was only to have been expected as the initial result of such a decision.

Now, as we can see, there has been a fresh outburst of political battles which are intensively shifting to the regions. People are getting involved in them in their masses. But we can also see right now that people have a better understanding of the nature of the conflict, it is no accident that committees in defense of the Constitution and of democracy are being formed so quickly everywhere.

Another important aspect: As a result of the conflicts imposed on the congresses, there has been a serious weakening of all branches of power, in other words of state power as a whole. After all, even though power is built on the principle of separation, it is nonetheless unified. This is why the confrontation between the executive and legislative powers leads to their self-destruction.

As you know, the congress did not get as far as the president's impeachment and the Supreme Soviet chairman's resignation. Deputies realized that, at this moment, this would have meant a total political collapse. Actually, I do not have the replacement of the Supreme Soviet chairman in mind, this would not be a tragedy.

There is an extremely fragile balance of forces at present. It cannot last, and there will have to be a resolution of this confrontation. How will this occur? This is very important. How will this occur, which forces will find themselves on the crest of the political wave? These are the fundamental questions of the immediate future, and it is important for this conference to discuss them. All honest people in our fatherland must ponder this. Who will end up with power in his hands, are our people happy with the impulsiveness and unpredictability of power? This specific question must be answered by each and every person who goes to the polling booth. After all, the important point is not just to go to the polling booth and to formally delete or not delete something on the ballot paper, or to simply not go to the polling booth. Each and every one will have to make a highly responsible choice.

Much fear is being whipped up about the likelihood of some third force coming to power, in the form of the so-called "red-brown" or simply profascist forces. Emissaries are roaming all over the place, telling the public that the "red-browns" will allegedly come to power any time now and will restore the usages of dictatorship. Of course, lies are always ugly, there can never be a beautiful lie. But this monstrous lie is being promoted and circulated all over the place, it is yielding its poisonous fruit. All this stems from certain politicians' desire to see our present complex reality in just two colors—democratic and antidemocratic, white and black. If you are a democrat but are not a fanatic supporter of radical (in other words essentially anticonstitutional) methods of social development, this means that you advocate a return to the past, the restoration of communist totalitarianism.

But this is a perfectly deceptive picture. It does not depict reality. Reality cannot be fitted within such a procrustean bed. Life is much more complex, it contains numerous other colors and hues. The essence of the problem is that the objectively necessary transition to a market economy is a lengthy and complex process, it requires its own solution through the creation of stable state institutions and not through leaps and the people's impoverishment.

Sober consideration of this complex reality and calls to choose the suitable methods and means—is this so bad? Is there anyone calling for a return to the prereform period or for the abandonment of reforms? The sole demand is: Life is real, let us develop our methods to suit

these realities. Now the radicals who are at the helm of executive power (and I must say this with deep regret) lack both strategic ideas and a sociopolitical base—this is already obvious to all.

Evidently, the radicals who are in power have exhausted their potential for peaceful implementation of the ideas in their arsenal. This is why they resort, directly or indirectly, to certain strong-arm methods to achieve solutions. This is exceptionally dangerous. In the quest for strategic ideas which they lack, they are using means which are directly linked with a retreat from democracy.

If we had sufficiently durable democratic institutions of power, we would not have been afraid of any leaders [vozhd]. Such institutions, developing autonomously and underpinned by mighty social support, would have ensured their own reproduction on a democratic basis. But democracy in our country is only just emerging; hence the instability of the democratic process itself and of its democratic foundations.

Frankly speaking, common sense tells us: Compromise and accord are needed more by those who are at the summit of executive power than by anyone else. This is the only way to ensure power on a legitimate basis. The unwillingness to grasp this could have tragic consequences.

5. Extrication from the Crisis

Yes, the referendum is an important act and it must be held normally. But no matter what its outcome may be, strictly speaking it will not provide a solution to our main problems, and at best will only map out a possible field for further actions. What form could they take?

The main one is stabilization. Analysts of the progress of economic reform believe that any continuation of the political confrontation at the center threatens further destabilization and a further decline of production by up to 30 percent on top of the current decline. But a political consolidation at the center will make it possible to reduce the decline of production to 10 percent and to hold inflation down to 7-8 percent per month.

The following conclusion comes automatically to mind: No matter what the outcome of the referendum might be, it is necessary to elaborate a mechanism of national accord, social reconciliation, and consensus because the rejection of such an accord would mean rejecting Russia's revival and deepening the crisis with rather predictable consequences. I can assure you that parliament has always been in favor of accord, of reforms, of honest performance of the obligations stemming from the Russian Federation's Constitution and laws.

The most likely outcome of the referendum will be the need to hold early elections for both president and people's deputies. As you know, over at least the last six months I have been advocating new, simultaneous, and honest elections for both institutions. It seems as if everyone is already aware that early elections would also indicate the need to pursue a new policy. This is the aspect that must be grasped.

Let us hope that the ideology and politics of leaderism [vozhdizm] and the authoritarianism that goes hand in hand with it have receded into the past. The latest events have proved that they are unacceptable for the country. We are entering a new period, when conditions are being created for the development of the political process exclusively within a constitutional and democratic framework. We are becoming more clearly aware of the need to switch the center of gravity of executive power from the president to the federal government.

One of the fundamental tasks is to really form a government of national accord comprising pragmatic professionals, based on the leading forces and the trade unions, enjoying support from the regions, and capable of ensuring stabilization of the situation and preventing the country's collapse. Moreover, the government must be formed on the basis of a program of anticrisis measures. For this purpose it would be important to define the economic "corridor of accord."

It is necessary to act without further delay, to reveal the real and specific disposition of political forces, and to conduct practical consultations between the president and the heads of the government and the Supreme Soviet relying on the regions and on forces representing the vital interests of Russians, parliamentary factions, trade unions, and leaders of the most influential movements in our society. As I have already said, all this can be done within the framework of the standing "roundtable" where it will be necessary to conclude a pact of social and civic accord concerning the new general policy of implementing reforms in the country.

Revision of reforms, especially along the line of giving a powerful social direction to economic transformations, considerable renewal of the cadre structure of the top echelons of power, reliance on the real social centers of attraction and the regions' interests—this is what we certainly need today, no matter what we say and no matter what we try to do.

Forces of politically moderate orientation could become a genuine "third force" at the new stage of political development. Centrist forces, if you like.

The political process is on the threshold of the stage when we can perfectly clearly perceive the limitations and exhausted potential of people whose main guideline was destruction and were incapable of any constructive activity. This is what dooms the radicals who are ruling the country.

Therefore, generally speaking, there is nothing unusual in what is happening in the country. We have the natural historical logic of the revolutionary process itself. These forces have done their job, they have destroyed. The time has now come for other forces—the creators. Incidentally, Lithuania offers a graphic example of this.

The tried and tested institution of free elections is exactly such a change in democratic society. In our own country, too, opting for elections could promote the transformation of today's most acute political confrontation and rivalry into a peaceful election campaign. In all likelihood, early and simultaneous elections for both branches of power are becoming inevitable. It is important to treat this calmly, without any fears. These fears can be overcome provided actions are taken strictly in compliance with the Constitution and the laws.

It is possible that elections may give a powerful boost to the development of the democratic process within the framework of the law, as well as to the strengthening of already emerging parties and social movements. They will make it possible to reveal the real rather than imagined public influence, to reveal the voters' real wishes. They could provide the foundation for achieving social accord and forming a new government genuinely based on people's trust.

Forecasting the most likely option for the development of the political process, it can be assumed that, following the referendum and on the basis of its outcome, it is perfectly possible that an extraordinary congress of people's deputies may have to be convened anew to decide the question of possible early elections. Of course, in view of this, we all must prepare to convene such a congress should it become necessary.

I would like to say a couple of additional words. Why should it be mandatory for us to convene a congress? Yes, our Constitution has numerous faults. The point is that, without the Congress, the Supreme Soviet itself is not a fully fledged legislative organ, and it can function as an effective legislative and monitoring organ only in conjunction (with the Congress). The basic provisions of the Constitution and the new laws we are to adopt must go through Congress today.

If Congress were to be disbanded, the Supreme Soviet would remain virtually powerless. This is evidently not realized by our fellow-citizens who are offered—to put it mildly—the most touching scenes from the congress' activity, thus creating anti-congress moods in society and generating anti-congress feelings. But let there be such a democracy, at least it is visible. It would probably be much worse for the population if decisions are made in secret, if nobody knows about them, and families are awakened in the middle of the night by the thud of hobnailed boots and a loud knock on the door. Such secret decisions would probably be less acceptable to our population than sensational, loud, and even scandalous congresses. After all, everyone can see what is happening there. Of course, the congress decisions are critically analyzed by our entire society. But there is also a positive aspect to all this. It is the congress that keeps in certain awe the forces which would like to establish an authoritarian regime. This must also be realized.

6. The Soviets in New Conditions

A few remarks about the soviets' activity as representative organs of power. First. Now that preparations for the referendum—a most important political event—are in full swing, you can see for yourselves, and all political forces which have been and remain scornful of representative organs of power can also see, that the representative organs are actually the main guarantors for preserving the democratic nature of the transformations now under way in the country.

The representative organs of power will have to monitor the most important political event—the referendum. This is the constitutional duty of representative organs of power, and it is incumbent upon you to perform this constitutional duty.

Second. At present the soviets are becoming increasingly important as regards the strengthening and development of federal principles in the face of any manifestation of separatism and nationalism encouraged by attempts to regionalize Russia and divide it into numerous separate principalities. The representative organs of power, with their complex and simultaneously very effective network of representative institutions, actually have to play the main role in preserving the Russian Federation's unity and integrity, especially in the conditions of continuing decline of trust in the center and all central institutions.

In this increasingly unstable situation, the soviets express the genuine interests of the majority of the population and can, of course, play a truly unique role in establishing constructive collaboration among different social forces and groups and preventing any further conflict development of events. There are not and there cannot be any other forces capable of performing these functions, apart from the soviets as representative organs of powers. There are no such forces!

Third. The soviets today have been assigned an exceptionally important position in the development of socioeconomic processes and the implementation of market transformations on their territories. This applies primarily to issues like regional budgets, measures to deepen economic reforms and stabilize the economic situation, privatization of state and municipal property, implementation of land reform, development of natural resources, environmental protection, and others.

Fourth. Let us be frank: Despite all the bombastic lip service paid to market reforms, the executive power at both central and local level at times proves to be simply incapable of effectively implementing them. Here we have the impact of poor professional standards among radical reformers, their detachment from real life, and the corruption of the state apparatus at all levels, especially here at the center, a corruption which spreads like a malignant tumor.

In these conditions it is simply incumbent upon the soviets and the corps of deputies to give the executive structures the necessary assistance and businesslike help

in solving practical problems. Life shows that no contradictions exist wherever issues are really resolved jointly, wherever the deputies and soviets are sincerely interested in solving these problems jointly with the administrations. Such contradictions between soviets and administrations would have been resolved a very long time ago even at oblast and kray level, making use also of the Supreme Soviet leadership's good offices, had they not been artificially whipped up.

Life shows that wherever local authorities are concerned about real problems, contradictions really never surface and never become objects of speculation, they are resolved in the course of daily work.

Fifth. In today's conditions, the soviets' activity to boost the population's social protection is extremely important. Perhaps one of the main causes of the unsatisfactory progress of reforms is their bureaucratic-technocratic nature, whose fatal consequences for the material situation of different strata of the population are obvious.

I would like to say that this criticism is generally accepted now, even by the president and the government. Much is being done to give some sort of social orientation to the reform. But this is being done too haphazardly and impulsively. For example, we have a law which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet despite pressure from the president and the government. In compliance with this law we—let me repeat this, on a legitimate basis—increase pensions, allowances, grants, and so on each quarter. But political games are taken to the point where attempts are being made to seize the initiative from the Supreme Soviet and issue decrees alleging the allocation of hundreds of billions of rubles to increase wages, pensions, allowances, and so on.

And yet, friends, it is obvious that, under the Constitution, the Supreme Soviet alone can dispose of the budget. It is obvious that nobody—neither the president nor the government—can spend even one single kopek for whatever purpose without the Supreme Soviet's consent. Who needs these artificial games? Does it matter who made the decision—the Supreme Soviet, the president, or the government? The important point is to make these decisions promptly, it is important to ensure that these decisions are based on real financial potential, it is important that these decisions are implemented.

This is what should be pondered, not who initiated it all. To conclude my somewhat lengthy speech, I would like to say that the development, based on the development of the democratic process in the Russian Federation, has reached the stage when the people themselves will have to openly say whether they want to be subjected to further experiments in exactly the same form. The time has come to remind people about specific promises. People must be told more about the social differences which exist, which are being created by these methods of leadership, between the newly emerged nouveaux riches, today's "masters of life," and the bulk of the mass of real working people who are already on the brink of poverty, as well as the entrepreneurs who would like to have a stable system rather than racketeering by the state.

Do our young people wish to find themselves again in the chains of a new totalitarianism by democrats in place of the old one? This also has to be asked.

It has to be asked whether the older generation of Russians, who have borne on their shoulders all the burdens of the past decades, wish to spend the rest of their lives "fertilizing" the field of "weeds" of new criminal politicians who have gotten rich through privatization or, to put it more simply, by plundering the national wealth accumulated by previous generations.

Or are the Russian people nonetheless in favor of changes which would be effected on a platform realistically built on the principles of pragmatism and common sense, are they in favor of these reforms being conducted by people who are fully trained professionals and genuinely pursue the interests of the fatherland and the people! Are they in favor of these changes progressing normally rather than impulsively and unpredictably, on the basis of laws and mutual accord, along the path of correcting mistakes rather than committing new ones! The Russian people are, of course, perfectly mature to make the correct choice.

Economic Issues

Fedorov on Central Bank, Fighting Inflation

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[Interview with Vice Premier Boris Fedorov by Vitaliy Kovalenko under the rubric "Fate of Reform"; place and date not given: "Boris Fedorov: Another Six Months of Living Like This and the Budget Will Collapse"]

[Text] On 2 April we published a letter from Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, in which he justified his position in the conflict between the government and the Central Bank. At the request of Vice Premier Boris Fedorov, our correspondent met with him and prepared an interview in which the opposite point of view on the causes of the disagreements is expounded. We present it for your attention.

[Fedorov] Essentially, it is a matter of something very simple: Today we are living in a totally different economic reality. You only have to go out onto the street, visit any store or kiosk, or see businessmen in their Mercedes to realize: There are no longer uniform price lists for all and sundry; not just one International Bank for Economic Cooperation, but hundreds and thousands of firms trade with foreign countries; credits are issued not by one State Bank for the whole country with a subdepartment in the guise of the Industrial Construction Bank, but 1,700 commercial banks. The situation has changed in the most radical way, and fundamentally

different methods are required for the management and regulation of the economy. In these conditions the Central Bank has an exceptionally important place which it has no wish to occupy.

[Kovalenko] You, of course, worked in the USSR State Bank in your time and can explain from the inside, as they say, the reasons which do not allow this step to be taken.

[Fedorov] In principle, yes. Although our foreign-exchange economic administration had almost no direct relation to the activity of the State Bank. In effect it was an analytical center, which studied the activity of the central banks of Western countries and of the monetary and credit system. All my work as an economist—and there were 70 or 80 articles which I wrote at that time—are devoted precisely to this theme. But our research, with the exception of some narrow utilitarian tasks, was not necessary to the State Bank at that time. Because to all intents and purposes it was not the country's central bank but a large cash office with no interest in any mechanisms of currency regulation or management of the money market.

But now, look what a curious situation is developing. In 1990 we saw the appearance of the Law on the Central Bank, which I was involved in, naturally, insomuch as it was based on my draft. The law is, of course, imperfect, above all because it was shaped in difficult conditions—at a time, if you recall, when a bank war was under way between the Union and Russia, and Ruslan Khasbulatov, incidentally, was actively fighting against Viktor Gerashchenko. But despite all its defects it was a market law. The principle of a two-tier system was proclaimed, in line with which the Central Bank is supposed to handle the regulation of the activity of commercial banks through their liquidity, interest rates, and reserve requirements. And when today people ask where the conflict arose from, the answer is simply: from the fact that the Central Bank does not wish to fulfill the functions provided for under this law, but for some reason keeps wanting to be a second government.

[Kovalenko] A serious charge, but what is your indictment?

[Fedorov] Only the Central Bank's own indictments. All these are its statements: that we are not ready, money has not yet acquired the all-embracing role essential to the market, that it is necessary first to increase production, and then tackle finances—in effect, a government program.

In my view, there are axioms which no sensible person questions. One of them is that, in conditions of our 2,500 percent inflation, there can be no question of any long-term investment. Therefore, there is no greater disaster for the economy right now than inflation. And I maintain that 75 percent of success in the battle with inflation depends on the Central Bank. Because, although we speak of 1,700 commercial banks, in fact there are only 10-15 influential ones among them, mainly the Moscow-based ones. Together with the Central Bank, they are the nerve center through which alone a tough, anti-inflationary, monetary policy can be implemented today. And if the Central Bank refuses to establish any kind of parameters for its activity, this means that it intends to implement its own policy.

[Kovalenko] In his letter Viktor Gerashchenko claims the exact reverse. Therefore, let us be more specific: What exactly is at issue?

[Fedorov] Above all, the market interest rate for credit. There is a single criterion for the efficacy of our economy—the money market. Today 1,700 banks are issuing loans in this market at 120-200 percent annual interest. In this context when the Central Bank issues credits at 80 percent (and after my outcry, now at 100 percent) this is a subsidizedy rate, in other words it subsidies the difference from the budget.

The second factor is connected with the volume of the money supply. Both the Central Bank and some people in the government are displaying, in my view, astonishing ignorance in making the following link: Prices have grown 26 times over, the money supply tenfold, therefore the latter must be increased.

[Kovalenko] But prices have not grown 26 times over...

[Fedorov] Never mind, let it be 100 times over, and the money supply 50 times. What is important is that it is incompetent and unprofessional to demand that the money supply and prices grow uniformly quickly. Money changes hands many times; there is a whole system of multipliers which can be used to calculate how much its growth should lag behind the rate of growth of prices. And the only thing I ask of the Central Bank is that it get to grips with these things.

Inflation is constantly driving us into a corner. The higher its rate, the greater the difference between the requirements and possibilities of the budget. Provoking a decline in production, it reduces the state's income, but, by inflating prices at the same time, it requires the state to make ever greater social payments to the population. Without breaking this vicious circle, there is no way out of the crisis. And it can be broken only by one method—by driving down the demand for money.

[Kovalenko] And this is why you are demanding that the Central Bank raise its rates to the market level. But this will only start up a race which has no ultimate goal: Today the commercial banks give credit at an average of 160 percent; tomorrow, when the Central Bank has raised its rates to 160 percent, in the commercial banks they will soar to 250 percent. Who will then be able to afford credit, if even today only trading and brokerage firms can afford it?

[Fedorov] But this is unimportant. Let those take it who can. Otherwise it will carry on like this: Every enterprise sitting idle and doing nothing. And why? Because our

director is well aware that when things get really tight, he can go to Ruslan Imranovich or Chernomyrdin, sign a piece of paper, and get hold of preferential credit.

[Kovalenko] Boris Grigoryevich, in my view, your position contains a serious contradiction. We began the conversation with your claim that economic reality has radically changed. But if directors continue to act in the old way, where are these changes? Or do they affect only the "kiosks"?

[Fedorov] They affect 15 million people.

[Kovalenko] According to the information at my disposal, it is apparently a question of 3 million people—1.5 million trade in kiosks, and the same number are engaged in the racketeering which services them.

[Fedorov] You are forgetting the enterprises which have managed to pay off their debts. This process began back under Silayev. I was recently at "Nevskiy Cosmetics." There, incidentally, they get by without credits. They have reduced their commodity stocks and sold everything they can, and try to work "with a quick turnaround" ["s koles"], as in the West.

Those who have not yet mastered this style are obliged to adapt to the new conditions. No options exist, strictly speaking. Either we squeeze them to death or... After all, there is no longer any budget as such. Revenue of 11 trillion and a deficit of 7 trillion—that is what they have done for us. Moreover, this, of course, is not the whole deficit. If all the expenditure were put together, it would perhaps make a whole 17 trillion.

We are obliged to reduce inflation at any price. No one today is speaking of a zero-deficit budget, about ending all credits and giving no one anything. But it is essential to lower the inflation rate at least to around 100 percent per annum. Otherwise all work collapses, it is impossible to fund anything, and any planning becomes absurd. Today there is not a single enterprise or a single ministry which knows what will happen to it in the third quarter.

[Kovalenko] And in these conditions you are demanding that Gerashchenko clearly state the rate of the growth of the money supply one year ahead and accept your proposal that the growth of credits be limited to 40 percent in the first quarter, 30 percent in the second, 20 percent in the third, and 15 percent in the fourth? The situation is not forecastable; it is quite possible that it will change unpredictably, and you keep driving him into a corner with these figures?

[Fedorov] But, you see, there has to be at least some kind of wall. Today, I am sure that it is money. Without it, no question can be solved. And this, against a background of the universal custom of spending like there's no tomorrow. You know the formula: "Let the Ministry of Finance find the money!" But now the Ministry of Finance will no longer find anything for anyone—its vaults are empty. It can only go to the Central Bank and ask for money.

As vice premier I do not have, strictly speaking, a single real instrument of economic policy. The Supreme Soviet adopts the budget. I do not have the opportunity to insist: The deficit will be such and such, and no more. The Ministry of Finance can of itself only issue directives. But the Central Bank has in its hands very powerful and specific mechanisms. Moreover, it makes decisions—which of these mechanism to use and in what form—autonomously.

[Kovalenko] But after all, that is one of the underlying principles of your Law on the Central Bank—its autonomy and independence.

[Fedorov] Absolutely correct, only everyone should do their own job. There is a government which defines priorities and, correspondingly, the sectors of the economy which need support and preferential funding.

[Kovalenko] Be so gracious as to forgive me, Boris Grigoryevich, but I get the impression that the whole conflict boils down in the final analysis to the question: Who should control the "faucet?"

[Fedorov] This is probably because you and, unfortunately, most people in the country, do not realize the real situation in which we now find ourselves. For the umpteenth month the country is teetering on the brink. Not of hyperinflation, with which the press is frightening everyone. Hyperinflation really exists, that is unambiguous. But there is still a chance for some kind of maneuver. The other day we were at a credit commission meeting—we allocated something to the North and something to agriculture. But mine workers and transport are just as much in need of subsidy—all sectors are in a state of financial ruin. For the time being we are managing to keep the economy going with ad hoc infusions. But another six months of living like this and hyperinflation will erode the wall of the economic organism once and for all and then the budget will collapse. Followed by the financial and credit system. This is why all means must be concentrated in the same hands right away.

As for the Central Bank, it has more than enough work. It is obliged to see that the commercial banks meet their performance standards, combat swindling, and handle payments and above all, of course, supervision. On top of this there is strategy. Let us assume that the government has decided to ensure a growth in production next year of 5 percent. Gerashchenko should have 200 analysts sitting with him to calculate the options: how to stimulate business activity but not overshoot, for example, 10-percent growth in inflation. That is the normal policy of a Central Bank. This is what we are talking about, and, I assure you, there are not the slightest personal factors here.

Central Bank, Government Compromise Viewed

PM1404152393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Report by Irina Demchenko: "Compromise of Central Bank and Government Could be Trap for Government"]

[Text] The joint decision of the Russian Government and Central Bank to establish for the first time a limit to the increase in centralized credits for the second quarter of this year could put an end to the protracted war between the bank and the Ministry of Finances.

At any rate that is how one would like to assess the compromise reached 9 April at the session of the credit commission. Let me remind you that it was decided to restrict the increase in centralized credits to the sum of 3 trillion rubles [R] in the second quarter of this year. In the first quarter, according to various figures, the increase in centralized credits issued by the Central Bank of Russia was R11-13 trillion (54 percent of the fourth quarter of last year). The increase of 3 trillion is assessed by Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko as 30 percent of the level of the first quarter.

The suggestion to establish tough limits on crediting, preferably immediately, for all four quarters came from Vice Premier Boris Fedorov, who was recently appointed minister of finances, and was initially assessed by Viktor Gerashchenko as "charlatanism" and "fantasy." Now it has become the subject of an agreement between the government and the bank.

Of the increase of R3 trillion R1.2 trillion are earmarked directly for the government: R800 billion to cover the internal state debt and R400 billion for conversion. Boris Fedorov said that the government will as before receive this money at an interest rate of 10 percent per annum because "there is no one mad enough, given an inflation rate of 2,500 percent a year, to buy state securities for any long period." This makes it impossible to register the internal state debt in a civilized manner which, incidentally, Boris Fedorov was calling for back in 1990 when he was Russian minister of finances in Silayev's government. Fedorov also considers it impossible to extend the usual Central Bank credit rate (100 percent per annum) to credits to the government since "the government can take money to service credit only in one place—the Central Bank—which makes the operation utterly pointless and inflationary."

Answering questions about the reasons for the sudden compromise with the government, Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko, although he was a formerly a categorical opponent of a limit on credit, made it clear that his position has remained unchanged, and he was agreeing merely so that Fedorov himself could be persuaded of the error of his viewpoint. "When the minister of finances suggested trying again," Gerashchenko said, "I replied: Well, all right, let's try."

The Central Bank leaders (Gerashchenko, Khandruyev) are absolutely convinced that the government will not keep within the agreed R1.2 trillion. Gerashchenko recalled that in June it will be necessary to pay teachers three months' leave in advance, and that other increases in wages and grants are imminent. Last year, he recalled, in June teachers were simply told that there was no money and they must be patient, but this year the socioeconomic and political situation has changed substantially and executive power will not have this possibility. Inflation is too high to make it possible to persuade people to "be patient" and hold out for an entire quarter for the sake of the principles of credit and monetary policy.

Despite the overt cynicism of this statement, to judge by recent decisions of the executive power the Central Bank chairman's statements have a chance of coming true: Subsidies for prices for gasoline, compensations for investments in the Savings Bank, the increase in grants for students and graduate students and other social payments could perfectly well cancel out the positive agreements since funds for these purposes will have to come from emission. In that sense the decision on the limits to credit could be a trap for the minister of finances, with whose name it is directly linked: If the government itself does not withstand the regime on which it has so insisted it will be a triumph not only for the Central Bank but also for its supporter—parliament.

The Central Bank chairman has every grounds for having complex personal feelings with regard to the Russian Government, which in the past destroyed the USSR State Bank which he used to lead. Viktor Gerashchenko, whose high professionalism, like that of his former State Bank deputies, now deputies in the Central Bank of Russia, has been recognized by financial experts throughout the world, was unemployed for a year. Today he seems to regard himself as indebted to Ruslan Khasbulatov, who returned him to his immediate business. Let me remind you that the Russian Government's candidate for the post of Central Bank chairman was Boris Fedorov, but parliament gave its preference to Gerashchenko. Perhaps it is this factor which is encouraging the war between the Ministry of Finances and the central Bank which, incidentally, could hardly be waged so consistently were it not for the complex relations between the executive and legislative powers.

Supreme Soviet

Parliament Ratifies CIS Charter 15 April

LD1504084193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0823 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 15 TASS—The Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Russia on Thursday ratified the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independents States (CIS)

adopted in Minsk on January 22, 1993. The decision won a majority at a joint meeting of the parliamentary chambers.

Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy foreign minister, who presented the document the charter meets the national state interests of Russia, emphasised. [sentence as received]

Adamishin believes that the charter is important instrument for acquitable [as received] operation between Russia and CIS partners.

The charter is aimed at enhancing centripetal tendencies in the CIS and at consolidating it. Adamishin said "this signifies that a new tendency aimed at establishing a zone of stability and active cooperation throughout the former Soviet Union has emerged and is growing stronger," he added. The charter is yet another proof the CIS makes headway towards civilised work not a civilised [word indistinct] as some predicted, Adamishin said.

The diplomat stated that the adoption at the same time reflected growing awareness of the fact that political independence of their states does not rule out close interconnection between them and moreover that such interconnection is of benefit to all.

He recalled that the charter sets out better guarantees for human rights and figures "to us this is a factor of exceptional importance since about 25 million of our compatriots live outside Russia," Adamishin stressed.

Press Service Attacks Kostikov Criticism of Khasbulatov

LD1504111693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0944 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow, 15 April—The press service of the Russian Supreme Soviet has described remarks by the Russian president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, in which he "accused the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of attacking the Russian Orthodox church," as "provocative" and directed "against the representative authorities."

"One feels that at this acute political juncture, such criticisms of the leader of the Russian parliament have one single objective—to compromise people's deputies not just in the eyes of society as a whole, as has already been attempted several times in the past, but specifically in the eyes of those Russian citizens who are believers," says the statement issued here by the parliamentary press service. "On this occasion, by all accounts, the 'collective Rasputin' is trying to play the religious card."

"The closer the referendum comes, the more sophisticated becomes the attack launched by those whose purely selfish and political objectives are being obstructed by the Russian parliament, the sole guarantor of democracy in Russia," the statement notes.

It should be recalled that, last Monday, the president's press secretary said a statement by the Supreme Soviet speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, in which the latter claimed that "the president's team is extorting money from social and cultural organizations and commercial structures in order to finance its referendum campaign," was a "fabrication." "Khasbulatov's attack on the Russian Orthodox Church, which he also groundlessly accused of financing the referendum, was particularly unseemly," Kostikov noted in his statement.

Khasbulatov Discusses Yeltsin Power Struggle

AU1304131393 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Apr 93 pp 149-151

[Interview with Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov by Joerg R. Mettke and Christian Neef in Moscow; date not given: "Yeltsin Has Been Warned"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Ruslan Imranovich, are there any qualities that you appreciate in Yeltsin?

[Khasbulatov] A lot, but I do not want to list them; this would not be proper.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yeltsin has supported your parliamentary career; you were his man. What has made you political opponents?

[Khasbulatov] I have never been Yeltsin's man. Being dependent in such a way is not compatible with my nature. We were like-minded, and I hope that we still are—at least if the president advocates democracy and market and stands on the basis of the Constitution.

[DER SPIEGEL] But, in your view, he has not been doing this for a long time.

[Khasbulatov] Then I am against him, as I was against the putschists. I am not fighting Yeltsin personally, but I am fighting a politically motivated deviation from the Constitution and the law, which the president and his entourage are pursuing.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your opponents are complaining that the Congress of People's Deputies is an instrument of communist inquisition and that you are the grand inquisitor.

[Khasbulatov] Those who say that are either stupid or ignorant. It was the Congress that created the office of president; it is its creature, not that of the devil, but they would like to send us to the devil, because we remind the person in this office of his constitutional duties.

[DER SPIEGEL] Compared with the president, who is directly elected by the people, the Congress only has a limited democratic legitimation.

[Khasbulatov] That is incorrect. This Congress with its more than 1,000 deputies was elected in 1990 at the

climax of liberalization under Gorbachev. The Communist Party no longer had a say. The election of the deputies was more democratic than that of the president.

[DER SPIEGEL] How so? Most candidates were put up by enterprise employees who were instructed by party functionaries.

[Khasbulatov] Of 1,037 deputies, only 11 were elected without an opponent. All others had up to 30 rivals; this was a real election campaign. This corps of deputies, which is now defamed as being reactionary, helped Yeltsin to win. We all agreed at that time: Yeltsin is the symbol of the new democratic Russia. Therefore, none of his opponents had a real chance.

[DER SPIEGEL] But this Yeltsin has not changed.

[Khasbulatov] Democratic constitutions envisage certain counterweights so that a president cannot become a danger to the stage. We do not know what kind of role the U.S. President would play if there were no Congress in the United States.

[DER SPIEGEL] Perhaps the Russian voters want to see Boris Yeltsin in the role of the strong tsar?

[Khasbulatov] The people want to see other leaders, above all. Yeltsin does not represent anything new after 30 years of ambitious career in the party. He does not have a new concept for this country. Why would it be a tragedy if he were no longer president? Russia does not stop being Russia because of that. The sky would not crash down to earth. The reforms continue, not because they were the ideas of Gorbachev, Yeltsin, or Khasbulatov, but because the people want them.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yeltsin says that at the moment there is no alternative to him.

[Khasbulatov] No one should claim that of himself. There are at least 50 people in the Supreme Soviet who could replace me.

[DER SPIEGEL] You have accused the government of having ruined the economy and of having driven broad strata of the population into misery. Are losses in production and social hardships unavoidable after almost three-quarters of a century of communist mismanagement?

[Khasbulatov] At the beginning of the reforms, we had an industry that was working relatively well—good workers and engineers, a people with almost unlimited patience, enormous natural resources, and a relatively intact infrastructure. I was in favor of beginning privatization step by step, but there was no program. Instead, there came the deregulation of the prices. According to Yeltsin, they were not supposed to do more than triple. At that time, I warned the president that our monopolistic economy would react with price hikes by several 100 percent.

[DER SPIEGEL] In return, goods were put on the shelves that had never been seen during the time of lower fixed prices.

[Khasbulatov] I personally, as well as the Supreme Soviet, do not want to return to the communist planned economy. We urge well thought-out reforms with a social orientation, like under Ludwig Erhard. Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar has openly admitted that he has never read Erhard's publications. He only knows the American Milton Friedman.

[DER SPIEGEL] At the latest attempt by Congress to depose Yeltsin, only 72 votes were missing for the necessary two-thirds majority. Would his overthrow have led to chaos?

[Khasbulatov] The primary issue was not to dismiss the president. Parliament had to assess his violations of the Constitution—so far, this is the only case in Russian history where the power of the Constitution could be felt. It was not a company of revolutionary seamen who stormed the room; no one let his tanks roll. In the end, the decision was: The president has been legitimated again and remains in office.

[DER SPIEGEL] Boris Yeltsin returned with foreign support from his first summit with U.S. President Clinton. Does this help him in Russia?

[Khasbulatov] If he thinks that, then he will run into great danger again. I appreciate the help of the West and, above all, the Germans, who have enough problems of their own. However, first and foremost, one needs the support of one's own people. Both the president and the parliament have long gambled that away. The country has been thrown into a crisis by its leaders, the scope of which can hardly be reduced by foreign money.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Americans and most industrialized states are currently counting on Yeltsin as the guarantor of Russia's path toward a market economy.

[Khasbulatov] The world supports the democratic process, not one person. Anything else would be a terrible mistake. What is $1.6 billion for Russia? Despite all our gratitude, it is peanuts and hardly worth talking about.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yeltsin thinks that not only the other countries are on his side, but also Russia's Army.

[Khasbulatov] I know the mood there: no barracks, no apartments, discontent, and subversion in the troops. Discipline can hardly be maintained anymore and sloppiness in dealing with missiles cannot be ruled out anymore.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is the defense minister's promise worth that the officers' corps will stay out of politics?

[Khasbulatov] Parliament is worried about the social problems of the officers. The withdrawal of our troops from Germany and the Baltic states creates enormous problems. I do not understand the hurry of Yeltsin and

Kohl to bring the remaining units of the Western Group back, even four months early. They are not really a threat to anyone in your country and here they are forced to camp in the open air. Why does the German chancellor have to exert pressure and our president give in to it?

[DER SPIEGEL] The withdrawal has meanwhile been stopped in Estonia and Latvia. Just because of a lack of housing for the soldiers?

[Khasbulatov] Like Russia, these republics were part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they must carry part of the responsibility for the rest of the Union troops. Russia has immediately recognized the independence of the Baltic states and does not interfere in their domestic affairs. In light of this, is it too much to demand if we ask for more understanding for our problems?

[DER SPIEGEL] On April 25th, the people will decide on the fate of Yeltsin and his reforms. According to the rules set by the Congress, the president needs the absolute majority of those eligible to vote for a vote of confidence. What happens if he does not achieve this goal?

[Khasbulatov] The president recently assured me that he enjoys the love and respect of 92 percent of the population. Even according to conservative estimates, at least 80 percent of Russians support him. If his media experts Poltoranin and Kostikov say so, then nothing can go wrong, can it?

[DER SPIEGEL] According to the draft of the new constitution, the Congress is no longer supposed to exist as a supreme organ of power. Can your deputies resign themselves to this fate?

[Khasbulatov] At the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies, there was a constitutional draft that no longer envisaged the Congress. However, one cannot destroy it or drive it apart in an unconstitutional manner by simply having someone switch off the light or ordering soldiers to march in.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you seriously worried about that?

[Khasbulatov] In the Constitutional Commission, there were no differences of opinion about the future of the Congress. Only when dissatisfaction with the course of the reforms increased did the president and his team begin—in their tested manner—to look for opponents, scapegoats. Parliament and its speaker were branded as communists and the legislative branch was generally defamed as being hostile to reforms. The president's team is obviously convinced that Yeltsin needs such confrontations to make surprising political moves.

[DER SPIEGEL] The fact that the majority of deputies were Communist Party members, who rather distinguished themselves as brakers of reforms than of their promoters—all that is a fairy tale?

[Khasbulatov] Which the West believes. Some leaders there are playing a nasty game without analyzing the situation and helping our young democratic institutions. They have one-sidedly committed themselves to supporting one man who wants to build his personal regime of power.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are praising the large number of laws, which have been adopted by Parliament. But they are observed as little as the president's decrees. Who is supposed to stop the decline of law and order?

[Khasbulatov] If the many presidential decrees did not exist, law and order would be far better off. Yeltsin's ukases are completely superfluous and only cause damage. Parliament exists to put the president's ideas into the form of laws. It has never refused to do that....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...but it has always watered them down.

[Khasbulatov] The method of ruling by means of ukases reminds one of the times of absolute monarchies. If Yeltsin issues three decrees just on the work of television within two months, this borders on the ridiculous.

[DER SPIEGEL] Spokesmen of the republics, regions, and districts call for a Federation Council with far-reaching powers. Could this stop the imminent crumbling of Russia?

[Khasbulatov] No. If the heads of the republics and provinces want to issue their own laws, then this just accelerates the further dissolution. The president should no longer be the highest-ranking civil servant of the country or the head of the executive branch, but the head of state—with the power of appointing the prime minister. The Cabinet must be given great powers and be able to rely on a majority in parliament. Russia needs a strong government. The president, on the other hand, represents national unity as the father of the nations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yeltsin's advisers have suspected for a long time that you would like Yeltsin to play a role like the British queen.

[Khasbulatov] This is certainly not the worst. At least for a person with a sense of humor.

[DER SPIEGEL] Ruslan Imranovich, thank you for this interview.

Deputy Committee Head Recommends 3 Yes Votes, 1 No

MK1404134493 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 4

[Interview with Boris Zolotukhin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, by Konstantin Katanyan; date and place not given: "Three 'Yeses' and One 'No'"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Boris Zolotukhin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation,

considers that the question on the president's and government's social and economic policy that has been put to the referendum is illegal, but, if all the questions remain unchanged, his reply will be three "yeses" and one "no."

Boris Andreyevich Zolotukhin was born in 1930 in Moscow. He graduated from Moscow Juridical Institute in 1952. He has been an investigator, assistant Moscow prosecutor, and attorney. In 1968 he demanded a "not guilty" verdict for well-known defense attorney A. Ginzburg, for which he was disbarred.

He is a member of Moscow's Helsinki Group and cochairman of Moscow's "Memorial" society. He is a member of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and Constitutional Commission. He is married with a daughter and granddaughter.

[Katanyan] The Ninth Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies decree on an all-Russia referendum clearly contradicts the law. On this basis can it be concluded that there has been a violation of Article 4 of the Constitution, which obliges all state organs to observe existing legislation?

[Zolotukhin] The Congress decree does undoubtedly contradict the Law on the Referendum—at least two of its articles: Article 1, which lists questions that cannot be put to a referendum, and Article 35, which deals with the methods of counting votes and determining the results of nationwide voting. I am not surprised that the Congress has broken the law. The Congress majority is guided not by the desire to observe legislation but by the wish to satisfy its political appetites. When the Congress majority felt that it was controlling the situation and could adopt any arbitrary decision irrespective of what the law says, the norms of law were completely forgotten. And the Congress, which should be the supreme custodian of legality, became one of its first violators.

Apart from the law on the referendum the Congress also broke a number of other normative acts. Let us take as an example the impeachment procedure, which also ran counter to the constitution and the law.

[Katanyan] But all this is being done under cover of slogans about protecting the constitution?

[Zolotukhin] This is a very fine pose—ostensibly to protect the constitution while in actual fact violating it. In our immature political society we will repeatedly encounter such examples.

[Katanyan] After the Congress a Supreme Soviet session considered the question of amending the Law on the Referendum. I noticed that the draft law, which was elaborated by the Committee for Legislation before the Congress and which brings the law into line with currently existing administration structures, was suddenly concealed and replaced by an absolutely new draft whose authors had decided to legalize what the Congress was getting up to. Who exactly elaborated the new document? Not the Committee for Legislation, I hope.

[Zolotukhin] I cannot answer that question. Unfortunately, because of illness after the Congress I did not participate in Supreme Soviet sessions and accordingly the committee's sessions.

[Katanyan] In that case I would like to hear an assessment of this substitution, which was seemingly made from the sidelines.

[Zolotukhin] I interpret it the same way as you—as the desire to bend the law for political reasons. But at the same time, I must draw your attention to the fact that for certain reasons the Supreme Soviet has not proceeded to do this. An agreeable yet uninspiring fact, because the forces which control the Congress also control the Supreme Soviet. For certain reasons common sense prevailed in the Supreme Soviet.

[Katanyan] If the Constitutional Court rules in favor of the petition on the decree on the referendum, will this not entail the cancellation of the referendum itself?

[Zolotukhin] It is very hard to guess the Constitutional Court's decision. Any normative act is open to various interpretations. If we are talking about the triumph of the law, from my viewpoint the decree on the referendum must be rescinded by the Constitutional Court.

[Katanyan] In entirety?

[Zolotukhin] If not the whole decree then at least two of its paragraphs. First, I mean the second question put to the referendum: "Do you approve of the social and economic policy that has been carried out by the Russian Federation president and the Russian Federation Government since 1992?"

[Katanyan] Please explain, what is seditious about this question?

[Zolotukhin] The actual wording of the question is improper. An answer to the first question (on confidence in the president) also encompasses an answer to the question on the policy this president is pursuing. It was clear to the authors of the second question that most Russians would support the president, despite the grave economic situation in which Russia now finds itself. Common sense says that it is impossible to reform a totalitarian economy, in which the military-industrial complex prevails, without considerable harm to the population's standard of living and sensible people realize this.

The president's opponents therefore decided to indulge in a bit of cunning. When people are asked whether they are satisfied with their present situation and standard of living, even in the most economically prosperous countries any person will still reply: "No, I am not satisfied, I would like to live better." So this question is directly

aimed at getting Russians to say "no." Even those who support the president could answer such an insidious question negatively.

[Katanyan] All this is the ethical side of the matter. Where exactly is the violation of the law?

[Zolotukhin] The Law on the Referendum was created on the basis of a study of other countries' analogous laws. At the time it was stated plainly that questions about taxes, the budget, that is, plain questions of economics, would not be submitted to a referendum.

[Katanyan] Why?

[Zolotukhin] Because these questions always require a special attitude toward them, a profound analysis of the economic situation. Can a nonspecialist assess whether particular taxes are needed in a given economic situation, how to organize a tax system in order, on one hand, to facilitate the efficient working of the country's industry, and on the other to maintain a vast army, to have a large pension fund, and to provide medical services and education. All this determines people's standard of living. Which is why nowhere, not in a single country in the world, are such questions put to a referendum. This is the province of professionals. Representative authority, taking account of economists' opinions, formulates the budget and the tax system.

So this question, which contradicts the very first article of the Law on the Referendum, must be declared unlawful by the Constitutional Court and excluded from the questions proposed for the referendum. That is my opinion—the opinion of a jurist, a deputy, and a citizen.

[Katanyan] The second disputed paragraph—this is, of course, the paragraph about counting the referendum results?

[Zolotukhin] The Congress decree says that the count must be made from the total number of citizens listed on the voters' register. Here we again encounter a blatant violation of the law by the Congress. Article 35 of the Law on the Referendum says that it is only when a referendum is held on questions concerning "adopting, altering, or adding to the constitution" that the decisions are considered adopted if over one-half of the electorate have voted for them.

But the law very strictly limits this method of counting. In order for it to be used, it would be necessary to word the question as follows: "Do you consider it necessary to alter (add to) Article such-and-such of the constitution with the following text...?" But not a single question on altering the constitution has been put to this referendum.

[Katanyan] At the Congress, however, the deputies said that the third and fourth questions directly concern the constitution, which does not currently provide for early elections.

[Zolotukhin] That is indeed so. But to count in this way, as the Congress decided, it would be necessary to put a question on altering the constitution directly, that is, a question on inserting into it a list of conditions for early elections of the president or parliament. Then everything would be correct, but there is currently no question about altering the constitution. At the moment we are talking about the need to hold early elections in the current political situation.

If most of those who have taken part in the voting favor such elections, it will be a powerful incentive for the Congress and Supreme Soviet to carry out the proposed actions. But this, I repeat, does not concern the constitution as a whole, since we are not talking about the need to hold early elections in the future under certain conditions.

The Constitutional Court, standing guard over the constitution and the law, ought to have brought the counting method into line with the Law on the Referendum.

[Katanyan] Suppose people answered "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second. How could this result be interpreted?

[Zolotukhin] I do not see any difficulties. The first question accords fully with the Law on the Referendum, and we have already talked about the second—it is unlawful and can simply be disregarded.

[Katanyan] What if the answers to the first and third questions conflict?

[Zolotukhin] That is actually a political question. The president agreed to early elections in an act of civic courage, which has always been characteristic of our president. Right now it is important for him to find out the people's opinion and obtain additional legitimacy for his activity.

The political integrity of B. Yeltsin, who has called for four "yeses," can only be welcomed. As regards an early presidential election, it must not be forgotten that many political movements, including "Democratic Russia," to which I belong, have called on citizens to answer "no" to this question. I consider this call to be correct.

[Katanyan] Let us assume, however, that the people have heeded the president's appeals and answered with four "yeses." When might early elections be held? For, under the existing law, the president can be elected as early as tomorrow, while the draft law on elections of the federal parliament is still in embryo. Are there not fears that the Supreme Soviet will not adopt such a law before 1995?

[Zolotukhin] This was where the perfidy of the majority at the Congress was manifested. I believe that the elections must not be postponed even until March 1994. It would be ruinous to live for another year with the confrontation between the conservative majority of the deputy corps and the reforming president. In such a situation it is not feasible to advance along the path of radical reforms.

I advocate holding the elections as soon as possible, but the majority of the Congress is afraid of losing its mandates and will employ all measures to delay the adoption of this law and, thus, to postpone the parliamentary elections. If, however, the people support the idea of early elections, the president will have a great opportunity to demand that the deputies carry out the people's will. The president can egg on the legislators by relying on the opinion of the Russian people.

[Katanyan] How will you yourself vote, if all four voting papers remain unchanged?

[Zolotukhin] I have already said that I understand the president's position. The simplest way is to reply with four "yeses." But, if we are speaking of myself personally, I will vote as follows: "yes" on the first, second, and fourth questions, and "no" on the question of an early presidential election.

Defense Committee Appeal on Servicemen's Referendum Role

PM1304150593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 93 p 1

["Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Issues Address on the Participation of Servicemen in the 25 April 1993 All-Russian Referendum"—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium's 30 March 1993 decree on the participation of servicemen in the 25 April 1993 all-Russian referendum on the whole reflects the equality of political rights accorded servicemen and all the republic's citizens, as enshrined in the Constitution and Russian Federation laws.

The imposition of any restrictions on the participation of servicemen in the referendum directly before it is held would be an unconstitutional act, however weighty the arguments used to justify it.

This referendum is undoubtedly a political action that presupposes that every citizen of Russia will choose one of two alternatives on all the questions posed. The results of this choice will largely depend on the political campaigning of the supporters and opponents of the alternatives put forward in the referendum.

But any political campaigning on the territory of military units, combined units, and Armed Forces institutions is prohibited by the Russian Federation law "On Defense" (Article 18) with a view to preserving the unity and combat capability of the Armed Forces, and the reliability of troop administration.

On this basis, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Issues considers it necessary to make the following appeals:

To all Russian servicemen: Independently reach your own decisions on the referendum questions as your conscience and sense of duty dictate;

To Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and chiefs of all ranks: Resolutely put a stop to all attempts at campaigning on the territory of military units, combined units, and institutions from whatever quarter, and rule out any reports on the progress of the voting, the summing up of the results, and the generalization of the results of the voting, while giving your subordinates complete freedom to express their will and strictly observing legality during the preparations for and holding of the referendum;

To the president of the Russian Federation, people's deputies, and all representative and executive organs, political parties, movements, and factions: Do not conduct any campaigning work relating to the referendum questions among servicemen.

The committee expresses the hope that this appeal will meet with support from all Russian citizens for the sake of preserving Russia's security.

[Signed] Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Issues

Committee Chairman—Budget Deficit Projected at 15% of GDP

OW1304170593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1656 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The spending of the Russian Federation's 1993 budget is planned, according to the Supreme Soviet's Planning and Budgetary Commission, to run to 18,706.1 Bn. [billion] rubles, while revenues are expected to be 10,201.8 Bn. rubles. The upper limit of the deficit is estimated to reach 7216.3. Bn. rubles; the deficit will be partly offset by a total of 1288 Bn. rubles in foreign credits.

An updated draft of the Russian budget was adopted by parliament March 25; over 100 amendments were proposed by deputies and adopted. "Following the signing of the law on the budget by the president shortly, the Finance Ministry must adjust the final figures in the light of new price trends. Then the deficit may amount to 14-15 percent of the gross domestic product," said Aleksandr Pochinok, chairman of the Planning and Budgetary Commission in an exclusive Interfax interview Tuesday [13 April].

Parliament Resumes Work; Separate Chambers To Meet

LD1404082293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0734 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS—The sixth session of the Russian parliament resumed on Wednesday [14 April] after a week-long break. Parliamentarians will return to their work being enriched with impressions from meetings with their constituencies.

A number of draft laws are to be discussed in separate chambers. Among these draft laws is the document "On Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Referendum in the Russian Federation" and the draft resolution "On Setting Up Parliamentary Investigatory Commission", that has already been endorsed by the presidium. The commission is formed to investigate infringement by state officials of Russian laws, which jeopardises Russia's economic, political and other state interests.

Report on 13 Apr Supreme Soviet Proceedings

LD1404063493

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1958 GMT on 13 April begins broadcasting a report entitled "At the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation" by commentator Yelena Ozrina from the empty committees meeting room of the Supreme Soviet. Reception is good.

Ozrina begins the report by saying that today the work of the Russan Supreme Soviet took place in committees and commissions. The Committee for Legislation of the Russian Supreme Soviet is sometimes called the "mini-Supreme Soviet" because virtually all laws which are submitted for debate subsequently undergo their first approbation here, she says.

She goes on to say that today the results of the fulfilment of the decision of the Russian Supreme Soviet on amnesty were discussed. Also discussed were the draft law of the Russian Federation on the state monopoly on alcoholic production, the draft law of the Russian Federation on the introduction of amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, and the draft law of the Russian Federation on the introduction of amendments to the State of Emergency.

There then follows recorded highlights of today's session. B. A. Zolotukhin discusses the positive effects of amnesty: As a result of the amnesty, 19,112 were released from places of deprivation of freedom including 1,939 women and 1,544 minors. He gives Justice Ministry data on recidivists among those amnestied. An unidentified male deputy goes on to oppose amnesty, pointing among other things to dangers of recidivism. Deputy Mityukov refers to the 18 June 1992 decision on amnesty, repeats that 19,112 people have been released from detention as a result of the amnesty, including 928 over 60, 508 disabled of the first and the second group. He then goes on to speak in favor of amnesty.

I. A. Rogacheva gives a condensed history of the state monopoly on alcohol production in Russia since 1918. She then points to the danger of alcohol production no longer being a state monopoly, referring to a ITAR-TASS item reporting the death of over 400 people in Amur oblast as a result of consumption of lethal Chinese spirits. Another consequence, she says, is that excises and other taxes cannot be collected. The main aim of the draft law being proposed is to protect the state's economic interests by restoring the state monopoly on food, spirit, and alcohol products involving the use of spirits, except beer, she states. Spirits for technical purposes should also come under the state monopoly so as to rule out its use for food purposes, she states. She continues by giving the following figures: The cost of 1 liter vodka to date is 77 rubles whereas its retail trade is 750 rubles. The cost of 1 liter of spirits is 110 rubles, whereas its retail price is 2,043 rubles. To date on the territory of the Russian Federation there have been 719 works for the production of spirits and alcoholic drinks; there are currently 159 works producing spirits, she says: 129 works producing spirits listed in the state register, plus 30 such works which have not been entered in the state register. By 20 March 1993 310 applications had been received for permits to produce alcoholic products, she concludes.

Next, L.I. Brycheva, specialist of the Committee for Legislation of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, says that she believes it is possible to submit the above draft law for the first reading.

The program ends with V.I. Kazhdan explaining what a state monopoly involves.

Regional Affairs

Government Delegation Tours Stavropol Territory

LD1404100993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0918 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Stavropol April 14 TASS—The aim of a two-day working visit to the Stavropol territory by a government delegation headed by Aleksander Zaveryukha, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia, is to analyse problems connected with the practical implementation of reforms in the agroindustrial complex in the provinces, a spokesman for the press service of the head of the administration of the Stavropol territory told ITAR-TASS.

During the trip the delegation plans to discuss with farmers how to carry out a more efficient sowing campaign, and ways of developing livestock-breeding, including poultry farming. Members of the delegation also intend to meet with working collectives of the "Azot" Nevinnomyssk production association and the wool-spinning factory both of which have serious financial and production difficulties.

This spring the economic situation in the Stavropol territory was essentially intensified by landslides which destroyed

dozens of houses, damaged main highways, power networks and gas pipelines. After examining on board a helicopter the agricultural areas where landslides caused the most serious damage, the delegation headed by Aleksander Zaveryukha will discuss urgent measures on the elimination of the consequences of this natural calamity.

A meeting of the managerial personnel of the territory in which Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is expected to take part, is scheduled for April 15.

Chernomyrdin Arrives for Visit

OW1404185993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1837 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] During his meeting with the collective farmers of the collective farm "Kommunistichesky Mayak" (the Kirov region of the Stavropol territory) Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin appealed to them to come to and vote on April 25 in the referendum. "People should express their opinion," the premier said, so that later on "certain circles would not declare that the people did not come to the ballot boxes signifying that the people are against reforms."

He said that "the government has already made efforts "to correct miscalculations by the former cabinet of ministers and Russia is accelerating the speed of reforms"; at the same time the pime minister stressed that the present composition of the cabinet "is not a government yet." [quotation marks as received]

According to Chernomyrdin, the government "should talk less and work more." He also said that the government "still needs time" and noted that "he is not used to scolding his predecessors."

In Chernomyrdin's opinion, Russia had lost the race of changes primarily due to defense branches of industry because "this mighty country, armed to the teeth, was producing too many weapons."

The same day Chernomyrdin met workers from several processing enterprises and visited a hot-house farm "Kislovodskoe." Afterwards he is scheduled to head for Kislovodsk.

Discusses Labor Problems

LD1504133793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1146 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Stavropol April 15 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, on a tour of the Stavropol territory, visited the "Stavropolpolimer" production association in the town of Budyonovsk today. The premier discussed ways of settling problems connected with organizing a stable work regime of the Russian chemical industry with the management of the production association. Technological processes in the "Stavropolpolimer" are being made extremely complex by the delayed and unsteady supplies of raw materials from the neighbouring Chechen Republic. In this connection Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin admitted the need to consider proposals about the construction of an oil refinery in the Stavropol territory.

In the city of Nevinnomyssk the prime minister met chemical workers of the "Azot" production association where he discussed problems of delivering mineral fertilizers to collective and state farms and individual farmers for the approaching spring sowing campaign.

The Russian prime minister also visited a number of other industrial enterprises in the Stavropol territory.

Chubays Meets With Regional Officials in Kurgan

'Worst' Economic Trends 'Slowed Down'

OW1404134893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1340 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The worst destructive trends in the Russian economy have slowed down, Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays said at a meeting of regional official in Kurgan, a city south of the Urals, where he went to assess the economic and political situation in the region prior to the referendum.

Chubays said that the production decline has been stopped. To the best of his knowledge, in the first quarter of 1993 the daily average production grew by three to four percent on the last quarter of 1992. Nevertheless he did not expect "a dramatic improvement of the economic situation in 1993." He forecast a higher inflation rate in May or June because of the expected crediting increases.

Chubays also predicted that unemployment would become an acute problem. According to the vice premier, now it runs at one percent of the work force but this figure does not reflect latent unemployment.

The situation may deteriorate, he said, because Russia will "enter the stage of bankruptcies with all its dire consequences." He described this as an inevitable step.

He insisted that the referendum was essential and described President Yeltsin's position as quite honest. He thinks that the referendum questions have to be answered yes three times and no one time, on pre-term presidential election.

Visits Chelyabinsk 15 Apr

OW1504111493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1024 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

55

[Text] On Thursday [15 April], Russia's Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Committee for Property, Anatoliy Chubays, visited Chelyabinsk in view of the local regional council's decision to suspend cheque auctions under the pretext that most of the shares of the industrial enterprises had been obtained by buyers from other regions.

This statement is untrue, because not more than 6% of the shares had been sold to other regions, said Chubays.

He described the decision of the regional council as illegal and said that he had asked Russia's General Prosecutor Valentin Stepankov to investigate the case. In his opinion, this decision violates the rights of the people living in these regions who will not be able to use their privatization cheques otherwise.

Chubays instructed Chairman of the Regional Council Petr Sumin to resume cheque auctions within ten days.

Speaking about the current political situation and the forthcoming referendum, he said that if the people did not support Boris Yeltsin, "privatization will come to a halt", the cheque auctions will be stopped and the property already sold will be nationalized once again. He also noted that without the involvement of armed forces nationalization was unthinkable.

Chubays said that the State Committee for Property is displeased with the cheque's low rate and is making steps to raise it. He noted that cheques were not issued to be sold. He also pointed out that although their market rate stands at about 4000 rubles, during auctions it rises up to 60,000.

In order to raise the cheque's market rate, he asked the president to allow the State Committee for Property to begin the privatization of defense enterprises. Yeltsin has instructed all the ministries to reduce the lists of defense enterprises which are not to be privatized and whose controlling block of shares is in the hands of the state, said Chubays.

Chechen Delegates To Give Yeltsin Message From Dudayev

OW1404140593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1343 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A Chechen delegation will arrive in Moscow Wednesday [14 April] to hand to President Boris Yeltsin a message from President Dzhokhar Dudayev of Chechnya. A top official in the Chechen Foreign Ministry told INTERFAX that the message "contains a proposal that the issue of recognition of Chechnya by Russia be discussed." The delegation is headed by Shamsedin Yousef, Chechnya's Foreign Minister.

Further on Accident at Tomsk-7 Nuclear Facility

Scientists Assess Clean-Up, Damage

PM1404112193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Chernykh report: "Independent Experts Think Tomsk Was Very Lucky"]

[Text] Tomsk—Several groups that are not under the jurisdiction of any of the interested departments have been studying the radiation situation since the first few hours after the explosion at the radiochemical plant at Tomsk-7. The high standard of academic and applied science in Tomsk made it possible to involve top-notch specialists in the work. They have subsequently been joined by scientists and practical workers from Moscow and Novosibirsk. Each group has its own equipment, instruments, and aircraft. They are working in parallel.

Vladimir Pakhomov, chief geophysicist at the Berezovskiy State Geological Enterprise, Novosibirsk:

"We are the main organization assessing the radiation situation in the cities of Siberia. We have been doing research since 1986. We use modern, highly productive, remote-sensing methods. An integrated STK [expansion unknown] station makes it possible to register natural and man-made radionuclides with a very high degree of sensitivity.

"We have already carried out reconnaissance work and have preliminary data. Our equipment has recorded increased background gamma radiation in the region of the villages of Georgiyevka and Chernaya Rechka. It is two or three times higher than natural levels. In a few days' time we will be able to say for sure which territory has been contaminated and what the level of the increase in background gamma radiation is."

Leonid Rikhvanov, chief of the Faculty of Minerals and Rare Metals Geochemistry at the Tomsk Polytechnical University:

"Our group is made up of specialists in the fields of radioecology, geochemistry, and rare and radioactive elements. We are able to determine not only the strength of ionizing radiation, but its spectrum. The initial research results have shown that gamma radiation sources are represented by zirconium-95, niobium-95, ruthenium-103, and ruthenium-106. It is reassuring that long-lived gamma radiation sources are absent.

"The question of whether any alpha radiation sources are present began to concern us. It can now be stated that there are radioactive traces of them. The concentration of plutonium on the stretch of road between Tomsk and Samus is substantially greater than normal. Special work is now being done there. The concentration of alpha nuclides on the other side of the road will be low.

"As a researcher I am concerned about the presence of so-called 'hot' particles. These are several dozen microns

in size and have a very high specific [udelnyy] radioactivity of up to several dozen milliroentgens. The particles may have traveled even further than the boundaries of the trace. Regional research would be needed to pick them up.

"Because of the melting of the snow the radiation situation is changing before our very eyes. Particles are settling in the soil from the melted snow. Everything will become clear in May-June. More detailed aerial gamma spectrometry and ground work is needed.

"Tomsk has been very lucky. First, the wind was blowing in the opposite direction. Second, wet snow brought the radioactive particles down to the ground. The main contamination was on the territory of the combine itself, in its danger [sanitarno-zashchitnyy] zone. It was also fortunate that the equipment that exploded was at the end of the technological chain. There was a 'release' of cesium-137 with a half-life of 30 years, and strontium. If equipment at the beginning or middle of the cycle had exploded, the contamination would have been far more serious..."

No Additional Safety Measures Needed

OW1404161893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1545 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Laboratory studies of samples taken at the scene of the April 6 nuclear accident at a the Siberian chemical plant in the closed town of Tomsk-7 continue, Interfax was informed by the press-service of the Russian Federation's Atomic Energy Ministry.

Primary results suggest negligible surface contamination by plutonium-239, meaning that no additional safety measures are required. The ministry attributes satisfactory conditions in the area to the structure of the equipment and its location which prevented the discharge of Beta and Gamma radiation of over 40 Curie into the atmosphere.

The State of Emergency Commission puts the length of the radioactive trail with the level of radioactive contamination at 60 microroentgen per hour at 15 kilometers with a maximum width of 3 kilometers. Thus the size of the contaminated area is about 35 square kilometers.

Failure To Protect People Questioned

PM1504153993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Video report from the village of Georgiyevka by A. Pelt and G. Goryunov; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Pelt] As if to show mercy to a city of half a million people, the radiochemical leakage from Tomsk-7 took its toll on this godforsaken village of around 40 houses. Hot particles invisible to the naked eye have settled on roofs, roads, and gardens. Ten minutes before our arrival a decontamination team entered the village. According to the locals, they have been working here for three days now. Every bit of land is painstakingly checked meter by meter. Soil and snow reflecting an elevated radiation level are placed in polythene bags. But this picture does not inspire peace of mind.

Above all you have to ask why it is that the decontamination operation began just three days ago, instead of 6 or even 7 April. Why is it that the local inhabitants—even if there are only 40 or 50 of them—were not told of the danger on 6 or 7 April? Why is it that the decontamination workers, who go home in the evenings, are dressed in special clothing while adults and, more importantly, children who live here permanently wander around the very same areas as if nothing had happened? What is most frightening of all is that the kids play in the snow. Let them accuse us of inflaming the situation yet again, but we journalists simply do not understand this.

IAEA Commission Arrives

OW1504110293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1025 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An ad hoc IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] commission that had arrived in Tomsk, a West Siberian regional center, April 14 left for the Tomsk-7 chemical works where a radioactive waste tank had exploded last week, INTERFAX was told by officials in the Tomsk civil defense headquarters.

U.S., British, and Argentine scientists serve on the commission which was invited by the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry to see first-hand the environmental consequences of the explosion.

The Ministry's press officials said that the available tests show a very slight contamination of the soil with plutonium-239 which does not require any decontamination procedures. The area where the radiation background has increased to 60 uR/h as a result of the explosion totals 35 square kilometers.

The IAEA commission intends to make its preliminary findings public later on Thursday [15 April].

Shokhin on Official Visit of Far East Region

Arrives in Sakhalin

LD1404180493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1031 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Belovitskiy]

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 14 Apr—Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin of the Russian Government, who is touring the Far East, today arrived in Sakhalin.

"It is not in the interests either of the Russian or the Japanese side to depict the fate of the Southern Kurils as

57

the condition for the two countries' economic rapprochement. The language of ultimatums will not help to resolve the problem," the deputy prime minister stressed in a conversation with journalists. He also pointed out that the Russian leadership had managed to remove the Kuril issue as a condition for our attending the upcoming G-7 sitting in Tokyo in July.

"It is far more important," Aleksandr Shokhin thinks, "to develop economic cooperation. When we know one another better, it will be easier for us to agree." The deputy prime minister of the Russian Government voiced the hope that such an approach would be widely supported, not only by the inhabitants of Sakhalin Oblast, but also by everyone in Russia.

Government Session Set for 22 Apr

LD1404202293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Video report from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy by correspondent Valeriy Gorbikov, including recording of remarks by Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin left for Sakhalin today.

[Gorbikov] At dawn today, the aircraft carrying officials of Russia's Cabinet of Ministers, led by Vice Premier Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shokhin, landed at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, the most remote oblast center in the eastern part of the country.

[Shokhin, to camera] I will not hide the fact that, of course, the aim of our visit is, partly, to explain the situation in the run-up to the referendum. Apart from that, one would like to explain one's policy, the policy of the government, and to find out what modifications need to be made to it, proceeding from the interests of the regions, including such a specific region as the far east.

On 22 April we will have a big, expanded sitting of the government, with the participation of the heads of administrations, which will sum up the work of the government during the first quarter and the series of trips by members of the government, including those connected with the preparations for that sitting of the government.

Shokhin Arrives in Vladivostok

LD1504101793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin has arrived in Vladivostok. Our correspondent Olga Zhurman reports:

[Zhurman] At an airport briefing Aleksandr Shokhin frankly stated that his tour of the Russian Far East is connected with the forthcoming referendum. In addition to this, the visit does have another aim: establishing personal contacts with the leaders of the krays and oblasts in the region and also working out a mechanism for cooperation between the Federal authorities and the regional ones.

Today Aleksandr Shokhin set off directly from the airport for Nakhodka, where he will be visiting Vostochnyy port and familiarizing himself with the conditions and construction plans for a technology park in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone. The vice premier's travel plans also include visiting the Russian-Chinese border and the Grodekovo border crossing station, which is one of the biggest crossing points on the border.

Before arriving in Maritime Kray Aleksandr Shokhin was in Kamchatka and Sakhalin. In Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, for example, Aleksandr Nikolayevich said at a news conference that the government is presently adjusting its policy in respect of the remote regions of the country, taking account of their interests, problems, and potential. He also promised, incidentally, that in the future representatives of the authorities in the Far East will be received in the government without delay.

The vice premier showed particular interest in the free economic zones in the Far East region and appraised highly the idea of Yevgeniy Krasnoyarov, the new governor of Sakhalin Oblast, to set up an investment bank for the reconstruction and development of Sakhalin.

Tomorrow Aleksandr Shokhin will be in Vladivostok, where he will meet with the leaders of state production facilities, entrepreneurs, and the heads of administration of the cities and rayons in the Kray. He will then continue his tour of the Far East. Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin will spend Saturday and Sunday working in Khabarovsk.

Visits Free Economic Zones

MK1504082093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 15 Apr 93 p 9

[Semen Dalskiy report: "Aleksandr Shokhin in Far East. Vice Premier Inspects Free Economic Zones"]

[Text] Russian Government leaders have dispersed to the country's regions. Their mammoth task is to propagandize the inviolability of the "executive vertical" and the policy of reforms being pursued. At the same time these trips also have other aims. Aleksandr Shokhin, who arrived yesterday in the Far East, will surely use his visit to assess the information from local level about the attraction of foreign investment to the region and about the prospects for the Far East free economic zones. This information could be needed on the threshold of the Supreme Soviet's discussion of the draft law on free economic zones.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts believe that Shokhin's visit to Maritime Kray has, besides political objectives, other objectives associated with assessing the implementation of the foreign economic strategy for developing

the region. One of this strategy's most important components is the development of free economic zones.

The first such zone on the territory of the then-USSR was founded in 1991 in Nakhodka. The first stage in creating it will be implemented in 1991-1995. In accordance with the zone's development program, the reconstruction of the transportation infrastructure and the construction of industrial and tourist facilities are under way. Last year Nakhodka's joint enterprises produced output worth over 800 million rubles. At the same time they exported goods worth $4.7 million and imported goods worth $2.1 million.

The success of the Russian policy of free zones, however, is virtually limited to the Far East zones in Nakhodka and Sakhalin. The remaining zones—with few exceptions—sprang up without the necessary calculations and definition of the type of zone. "Paper" zones (and according to KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts' assessments eight of the 13 Russian zones fall into this category) have essentially become for the regions merely a particular form of obtaining tax and other concessions. In this context the law being drafted must, first, fix the various types of zones and, second, define the conditions to which a territory aspiring to such status must conform.

Yeltsin 'Protecting Himself' in Pressuring Mordovia

PM1404161993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 2

[Article by Constitutional Commission Secretary Ivan Fedoseyev under the "Hard To Believe" rubric: "Whom Is the Kremlin Protecting in Mordovia?"]

[Text] My little homeland of Mordovia has unwittingly found itself at the center of the political big time. It is well known that the republic's Supreme Soviet has abolished the position of president of the Mordovian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The powers of V. Guslyannikov, its first and hopefully last president, have been cut short.

Mordovia was not the first to choose its own president. The appropriate law was only adopted in October 1991.

We then experienced just over a year of presidential leadership. Those who spoke at the session summarized the results of this leadership:

—the professionalism of the government declined with the advent of the president and chief executive;

—duplicated administrative structures appeared, of which some were entitled to make decisions while others bore the responsibility, and this naturally led to a decline in administrative efficiency;

—sharp confrontation arose with the Mordovian SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as a strongly expressed desire for one-man rule;

—abuses of official position became commonplace—the deputies spoke with pain and bitterness about the self-serving ties between President Guslyannikov and Vice President Narezhnyy and commercial structures.

On the day the Mordovian SSR Supreme Soviet decided the fate of the presidency, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MORDOVIYA, which is known to be sympathetic to Guslyannikov, published a document signed by A. Sliva (from the Russian president's State Legal Administration) and N. Khovanskiy (from the Russian Ministry of Justice). These high-ranking lawyers claimed that abolishing the presidency of the Mordovian SSR "would contravene Part 2 Article 78 and Articles 132 (1) and 132 (2) of the Russian Federation Constitution." What is going on?

The Russian Federation Constitution says that the head of the executive power (the president) of a Russian Federation constituent republic is the highest official in the republic. Yes, when the post of president has been instituted in a republic, he is the highest official. But Article 132 (1) gives no reason for retaining the presidency as a matter of necessity, since the solution to this problem falls exclusively within the purview of the republic within Russia.

The same faulty approach vitiates Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 430 dated 8 April 1993, which also talks about alleged violations of Articles 132 (1) and 79 of the Russian Federation Constitution and, contrary to the decision made by the Mordovian Supreme Soviet, confirms the powers of V. Guslyannikov as president of Mordovia "pending resolution of the issue in line with established procedure."

The following request should be put to Boris Nikolayevich: Esteemed President, please open the Russian Federation Constitution on which you swore an oath, reread Article 78, and reread Article III of the Federation Treaty, to which you put your signature—these documents state unequivocally that the federal power is not entitled to interfere in the affairs of the Russian Federation's constituent republics with regard to issues concerning the organization of the structure of their organs of power.

Incidentally, it is reasonable to see a parallel between the situation of the president in Mordovia and the situation facing the Russian president.

In June B. Yeltsin will have occupied this post for two years. What is there to show for it? Making an open bid for one-man rule, Boris Nikolayevich calls himself "the boss," "elected by the whole people," and hints that his power is practically God-given, that "no one but God can remove him." The result has been a legal free-for-all, an unwillingness to take into account the country's Constitution and laws, and a passion for rule by edict.

So it is not Guslyannikov that Yeltsin is protecting in Mordovia; he is protecting himself and his pretensions to be ruler of Russia.

Official: 106 Million Ton Grain Harvest Expected

OW1304183593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1819 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia will have a grain harvest of at least 106 to 108 million tons this year, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha told a news conference in Krasnodar. In addition to that, he said, farmers still had no less than four million tonnes of grain left over from last year's harvest. As for the rest of the 126 to 128 million tonnes of grain Russia needed, it would buy that abroad, he said.

Zaveryukha said the government would mainly subsidize and give loans to those producers who signed contracts to supply foodstuffs to the federal food reserve.

Kalmykia's New President Outlines Program

MK1304094693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 1

[Radik Batyrshin report: "Kirsan Ilyumzhinov Is the Republic's First President. Without Denouncing Lenin, He Advocates Prosperity Based on Market Economics"]

[Text] The voters of Kalmykia displayed unprecedented activity on 11 April. Some 82 percent of the republic's registered voters turned out to take part in the presidential election. According to preliminary reports, 65.37 percent of those who took part cast their votes for a 30-year-old businessman, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, 29.22 percent for General Valeriy Ochirov, and 1.55 percent for Vladimir Babayev, head of Kalmyk private farmers. Yesterday Ilya Bugdayev, chairman of the Kalmykia-Khalmg Tanch Supreme Soviet, congratulated Ilyumzhinov on his victory and promised that the republic's parliament would provide the utmost assistance for the president in his work. Ilyumzhinov defined his goal as "a prospering Kalmykia as part of a single, democratic, and mighty Russian Federation." "No one is obliged to feed us, and moreover it is shameful to rely only on alms," stated Ilyumzhinov in his election program. In his opinion, "reliance on subsidies means prolonging the republic's backwardness, encouragement of parasitism, and ubiquitous irresponsibility." This document is permeated with market pragmatism, but it also places a heavy emphasis on traditionalism. Ilyumzhinov promises to ask the president and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to grant Kalmykia a special economic status to attract foreign investments. He is planning to obtain monetary subsidies from Russia as credits that will be repayed "in accordance with the laws of market economics." The four words—"private ownership" and "market economy"—are repeated in Kirsan Ilyumzhinov's program dozens of times. At the same time his program stresses the need to provide targeted protection for the population, support for entrepreneurship, and guarantees for foreign capital. He advocates prosperity for all citizens of Kalmykia, emphasizing: "I am a Kalmyk, but at the same time I am a Russian [rossiyanin]—this is indivisible, like the heart." He even proposed that a monument be built that would reflect "the participation of the Kalmyks in the watershed episodes of Russia's history." In his opinion, Lenin's Kalmyk roots "is the most shining example of the blood-based unity of the peoples of Russia." He does not renounce either Lenin or Lavr Kornilov ["White" Russian of 1918-20 period].

Kirsan Ilyumzhinov promised that on the first day of his presidency he would accept the resignation of the republic's Council of Ministers and reduce the number of ministries by two thirds. Ilyumzhinov proposes that the local soviets in the republic's towns and rayons be dissolved and that instead presidential representatives, "vested with full authority," should be appointed. In his opinion, immediately after the presidential election the Supreme Soviet of Kalmykia should call early elections of a professional parliament of Kalmykia comprising 25 people. Ilyumzhinov is proposing that a Council of Elders be set up as a supreme consultative body under the country's president, and also an Intellectual Treasury Foundation. Interestingly, Ilyumzhinov is planning to invite the Dalai Lama XIV to the republic and grant him political asylum and land to build an autonomous Kurukhurul complex.

Baltic Force Withdrawn to Kaliningrad With New Status

PM1504085593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 93 p 1

[Valeriy Gromak report in "From our News Bureau" column: "11th Army Withdrawn from Northwest Group of Forces"]

[Text] Kaliningrad— In connection with the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic region the 11th Guards Combined-Arms Army, stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast, has been given the status of an army in its own right and has been withdrawn from the command of the Northwest Group of Forces.

This not only means a change in the chain of command but also entails a substantial modification to organizational and personnel arrangements.

Presidential Aide Views Impact of Regional Poll Results

PM1404133193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by Anton Fedorov: "Soviets Trying To Paralyze Executive Power. Anton Fedorov, Acting Deputy Chief of Russian Federation Presidential Administration's Administration for Work With Territories, Comments on Results of Elections of Heads of Administrations Held in Certain Regions of Russia"]

[Text] The elections of heads of administrations which have been held in certain regions of the country give us reason to believe that in the near future the people who have come to power there today will scarcely support the policy that the president is conducting. Stroyev, a former CPSU Central Committee secretary, has been elected in Orel Oblast, for example; Narolin, who is from the same team of the former party nomenklatura, has been elected in Lipetsk Oblast, and Kovlyagin in Penza Oblast. An interesting situation has come about in Kalmykia: The man who was elected seems to be a young entrepreneur, a billionaire, but in his program the emphasis has been laid on economic autonomy. I am not sure that this will entail any positive aspects. The only thing you can note with satisfaction is that the greatest number of votes in Krasnoyarsk Kray went to Zubov, currently acting head of administration, while in Bryansk Oblast the head of administration has gone through to the second round of voting. Nevertheless, these people were elected by the oblast population. They are sufficiently legitimate leaders of the regions. But now it is scarcely possible to speak of the unity of the executive power, the unity of the presidential hierarchy [vertikal]. Its destruction will entail fairly serious and profound consequences.

Today the heads of administration, even those appointed by the president, in many respects find themselves under the influence of local factors, and in many ways are working more for the territory than for the presidential hierarchy. This is understandable, and probably inevitable. However, the fact that the president appointed them created a feeling of a certain unity within this team. Now there is no unity.

The elections of heads of administrations in the present situation are at the very least untimely. The transition to the election of administration heads should at least be accompanied by the strengthening of federal organs of power and their structures at local level. In this case, however, the purpose of the elections of administration heads is the desire of the soviets to paralyze the system of presidential power and destroy the executive axis [vertikal].

Only the swiftest implementation of the Federation Treaty can safeguard Russia against disintegration and preserve the idea of presidential rule. The principle of the separation of powers must be carried through in legislative terms. There must be a clear demarcation of powers between the federal and territorial organs of power. The regions must be given economic autonomy, but not an iota of political autonomy. Otherwise Russia will be destroyed.

Low Turnouts Widespread in Regional Polls

PM1404141393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Georgiy Melikyants report: "Pity, but Voters Fail to Flock To Polls"]

[Text] Last Sunday could be called a rehearsal for the 25 April vote.

It was a rehearsal in the figurative sense, since the results of the elections for administration heads in Krasnoyarsk, Orel, Bryansk, Penza, and Chelyabinsk and for Russian Federation people's deputies in Kursk and the Kuban are a pointer to voters' current activeness. It was also literally a rehearsal because a second round of voting will be held along with the referendum wherever the first round was inconclusive.

It is not easy to give an unambiguous answer as to the level of the population's political activeness. It is well known, however, that fewer than half of the residents entitled to vote turned out in Krasnoyarsk Kray. In Norilsk, in particular, where there had been a high level of organization in labor collectives, only 12 percent of those registered to vote turned out. Barely more than half of the adult population exercised its right to vote in Orel Oblast, and only 40 percent turned out in the oblast center and the industrial cities of Mtsensk and Livni. Admittedly, this was enough for Yegor Stroyev, director of the Scientific Research Institute of Fruit Crop Selection and Strain Breeding, to be elected head of the administration. He won more than 70 percent of the vote. But this was only slightly more than 30 percent of those who could have voted.

In Bryansk Oblast 54 percent of the adult population took part in the election, and the figure was approximately the same in Penza Oblast. Turnout in the Kuban ranged from 37 to 60 percent depending on the rayon.

A general phenomenon was that country dwellers were more active than townspeople. In Bryansk Oblast this was particularly noticeable in areas that suffered from the Chernobyl disaster—people there believe that the solution to their problems directly depends on the local administration. In Krasnogorskiy Rayon, in particular, more than 93 percent of voters turned out.

Candidates were nominated on a contested basis everywhere. The choice in Bryansk was between 14 candidates—Vladimir Barabanov, the current head of the oblast administration, and ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Lodkin are currently some way ahead of the other candidates. Both are Russian Federation people's deputies. They will contest the second round. In Penza there were nine candidates for the governorship—the overwhelming majority of votes (500,000 out of 705,000) went to Anatoliy Kovlyagin, Russian Federation people's deputy and member of the Russian Supreme Soviet Constitutional Commission. It is interesting that the representatives of the current oblast administration—Governor Aleksandr Kondratyev and his three deputies—failed to gain the votes they needed. Conversely, Nikolay Kondratenko, former chairman of the kray soviet, was leading in Krasnodar Kray.

The election of administration heads in Chelyabinsk Oblast is a special subject. IZVESTIYA was told by

journalist Pavel Bolshakov that out of the nine candidates the leader is Petr Sumin, chairman of Chelyabinsk Oblast Soviet—he has won almost 60 percent of the vote. But he needed another 5 percent to be elected. Everything will be decided by the second round. But the oblast prosecutor is disputing the legality of the election. The fact is that Russian President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed the powers of the head of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration. It was the Inner Soviet that decided to hold elections for a new governor. But most voters, according to ITAR-TASS, were unaware of this decision—only around 30 percent of those entitled to vote turned out.

Executive Gains Increasing Support in Countryside

PM1404151793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 93 First Edition p 8

["Editorial Viewpoint": "Peasant Awaits Certainty"]

[Text] People in the countryside usually have a far more restrained and suspicious attitude to any kind of political upheavals or campaigns than people in cities. However, the upcoming referendum has provoked a wave of activity among rural inhabitants. Despite the fact that the moment does not seem particularly auspicious—sowing is under way, and there are plenty of pressing concerns in every peasant's yard and on every farmstead.

Nevertheless, representatives from all regional private farmers' organizations are converging in Moscow in order to determine their attitude to the referendum. Other agrarian social organizations and parties are also adopting documents and statements on this matter.

On the one hand, the peasants' growing interest in politics can be explained by the desperate nature of their present situation. The going is tough with regard to loans and material-technical provision for the work in the fields that has just begun, and a number of conflicts and contentious situations are arising as a result of the process of reforming farms and dividing up land. On the other hand, following the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies it has become clear to a number of peasants that confrontation at the top could have a serious impact on them and an already none too stable situation.

Here is the remarkable part. Whereas the position of private farmers in relation to the struggle at the top and consequently to the referendum is entirely understandable and predictable—the private peasant is resolutely in favor of the president and the executive—in another rural structure the mood has noticeably changed of late. Basically, things are no longer the same as before: All those who are not private farmers work on kolkhozes. Of the collective farms, a significant proportion are now seriously reformed and have moved closer to market methods and new forms of ownership. These include joint-stock companies, cooperatives, and associations of peasant farms... Their interests lie increasingly with the radical reforms. Even farms which retain their traditional structure are now showing more concern about the legislative bankruptcy which the Congress has demonstrated of late than the harshness of the reform course.

Peasants, whether they be private or integrated into collective farms, need certainty. They need to know what guarantees of their status exist, they need to know whether they will be able to sell their produce freely and obtain loans by mortaging their land, and whether they should ultimately expect a law on agricultural cooperatives... In the present situation it is difficult to count on this. It is also hard to expect the Congress and the present body of deputies to suddenly divert themselves from the power struggle and get down to business.

This is why more and more people in the countryside support the executive. Although plenty of unanswered questions remain, the peasants' choice at the upcoming referendum is looking increasingly clear.

International Affairs

Supreme Council Chairman Views START I During PRC Visit

LD1504091093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] Ratification of the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by Ukraine's parliament would happen tomorrow if Ukrainian legislators were to find out today that two important issues had been resolved: on the ownership and on the conversion of nuclear missile units deployed on the territory of the state. This was stated by Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, who is on an official visit to China.

Commenting on the recent expression by a representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry on this issue, Plyushch acknowledged that there are political forces in Ukraine that want Ukraine to be a nuclear state. But there are more forces, and I belong to them, observed the chairman of the Supreme Council, that want us and Russia to have significantly better relations than we had previously. Healthy forces, said Ivan Plyushch, do not even think about Ukraine altering its nuclear course and changing its position on the issue of reducing nuclear weapons with their forthcoming elimination and limitation of their proliferation.

The issue is a material one now. Ukraine is nuclear not because of weapons, but because of atomic power units. There is a large quantity of fuel for our atomic electric power stations in missile units. So it is not worth simply giving them away like that, and carrying out conversion. We are saying that conversion of these nuclear units and systems would be carried out at enterprises in Russia. There would be some kind of expenditure as a result of the conversion. We are prepared to remunerate Russia for them, but to receive part of the fuel, said Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in a press interview while on an official visit to China.

Commentary Focuses on U.S. Unwillingness To Receive Kuchma

MK1304090293 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 3

[Mikhail Shchipanov commentary: "Kuchma Turned Away From U.S. Gates"]

[Text] With unexpected harshness President Clinton and Vice President Gore have turned Ukrainian Premier Kuchma away from the house. The White House, naturally. The refusal was issued with the utmost diplomacy: For a number of reasons, it was said, a meeting and talks with the head of state can in no way be guaranteed, and Kuchma only happens to be going to the United States at the invitation of a U.S. congressional committee to study agrarian experience there. He evidently wanted to combine something pleasant for the organism with something useful for politics. But it did not come off.

Not, of course, that it is a matter of the personality of Leonid Kuchma himself, a businesslike and vigorous technocrat. In this way the inhospitable White House has voiced its displeasure at Kiev's nuclear policy, which is increasingly starting to compromise Washington itself. Indeed, far from stupid people have advised not being in a hurry to recognize certain former Soviet republics until the newly emerged countries resolve a number of formal points. This has primarily concerned Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which shelter nuclear missiles on their lands. In the morning they subscribe to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in the evening they exchange ambassadors. But the Americans have been in a hurry. They very much wanted to see off the collapsing empire as quickly as possible. And what now? How is it possible to preach the idea of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, if any country that is hot about nuclear toys can taunt Washington with the example of Ukraine: Kiev also promised to denuclearize itself, and what happened? The Yanks have no one to blame but themselves.

In this situation it is Kuchma who has run up against unpleasantness and become a historical victim of circumstances. Not that Clinton's behavior is to everyone's taste on the other side of the ocean. Voices have been heard saying that he should have sat down beside the Ukrainians and talked amicably so as to clear up all the nuances of their positions. Undoubtedly a correct idea. It is high time Kiev stopped shocking the world with its dissent over the nuclear topic and made up its mind. Let us remove the missiles! No, let us leave them! This really is the trouble. Nobody proposes having a confidential talk with North Korea, which has decided to break with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but they threaten Pyongyang with various punishments. So young Clinton is moving from words to action. Russia evidently should no longer bombard Kiev with tough statements. Moscow has done everything in its power in the nuclear sphere. Incidentally, the day before yesterday the Ukrainian Officers Union also came out in favor of preserving nuclear status.

Kravchuk, Shevardnadze Comment on Russia, 'Nuclear Drift'

OW1404170593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1605 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a joint news conference on the visit of the Georgian leader to Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk said that Ukrainian- Russian relations cannot be easy because the two countries used to have most diversities. The most controversial issues in the bilateral relations were, he thinks, the sharing of the Black Sea Fleet, the status of Sevastopol, the future of strategic nuclear weapons, and economic issues.

If Russia recognized Ukraine's ownership of whatever finds itself on Ukrainian soil, all issues could be settled in the framework of the international law, the Ukrainian head of state thinks. If the 43rd Missile Army were declared Russian, that force would become an army of occupation on Ukrainian soil, he is convinced.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: A similar opinion was voiced a few days ago by Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov who wanted the 43rd Army servicemen to take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine and by Yuriy Kostenko, chairman of the parliamentary commission on START-1 ratification. For his part, a spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry described the statements made by Kiev officials on nuclear forces as "the nuclear drift" of Ukraine which causes concern among the international community.

Ukraine's top priority, Kravchuk said, was to creating its own navy. "I never thought that it would be that hard, he emphasized, or that the other side, Russia, would make territorial claims."

The Ukrainian leader reiterated his position that there was no question of his country agreeing on handing Sevastopol over to Russia. He said that at its latest meeting the Defense Council, which reports to him, had worked out "certain changes" in Ukraine's position on this issue but did not elaborate. (Vladimir Grinyov, deputy chairman of parliament, called for a long-term lease of the city to Russia which, he thinks, would suit the both sides because in this case Russia would implicitly recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over the Crimea—IF).

Kravchuk supported Eduard Shevardnadze's desire for Georgia to participate in negotiations on the Black Sea fleet.

The Ukrainian president said that he did not believe that the relations of his country with Russia could deteriorate as Ukrainian-Georgian relations improved, even though certain statements by Russian political figures had "extremist and revanchist undertones." Shevardnadze added that good relations between his country and Ukraine could only have a positive impact on the bilateral ties of these countries with Russia.

On Ukrainian Military Aid to Georgia

Kravchuk said at the news conference that the way in which Ukraine would contribute to the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict had not been decided. His country could mediate as a UN or CSCE member but this would not be "its own initiative," the president said.

"I am thankful to Leonid Kravchuk for his willingness to contribute to the resolution of the Abkhazian conflict," Eduard Shevardnadze said at the news conference.

On his return to Tbilisi he told journalists that the desire shown by Ukraine to take part in resolving the "Abkhazian" conflict would materialize in sending Ukrainian peace keeping forces to Abkhazia. "I think," the Georgian leader said, "that this factor may become decisive when participation of UN forces in the resolution of the conflict becomes a realistic proposition." (Sources in the Ukrainian president's headquarters told Interfax that Kiev officials cannot confirm Shevardnadze's remarks).

Deputies Complain to Kravchuk on Black Sea Fleet Issues

LD1404181593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] The Black Sea issue, as you see, has not lost its acuteness. This is also shown by the open letter of a group of people's deputies of Ukraine to President Leonid Kravchuk. This letter was published by the parliamentary periodical HOLOS UKRAYINY [Voice of Ukraine]. Here is an account of this letter for your attention. And here is our correspondent Olena Hrytsenko:

[Hrytsenko] The problem of the Black Sea Fleet has already been often discussed in the mass media of Ukraine. It has also often concerned violation by Russia of the Yalta agreement. This is stressed by a group of people's deputies of Ukraine in their open letter to President Leonid Kravchuk.

They write in the appeal: We have learned from reliable sources that the Ministry of Defense of Russia has in recent months been actively carrying out unilateral acts regarding management of the Black Sea Fleet. In the opinion of the people's deputies, this is a gross violation of the principles and clauses laid down in the Yalta agreement, which was signed by Ukraine and Russia in 1992.

In particular, starting last October, the appeal notes, the main headquarters of the naval forces of Russia, (?the direct command) of the Black Sea Fleet—and without appropriate sanction on the part of the Ministry of Defense of Uraine—has issued a number of decrees and orders on redeploying certain ships of the fleet beyond the state borders of Ukraine. The policy of the present command of the Black Sea Fleet of oppression and discrimination against servicemen who decided to swear allegiance to the people of Ukraine and to serve in the naval forces of Ukraine—a policy which was started by the predecessor of Baltin—is still being continued.

Special concern is aroused by instances of unlawful acts by ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the territorial waters of Georgia, in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the letter stresses. It is well known that ships of the Black Sea Fleet have carried out and are still carrying out the transfer of fuel to ground troops of Russian armed forces which are deployed in the area of the town of Gudauta in Georgia. A system of transferring fuel without mooring has been constructed for this near the Cape of Souk-Su. This fuel, the letter notes, was given by Ukraine for the requirements of the Black Sea Fleet, although Ukraine is itself now experiencing an especially acute need for fuel.

It is also well known that a council took place at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, which particularly examined the issue of not allowing officers of naval

forces of Ukraine on the territory of formations of the Fleet. A relevant order was issued on this.

The marine infantry of the Black Sea Fleet were placed on increased combat readiness from 27 March 1993. Other violations on the part of the command [word indistinct] of the naval forces of Russia are also well known, the authors of the appeal note.

All of this indisputably shows that the Yalta agreement is not being implemented, but is being deliberately and grossly violated by Russia. The group of people's deputies of Ukraine believe that in the situation which has arisen in the Black Sea Fleet, it is not only inexpedient for Ukraine to remain in the Yalta agreement, but is also harmful for the interests of our state. (?Only) canceling the Yalta agreement, and the intensive development of property of the naval forces, in the opinion of deputies, can save Ukraine from the secret plans of the Russian aggressor.

Russia Accused of Breaking Yalta Agreement

MK1404123693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report: "Yalta Agreement Jeopardized. Ukraine Accuses Russia of Unilaterally Using Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] As NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reported earlier, prior to the closed parliamentary hearing on the issue of ratification of the START I Treaty and Ukraine's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, an open letter to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk was circulated among journalists, signed by 87 deputies from all political groups and factions in parliament, suggesting that the Russian Defense Ministry is unilaterally exercising command over the ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet, and calling on Leonid Kravchuk to realize that Russia is grossly violating the Yalta agreement of 3 August last year, and therefore Ukraine must unilaterally denounce this document and concentrate on building its own navy.

This letter from deputies has become one of the links in the general chain of accusations leveled against Russia that it is violating the agreements signed. In particular it was preceded by a statement from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry of 2 April enumerating all the sins committed by the Russian military department. That statement ended with the following words: "The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is currently studying numerous proposals concerning the preparation of an appeal to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet about the possibility of considering the question of terminating the effects of the Yalta agreement."

It transpired that the Ukrainian Defense Ministry was given its information by members of the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). They circulated two documents about the events in the Black Sea Fleet. One of them is a copy of the "Report by the Commander of a Detachment of Ships on the Specific Actions in the Period from 22 September through 5 October 1992," signed by Captain First Rank V. Fomin, commander of the detachment of ships. The captain describes in detail the actions in execution of a combat mission that is formulated as follows: "To ensure the security of the vessels in sea transit and in the area of the fuel transfer point." According to this document, in order to carry out the combat mission a detachment was formed comprising the escort ship Bezukoriznennyy, the KIL-25 [exact expansion unverifiable—ship with heavy lifting rig], the VNT-38 [exact expansion unverifiable—water tanker ship], and the tanker Ton. In addition, the escort ship Bezukoriznennyy was to ensure the security of the Russian troop units positioned in the area of the town of Gudauta in the process of fuel transfer, to which end in the roadstead off the Gudauta coast, according to Captain Fomin, "a roadstead buoy [bochka] was set up in the Gudauta bay in the area as specified by the Black Sea Fleet Command, 600 meters from the passenger wharf." Next it goes on to say that after the rectification of many faults and defects in the period from 30 September to 1 October last year, 420 tonnes of diesel fuel and 234 tonnes of gasoline were transferred to the shore, for which purpose "in the area of Cape Souk-Su a fuel transmission point was set up. The overall length of the fuel pipeline from the coast storage facility to the tanker is 1,200 meters." Other details are also provided, for instance, diesel fuel transfer capacity, 40 tonnes per hour; and gasoline transfer capacity, 47 tonnes per hour.

In this document Captain Fomin also writes that "at 1700 on 2 October Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General G.G. Kondratyev set a combat task for the escort ship Bezuroriznennyy: 1) to prevent the landing of amphibious forces of the Georgian side in the area of Cape Pitsunda (Gagra), including, if necessary, the use of arms; 2) to maintain the air defense of the Gudauta Aviation Squadron; 3) to provide evidence that troops and weapons are being supplied to the Gagra group of the Georgian side." Bezukoriznennyy repeatedly, including on orders from G. Kondratyev, fired warning shots at Georgian helicopters. According to these documents, the overall cost of the operation in the Gudauta area is 9,792,568 rubles.

The other document circulated in Ukraine is the "List of Orders and Directives of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Main Staff of the Navy on Effecting Unilateral Administration of the Black Sea Fleet." This list contains the numbers and dates of orders and directives for repositioning particular vessels of the Black Sea Fleet, decommissioning helicopters, reducing the number of coastal observation units, depots, bases, coastal-based hydroacoustic complexes, radiotechnical workshops, and so forth, without coordination with the Ukrainian side. This document also asserts that without coordination with the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the KIL-158 ship was dispatched to Bulgaria and the tanker Ivan Bubnov to the Mediterranean, and in March/April this year the large antisubmarine ship Krasnyy Kavkaz and tankers Mizen and Iman moved out to the roadstead of Gudauta and Tuapse. It

was also pointed out that large landing vessels (the Olshanskiy, Ilya Azarov, and Voronezhsksiy Komsomolets) are being recommissioned and are due to be moved to Donuzlau in Crimea, to be assigned to the 39th landing vessels division. It is also reported that on 26 March 1993 Rear Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, issued an order whereby Ukrainian officers may not be allowed into the territory of the fleet's large units and vessels, and on 27 March all the marines of the Black Sea Fleet were put on high alert.

These documents, according to UNA Deputy Chairman Dmitriy Korchinskiy, were sent to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and parliament speaker Ivan Plyushch to familiarize themselves with and to act upon. No measures were taken, however, except the above- mentioned statement from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry; therefore, Korchinskiy said, there is every reason to arouse the Ukrainian public against the Yalta Agreement and to question the competence of Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, who is hiding the true state of things in the Black Sea Fleet from the commander-in-chief—President Leonid Kravchuk.

It is known by now that the defense minister, criticized both from the left and the right, has reacted in fairly strong terms to such charges, considerably radicalizing his attitude to the events in the Black Sea Fleet. Addressing the Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Officers' Union on 10 April, he stated that "it is necessary as soon as possible to divide up the battleships of the Black Sea Fleet and to ensure the withdrawal of the Russian part from the Ukrainian ports and bases and on no account agree to Ukrainian territory's being leased to Russia. And if this is the price the Russian side is demanding for the division of the Black Sea Fleet, then the question of the entire Black Sea Fleet's being withdrawn from Ukraine will be raised," Colonel General Konstantin Morozov stated. In addition, the Defense Ministry press service reported on 13 April, he ordered that the payment of allowances to the Russian Black Sea Fleet servicemen, recalculated from Russian rubles into Ukrainian coupons, be cut back; he issued instructions that the financing of housing for naval officers be approved only by the Ukrainian Naval Directorate, and refused to further support and finance the Black Sea Fleet newspaper FLAG RODINY ["The Flag of Motherland"]. Moreover, the Ukrainian defense minister issued orders to the commander of the Odessa Military District that commanders of Black Sea Fleet garrisons may be appointed only from among the servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to oversee the observance of the Ukrainian legislation.

It is noteworthy that the uproar around the Black Sea Fleet has been raised in Ukraine simultaneously with the uproar in Russia over the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine and the increasing accusations being leveled against Ukraine of deliberately delaying the ratification of the START I Treaty and its accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Insofar as the 5 April 1993 statement of the Russian Government directly accuses Ukraine of violating its earlier assumed obligations regarding nuclear weapons, it is quite possible that some Ukrainian politicians would like in response to charge Russia with breaching the documents already signed and shape public opinion accordingly.

Morozov Appoints Commanders to Black Sea Fleet Garrisons

LD1204194093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1921 GMT 12 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM-TASS and ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Balykov, Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Kiev April 12 TASS—From now on, the financing of the Black Sea fleet will be effected only by 50 per cent of the needs in funds without taking into account a rate of exchange of the karbovanets to the rouble. According to the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, such an order was sent to the appropriate services by Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov.

With the aim of exercising control over the observance of Ukrainian legislation, the defense minister decided to appoint servicemen of the Ukrainian armed forces to the posts of commanders of the garrisons where units of the Black Sea fleet are stationed. The corresponding orders are given to the commander of the Odessa Military District.

Moscow April 12 TASS—The order of April 8 by Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov on the re-subordination of commandant's headquarters located on Ukrainian territory, runs counter to the Yalta Agreement on the Black Sea fleet, a spokesman for the chief staff of the Russian navy told ITAR-TASS on Monday.

Despite the Russian-Ukrainian agreements, the Ukrainian defense minister appointed a new garrison commander of Sevastopol. In accordance with the defense minister's order, the commander of the Odessa Military District must appoint before April 15 garrison commanders in 14 populated localities, including Feodosiya, Kerch, Nikolayev, Ochakov and other cities.

It is expected that the chief command of the Russian navy will issue an official statement in connection with the Ukrainian defense minister's order of April 8.

More on Morozov's Speech to Officers' Union Congress

PM1404152193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Maryukha and Anatoliy Polyakov: "Those Who Do Not Take the Ukrainian Oath Should 'Get Out of the Republic'"]

[Text] Those who do not take the Ukrainian oath should "get out of the republic" was the refrain at the latest congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine.

The keynote speech at the congress was delivered by Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov. Speaking about difficulties in the armed forces' organizational development, he stated that the republic's Army and Navy will be created, whatever the cost.

Out of the whole of Morozov's speech two features should be highlighted in particular. First, the minister stressed that nuclear weapons will remain on the territory of Ukraine for many years more. Therefore it has been resolved to administer the Ukrainian oath to the strategic forces. Effectively, this can mean only one thing: Ukraine has no intention of forsaking the status of a nuclear power, and the "nuclear button" is being placed entirely under its control.

The refusal to scrap nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine proclaimed by the minister was the first but not the only step taken by him contrary to the documents recently signed by Ukraine. Konstantin Morozov also stated that the republic is halving its expenditure on the upkeep of the Black Sea Fleet (for what that expenditure is and Russia's share of it, see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 April 1993). It has been resolved not to finance at all certain fleet structures, for example, the Black Sea sailors' newspaper FLAG RODINY [Flag of the Motherland]. Garrison commanders in garrisons in the Crimea, Colonel General Morozov stated, will henceforth be appointed by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

Again, following the republic Defense Ministry's well known statement of 2 April, the call to denounce the Yalta agreement on the Black Sea Fleet was heard. Russian ships and Black Sea Fleet sailors who do not take the Ukrainian oath should, the minister stated, leave Ukraine. Here he specially stressed that he sees no chance of Sebastopol or any other ports being leased to the Russian section of the Black Sea Fleet as basing facilities for ships.

On the whole, after such a frank speech by the defense minister calling into question the commitments previously adopted by Ukraine, the congress expressed itself in favor of the republic's nuclear status, the earliest adoption of a military doctrine, well-considered conversion, and the provision of the army with its own armaments and equipment. It was resolved that the Ukrainian Army should be built on the "physiology [as published] of Ukrainian nationalism."

Sevastopol Residents Demand Morozov's Resignation

OW1304123693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1016 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] An appeal from residents of Sevastopol to the CIS heads of state describes the Saturday [10 April] TV statement of the Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov demanding the withdrawal of the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol as a crude violation of Yalta agreements aimed at undermining the combat capability of the fleet and the security of the southern border of the CIS. The statement will cause a new round of confrontation in Sevastopol and the Crimea as a whole. The appeal was adopted by a meeting of voters on Monday.

The public urged the heads of state to discuss the minister's statement and subordinate the fleet to the Commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces. It also demanded the withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the Crimea because they destabilize the situation there.

City residents demanded the resignation of the defence minister for trying to fan ethnic tension in the Crimea.

Russian Officers in Sevastopol To Send Cadets to Russia

LD1404121793 Kiev UKRINFORM in Russian 0822 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Stetsyuk]

[Text] Sevastopol, 14 Apr—Cadets at the Sevastopol Naval Institute, who have not sworn allegiance to Ukraine, are being transferred to naval training establishments in Russia—this decision was adopted by the Russian General Staff of the Armed Forces. A group of officers from the main headquarters of the Russian Federation Naval Fleet has arrived at the institute. In the course of two weeks they must detach approximately 700 cadets from the second to fourth years to St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad to continue their training.

Government Establishes Diplomatic Ties With Saudi Arabia

LD1404211993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2102 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Victor Lebedev]

[Text] Abu Dhabi April 15 TASS—Ukraine and Saudi Arabia have signed a protocol on establishing diplomatic relations at embassy level in Riyadh today. The document was signed by Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's foreign minister, and his Saudi Arabian counterpart Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal al-Sa'ud.

The Ukrainian delegation, headed by Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, discussed the prospects of bilateral cooperation with Saudi Industry Minister 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil on Wednesday.

Both sides showed an interest in establishing mutually beneficial ties between Kiev and Riyadh, Dmitriy Tabachnik, press secretary to the Ukrainian premier told ITAR-TASS.

According to delegation members, Leonid Kuchma was received by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia on Wednesday evening. The Ukrainian delegation, which is on a tour of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region, has already

paid visits to Sultanates of Oman and Qatar. After the completion of its visit to Saudi Arabia which began on Tuesday, the delegation will also travel to the Organization of Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

New Deals Help To Diversify Energy Supply Sources

PM1304132593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report: "Ukraine Obtains Oil from Iran and Siberia"]

[Text] Kiev—Having learned bitter lessons from dealings with just one oil supplier, Ukraine has switched to the simultaneous use of several channels for securing energy sources from abroad.

It has been announced in Kiev that agreement in principle has been reached at government level on the use of Romanian ports to receive petroleum products purchased by Ukraine abroad, primarily from Iran. While oil terminals are being built near Odessa, Ukraine will be able to receive a significant quantity of oil products via Romania.

New forms of cooperation are projected with Russia also. On the same day journalists were informed at a press conference in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers about the creation of a Russian-Ukrainian multiprofile fuel and energy company. Its founders are the "Tyumenneftegaz" science and production association and the "Ukrneft" association.

"The company is called multiprofile because it will be involved not only in producing oil at old deposits, but also in searching for new oilfields, working them, and developing the adjoining territories," Yu. Vershinin, general director of the "Tyumenneftegaz" association said.

He announced that in the first instance the company will be involved in restoring mothballed wells, of which there are several tens of thousands in Siberia. The return of these wells to operation will enable hundreds of thousands of tonnes of crude to be sent to the Ukraine's oil refineries as early as this year.

Joint production of oil and gas in Siberia has become possible following the recent signing of the Surgut agreements between Russia and Ukraine. The formation of fuel and energy companies is the first step in the implementation of these agreements.

"The founders have agreed that new commercial structures can also take part in the company's work," Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Yu. Yoffe, who is responsible for the energy complex in the government, said at the press conference. "It is above all a question of attracting funds from commercial structures for the development and exploitation of new deposits. And working teams and equipment will be sent to Tyumen immediately to restore old wells."

Yu. Yoffe went on to stress that the oil which the joint company will deliver to the republic will not be offset against the well-known 20-million-tonne quota allocated by Russia for Ukraine.

National Affairs

Kuchma Urges 'Statewide Action' To Beat Economic Ills

PM1404145793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report: "Ukraine: Budget Ratified Without Hope of Anything Better"]

[Text] Kiev—Following a three-day debate in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet the republic's budget for 1993 has been ratified.

Expenditure exceeds income. The budget deficit is more than 1 trillion karbovantsy or 7.5 percent of GNP.

Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, speaking during the debate on the draft document, said that he was dissatisfied with the budget, since it failed to provide for the republic's needs even at a minimum level. But money cannot be printed, or the situation will be impossible to rectify.

The most interesting speech at the session was that by Prime Minister L. Kuchma, who analyzed the reasons for the economic crisis in the republic in the context of the development of events in the CIS. In the premier's opinion, the last bastion of stability—Belarus, where price growth in March alone was 500 percent—is now crumbling. The final collapse of the Union economy and its financial system is now beginning. A fundamentally new economic situation is emerging in the CIS, particularly in Russia. These processes will not pass Ukraine by.

Recalling that, when the Union ship was carved up, Ukraine got the part that had never had a rudder or bottomless natural resources making it possible to maintain the level of social protection for the population that was customary under socialism, L. Kuchma listed what he considers the new main components of economic difficulty.

"We are importing inflation," the prime minister said; "we import more than we sell. Our dealings with Russia alone are out of balance to the tune of more than 2 trillion karbovantsy. That is why the economic crisis will inevitably deepen, just as the risk of growing social tension is inevitable."

L. Kuchma admitted that the last reserve for extensive development—the relative cheapness of output—has now been completely exhausted. By actively reaching world price levels for output, the prime minister said, we are automatically making that output uncompetitive. Consequently, the extensive development of all national economic sectors will no longer be maintained.

The head of the government said that it seems as though not only the church but industry and certain oblasts and rayons have now divorced themselves from the state. The Cabinet of Ministers has to all intents and purposes exhausted its ability to normalize the situation. Help is required from the Supreme Soviet and presidential structures. The prime minister did not specify just what this meant. He merely said that "there should be a large-scale statewide action whose legislative basis should be created by the Supreme Soviet. Such a system is necessary in order to prevent an all-out social catastrophe, to combat the spread of speculation and corruption—the 'allergy' impeding privatization—and to allocate available land in order to really promote economic reform."

Government To Step Up Oil, Gas Production in 1994

OW1404142293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1343 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the near future the production of oil in Ukraine must be brought up to seven million tons and of natural gas, to 30 billion [bn] cubic meters a year, Vice Premier Yuliy Ioffe told a collegium on the fuel and energy industries in the Ukrainian government.

He believes that this year the country must maintain the existing levels, 3.8 Mn [million] tons of oil and 21 Bn cubic meters of gas, and increase them gradually starting with 1994.

Ioffe said that the 1970s levels, 13.8 million tons of oil and 64.9 billion cubic meters of gas, would cover one third of the country's needs in oil and one half of its needs in gas but regaining those levels is out of the question in the coming years.

Ioffe thinks that the oil and gas production may be stepped up by discovery of new fields and by introduction of advanced technologies which will make possible using the fields which are not cost- effective now. He said that the Black Sea shelf had not been explored at all. He also mentioned high probability of discovering new oil fields in the Dnieper-Donets depression.

According to Ioffe, the government is now working out an ordinance on resource saving.

Government Decides To Reduce Gas Consumption

LD1404171193 Kiev UKRINFORM in Russian 1627 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has adopted the proposal of the State Committee for Oil and Gas to reduce by 30 percent during the April-December 1993 period the gas consumption in enterprises under the administration of the Ministry of Power and Electrification, the Ministry of Industry, and enterprises in the composition of the "Ukrainian Cement" concern and the "Ukrainian Construction Materials" corporation. Ministries and departments, and oblast, Kiev, and Sevastopol city state administrations, are charged with intensifying control over observation of gas consumption, and with ensuring that it is now consumed inefficiently.

Taking into account the necessity of increasing work directed at ensuring efficient use of gas in the national economy, it has been decided to set up a relevant state inspectorate.

Removal of Kravchuk's Kiev Representative Termed 'Startling'

LD1404172293 Kiev UKRINFORM in Russian 1627 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] Ivan Dankevych, acting representative of the president of Ukraine in Kiev, called the relieving of Ivan Saliy a "startling surprise" at a press conference for Ukrainian and foreign journalists on 13 April. It was organized by leaders of the city state administration on the subject of the decree relieving Ivan Saliy of the post of representative of the president of Ukraine in Kiev.

The organizers of the press conference stressed that under conditions of a dangerous sharpening of economic difficulties and social conflicts, Ivan Saliy, relying on the team he had formed, managed to resolve a number of urgent problems of the city. Marked progress has been achieved in some spheres. But due to the absence of the necessary authority in the administration, although he wished to do so, he did not manage to implement all of the decisions and instructions of the president and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, including that on the necessity of vacating the building at 1 Mykhaylivska Square, where the city state administration is located.

Chernobyl Director Comments on Current Operations

PM1304111293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 Apr 93

["Novosti" newscast video report from Chernobyl nuclear power station by Vladimir Lyaskalo and Vitaliy Sulima]

[Text] [Lyaskalo] A news conference was held at the Chernobyl nuclear power station today. Director Nikolay Mikhaylovich Sorokin briefed journalists on the station's current operations and the problems worrying its collective.

Electricity is being produced at the rated capacity on the No. 1 and No. 3 units. Extraction of fuel has begun on the No. 2 unit. This marks the beginning of an irreversible process to take the No. 2 power unit out of operation.

The station's collective, Sorokin noted, is ready to carry out the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolution to take the Chernobyl nuclear power station out of operation within the current year.

But both the director and the station's staff are convinced that it is necessary to return to this question. If operations at the station are halted, there will be an annual shortfall of $500 million worth of electricity in the national economy.

Furthermore—and many journalists learned this detail for the first time—the Chernobyl reactors are the main source of alloy silicon [legirovannyy kremniy], which is indispensable in the electronics industry.

At the same time specialists reassure us that following the implementation of a multitude of technical measures at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, a repetition of the 1986 accident is impossible.

Belarus

Security, Cooperation Document Signed With Netherlands

WS1504101393 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] A communique has been signed on the results of negotiations between Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka and the Dutch Foreign Minister Peter Hendrick Koemans. The document emphasizes the readiness of the sides to support security and cooperation in Europe, to build a peaceful free Europe on the basis of democracy and respect for human rights. The sides will follow the aims and principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for New Europe, and other documents of the CSCE. The Dutch minister also paid a visit to Prime Minister Kebich and had a talk with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich.

Norwegian Envoy Presents Credentials to Shushkevich

WS1404132493 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 19 Mar 93 p 1

[BELINFORM report "On Presenting Credentials"]

[Text] On 18 March 1993, Oivind Nordsleten, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Norway to Belarus, presented his credentials to Supreme Council Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich.

Mr. Oivind Nordsleten was born on 1 June 1944 in Tsin, Norway. He graduated from the Philological Department of Oslo University. He began his diplomatic career in 1974. From 1977 to 1979, he was a secretary of the Norwegian Embassy in Ankara. From 1979 to 1982, he served as a secretary in the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow. Following that assignment he headed the CIS and Eastern Europe Department of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. In July 1992, he was appointed to the post of ambassador to Ukraine.

He speaks English and Russian.

He is married and has a son and a daughter.

Moldova

Snegur on Support for Yeltsin, Relations With Romania

OW1404165793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1604 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Mircea Snegur, president of Moldova, has confirmed his support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In an interview with Romanian radio this Tuesday, he said: "Everything that the parliament and the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the Russian Federation with Ruslan Khasbulatov at its head does is an attempt to restore a communist imperial regime."

Speaking about finding a peaceful solution to the Transdniester problem, the president expressed regret over the fact that the leaders of Transdniester continue to demand the granting of confederative status which Moldova is unable to offer. Snegur hoped that the issue of the status of this region would be solved in the near future.

Answering a question about the significance of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of unification of Bessarabia with Romania in March the president said that this was proof of the fact that on both banks of the river Prut the events of 1918 were still remembered.

The president confirmed that after some minor work, soon agreements on friendship and collaboration would be signed between Moldova and Romania.

Talks Begin on 14th Army's Withdrawal from Moldova

PM1304130393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Svetlana Gamov report: "Moldova Proposes Withdrawal of Russian Peacekeeping Forces"]

[Text] Chisinau—Bilateral talks have resumed in Chisinau on the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldovan territory.

The meeting is expected to set conditions and a timeframe for the withdrawal of Russian military formations. Moldova, which assesses their presence on its territory as a destabilizing factor, is insisting that this process be accelerated. In the words of Moldovan Defense Minister P. Kryange, the republic is also committed to securing the withdrawal of the Russian contingent of peacekeeping forces stationed in the republic's eastern regions, in the zone of the earlier armed conflict.

General Says 14th Army Transfer to Dniester 'Impossible'

AU1504111393 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1815 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS 14/4/1993—General Lebed [14th Army commander] asked the population from the left bank of Dniester to organise a plebiscite in order to express distrust for the authorities of the self-proclaimed Dniester republic. This appeal was launched yesterday during the broadcast of the independent TV station "ASKET." Lebed declared the transfer of the 14th Army to the jurisdiction of the self-proclaimed Dniester republic is impossible for two reasons: First of all Russia invested 32 billion rubles in maintaining this Army and this sum could not be covered by the budget of Tiraspol and secondly a change of status in regard to the

14th Army will lead to an imbalance of forces and will break the Paris's Convention concerning the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. In this context Lebed broke the rumor about the withdrawal of the 14th Army in the distant future and declared that at present Russia is building 412 apartments for the families of officers but those apartments were destined for those who have already retired from Army.

Accusing some of the leaders of the self-proclaimed Dniester republic of corruption and replying to the attacks of people whom he currently accused, Lebed reminded them about the telegram of Ana Volcova, prime-vice president of the Supreme Soviet of Tiraspol, addressed to GKCP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] in August 1991 which revealed her intention to leave Tiraspol after the coup d'etat was collapsed. In addition, Lebed said that "Volcova came across as a traitor" in her last article "DNIESTROVSKAYA PRAVDA" concerning participation of the 14th Army in the military conflict on the left bank of Dniester. Releasing his commentaries concerning the transfer of the 24th battalion of flight-engineers towards being under the jurisdiction of Tiraspol, Lebed declared that the officers of this battalion undertook this illegal action in order to hide some hard embezzlements from the lubricant resources of the Army and affirmed that the military prosecution of the 14th Army will successfully investigate this crime.

Government Adopts Decision on Hard Currency Fund

LD1504050793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0430 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] The Moldova Government has decided to create its own hard currency fund [valyutnogo fonda]. It will exist independently of state hard currency reserves of the republic which are under the jurisdiction of the National Bank.

Beginning today, enterprises, which have received the task of obligatory deliveries of output for state needs, must market a part of that output for hard currency and give the proceeds in full to the government.

Kyrgyzstan

President Discusses Goals of Visit to Japan

OW1404192793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1839 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The press service of President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan has told Interfax that the president, during his visit to Japan on April 20-24, would pay special attention to the development of Kyrgyz-Japanese relations, specifically seeking to persuade major Japanese companies to invest in the Kyrgyz economy.

The program of the visit includes a protocol meeting with Emperor Akahito and talks with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and other government ministers.

Kyrgyz and Japanese experts are going to discuss a package of subsidies, including humanitarian aid, technical credit for industrial renovation, and funds for science, health care, and social security.

To strengthen contacts between the two nations, Akayev will also meet the heads of influential government organizations such as the Foundation for Foreign Economic Cooperation, the Export and Import Bank of Japan, and the Federation of Economic Organizations Keidanren.

First CIS Leader To Visit

LD1304121693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1139 GMT 13 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo April 23 TASS—Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev will be the first CIS head of state to visit Japan after the break-up of the Soviet Union. A briefing in Tokyo was told today by Masamichi Hanabusa, press secretary of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, that the Kyrgyz leader was officially invited by the Japanese Government to visit the country from April 20-24. He will have talks with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and will meet Emperor Akihito. It is also planned to inaugurate here an association of friendship between the two countries.

"Japan plans to establish relations with Kyrgyzstan that would serve as a model of cooperation for the other countries of Central Asia," the Japanese diplomat said. Akayev's talks here are expected to focus on humanitarian and other aid to Kyrgyzstan in order to help it complete the ongoing political and economic reforms. According to the press secretary, Kyrgyzstan's successes in this direction had predetermined Japan's choice of a partner among the Central Asian states.

Tokyo attaches great importance to the promotion of economic relations with the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, planning, among other things, to take part in prospecting and tapping there of various mineral deposits, including petroleum and gas. A delegation of experts from several ministries, state-run and private companies have already paid a number of visits to that region. Several important projects are now on the drawing boards. They will help restore the so-caleld "silk route", which used to link the east and the West in ancient times.

It is important for Tokyo that Japan has no territorial claims to the countries of that region, such as the dispute with its closest neighbour—Russia, the economic relations with which depend on the elimination of such a political obstacle. Japan was guided by this consideration when it assumed a commitment to aid Central Asia in accordance with the decisions adopted by an international conference on aid to the so-called "new independent states", i.e. 12 republics of the former USSR without the Baltic states.

Visiting Swiss Delegation To Study Economy, Cooperation

LD1504082693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0713 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[Text] Bishkek April 15 TASS—The current official visit by a Swiss Government delegation to Kyrgyzstan is intended to study the Kyrgyz economy and to select possible areas of cooperation. The delegation, led by Swiss Finance Minister Otto Stich, arrived in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, today.

The sides are expected to elaborate a joint strategy for cooperation between the two countries within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's "Swiss Group". Kyrgyzstan is a member of the latter.

The agenda of the one-day visit includes a meeting with Kyrgyz leaders and businessmen.

Government To Raise Bread Prices

OW1404162093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1544 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Kyrgyzstan Premier Tursunbek Chingyshev has told Interfax that the government had decided to raise bread prices by three to four times, but not until "the implementation of a program creating a safety net for the disadvantaged."

This program would help 1.1 million people out of the republic's population of 4.5 million, Chingyshev added.

Today 1 kilo of flour is priced at 65 to 70 rubles, but a loaf of bread sells for 9 to 15 rubles. The government issues 4 to 5 billion rubles every month to support the bakeries. Before the end of 1993 the government will require 54 billion rubles to prevent the prices from rising, while the country is burdened with a 62 billion rubles budget deficit. "The economy is coming apart under burden of the subsidies," said the premier.

Tajikistan

Dushanbe 'Not Satisfied' With Afghanistan Response to Border Situation

LD1404161793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1519 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe April 14 TASS—Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry is not satisfied with the response of the authorities of Afghanistan to Tajik protests in March-April over the aggravation of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and facts of armed interference of the neighbour state in Tajikistan's internal affairs. This is said, specifically, in a statement that Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry issued on Wednesday and referred to Kabul via the local Afghan consulate. The statement says Afghanistan's leaders avoided a definite answer and resorted to vague phrases and declarations of adherence to the principles of goodneighbourliness and non-interference in Tajikistan's internal affairs.

The document notes ever more frequent facts of strafing of frontier posts in the territory of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region and in a number of districts of the Hatlon region from Afghanistan and the participation of Afghan citizens in armed actions against the constitutional system in Tajikistan.

Regarding the theme on the recent note of Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry about the "presence of forces of an alien state in Tajikistan's territory near the Afghan borders", which, in Kabul's opinion, threatens Afghanistan's security, Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry is authorised to state that under the treaty of the Commonwealth countries on collective security, Tajikistan has a right to deploy armed forces of parties to the treaty in Tajikistan's territory. Under the same treaty it is recognised that Tajikistan's border is the common border of the CIS. This is also in accordance with the United Nations Charter and other international agreements.

At the same time, Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry notes that frontier troops of the CIS in Tajikistan have never violated Afghanistan's borders. Quite the contrary, they exert efforts to the utmost to stabilise the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The Tajik Foreign Ministry expresses the hope that Tajik leaders will be given a clear answer by officials of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and that relations between the two neighbour countries will continue to be based on the principles of goodneighbourliness, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Russian Commander on Tajik-Afghan Border Situation

LD1404162293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 14 Apr 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] The disquiet of Tajik authorities at the situation that is taking shape on the Tajik-Afghan border has grown into legitimate anxiety. This was said at a briefing for local and foreign journalists in Dushanbe.

[Begin I.A. Kharkovchuk recording, deputy head of staff of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan] Over the first four days of April alone, border guards from the Moscow Border Detachment were fighting against two enemy groups which had broken through and on 2 April for the first time the enemy attempted to make an armed incursion with a force of up to 100 men. After a 4-hour battle, the joint forces of border guards from the Russian Federation, the forces of the 201st division, and a special purpose brigade from the State Security Committtee of Tajikistan, halted the armed incursion. [end recording]

[Correspondent] As officers of the State Security Committee said at the briefing, on the territory of Shurovabadskiy rayon alone, four major arms caches were found, with radios tuned to the border guards' frequency. All this property was destined for members of the Islamic Rebirth Party being redeployed into Tajikistan, not without the help of the Afghan side, to conduct terrorist activity and, ultimately, in the words of the deserters themselves, to overthrow the existing government.

In the past two weeks alone, more than two dozen attacks were made on the border guards from Afghan territory. The attackers have lost more than 80 men. There are prisoners. Weapons have been confiscated from them, including weapons made in China and Yugoslavia. The government of Afghanistan is not reacting in the slightest to the numerous notes of protest from the Tajik side. Tajikistan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and a participant in the collective security agreement. Therefore, the Tajik-Afghan border is the border of Afghanistan with the CIS.

Prime Minister on Border Situation, Opposition Activity

MK1404084093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Apr 93 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov by Aleksandr Nadzharov; place and date not given; carried under "Tajikistan" rubric: "'People Have Faith in Present Leadership.' Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov on Situation in Republic"]

[Text] [Nadzharov] What is your assessment of the situation on Tajikistan's Afghan border?

[Abdullodzhanov] It remains complex—that is unequivocal. But I think that after the three or four recent attacks which encountered good resistance—as a result of which the attackers suffered serious losses of men and equipment—according to our information, they on the other side thought hard about whether it is worth continuing to fight.

[Nadzharov] Military victories, no matter how significant they may be, are a passing thing, whereas the political process meets the universal desire for stability. What can you say about this today?

[Abdullodzhanov] I agree with you. I imagine this process as meetings with leaders of various political parties. And Andrey Kozyrev's recent visit is evidence that this process has already begun. His trips to Iran and Pakistan brought pretty good results. I think that following this visit some positive moves will begin here on the border.

[Nadzharov] What do you mean?

[Abdullodzhanov] According to our data, the Afghan side now no longer wishes to help the opposition forces and oppositionists who have fled from Tajikistan to Afghanistan.

[Nadzharov] Should a spring offensive by the opposition be expected?

[Abdullodzhanov] I think it unlikely. Although some individual minor sorties should still be expected. But a major offensive is simply impossible after the blows that these forces suffered. Of course, it is not only our foreign but also our domestic enemies who are thinking hard. The most important thing is that the people do not want what the oppositionists want. People are for stability. They have faith in the present republic leadership. This means vast support for us, which is clearly growing. And the power structures are now powerful enough. In essence, there is no force that could bank on success in destabilizing the situation.

UN General Secretary To Send Envoy To Help Negotiate

OW1404195993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1839 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] UN General Secretary Butrus-Butrus Ghali in a reply to a message by Tajik leader Imamali Rakhmanov informed the latter of his intention to send his own special envoy, Ismat Kittani, to the republic to establish a negotiating process between the warring sides.

In his address the UN General Secretary declared his support for the Tajik government's efforts towards stabilizing the political situation in the country and achieving a national armistice.

He also stressed his alarm over the situation along the Tajik- Afghan border which, in his opinion, threatened to heighten tension in the border regions.

Turkmenistan

Parliament Grants President Right To Adopt Decrees

OW1304173393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1544 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At its Monday [12 April] session the Turkmen parliament granted the right to adopt decrees on separate issues to President Saparmurad Niyazov. The parliamentarians have only deprived him of the authority to alter the Constitution, criminal and administrative legislation, and legal procedure.

Decrees adopted by the President will be destined to further confirmation by the parliament.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: According to the Constitution, President Niyazov is the head of both executive and legislative powers. He heads the government, fills the posts of central and local executive authorities, and rules them. The President has the right to issue decrees, resolutions, and instructions which have obligatory legal force on the territory of the whole republic.

Having made the decision on April 12, the Turkmen parliament has brought a provision of the Constitution stipulating that the parliament can transfer the right to adopt decrees on separate issues to the President into life.

Uzbek President Arrives for Visit, Meets Niyazov

LD1404192793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] A government delegation of Uzbekistan, headed by President Islam Karimov, arrived in Turkmenistan today. Karimov had a meeting with President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov. During this meeting they discussed questions of the political situation in the Central Asian region and further development of the mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of bilateral agreements.

75

Armenia

'Reports' Say Turkey Said Sending Troops to Nakhichevan

NC1404160793 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1300 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] The Azerbaijanis used armored cars and military aircraft in the unsuccessful 13 April attack on Martuni in Karabakh from military bases in Agdamskiy Rayon. Four self-defense forces fighters and a number of Martuni residents were wounded. One Azerbaijani tank was hit and [number indistinct] Azerbaijani soldiers were killed.

Azerbaijani equipment and troops are being concentrated south of the Lachin humanitarian corridor. The situation is relatively calm in Mardakertskiy and Kelbadzharskiy Rayons.

The border villages in Kapanskiy Rayon were shelled on the night of 13 April. Large amounts of Azerbaijani equipment are being concentrated near the Kapanskiy Rayon border.

Movses in Tavushskiy Rayon was shelled on 13 April.

According to reliable reports, Turkish troops have been transferred from Turkey to Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic dressed as civilians. In his 7 April statement in Tashkent, Turkish President Turgut Ozal said a special task force of 800 soldiers had already been prepared and that there were plans to send it to the operational area to assist Azerbaijan.

According to the latest reports, Azerbaijani units launched a new offensive on Martuni this morning. Azerbaijan is using tanks and armored personnel carriers. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's self- defense forces have forced the enemy to retreat to its previous positions. One self-defense forces soldier was wounded. The enemy suffered major losses.

Gadrut was shelled by tanks today.

Official Says Turkey 'Dare' Not Interfere in Conflict

OW1404144393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents D. Voskoboynikov, and I. Porshnev, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The tough anti-Armenian statements by Turkish leaders are a kind of preparatory bombardment, which will evidently be followed by some diplomatic steps," said the Press Secretary of Armenia's Foreign Ministry, Aram Safaryan, in an interview with INTERFAX's correspondent in Yerevan.

Though a strong enough state, Turkey will hardly dare to interfere in the Armenian-Azeri conflict, he said.

Iranian Parliament Wants To Review Relations With Armenia

LD1404191093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1825 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Kuzmin]

[Text] Tehran April 14 TASS—A majority of members the Iranian Majles (Parliament) expressed today its opinion in favour of "reviewing relations between Tehran and Yerevan" and increasing "material aid and moral support to the Republic of Azerbaijan".

In a statement read out during an open session of the Majles a group of parliamentarians condemned the "Armenian aggression" and demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Armenian troops from the Azeri territory.

Members of the parliament called on the "rulers of Armenia" to resolve the conflict with Azerbaijan through the mediation of international and regional organizations. The statement was signed by 150 members of parliament out of 270.

Charge d'Affaires to Iran Recalled After Attack on Embassy

NC1404195693 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1830 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Azerbaijani students at Tehran University held a rally on campus on 13 April. The rally, in which 500-600 people took part, had an anti-Armenian nature. The demonstrators marched to the Armenian Embassy at 1530, but were confronted by a police barricade. The embassy was stoned and windows broken. The police were ordered to control the demonstrators. [Words indistinct] adopted a resolution at the rally. This information was provided to ARMENPRES by the Armenian Foreign Ministry Press Service.

Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan summoned Iranian Charge d'Affaires in Yerevan Ahmad Sobhani and demanded an explanation for the incident. The foreign minister expressed the Armenian authorities' concern.

Sobhani assured Papazyan that the Iranian authorities will do everything to ensure the security of the Armenian Embassy and to prevent such events from recurring.

Vahan Bayburdyan, Armenian charge d'affaires ad interim in Tehran, has been recalled to Yerevan for consultations.

Azerbaijan Said Kidnapping Armenians for POW Exchanges

NC1404113793 Yerevan SNARK in English 1039 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Stepanakert, April 14 (SNARK)—The Karabakh State Department of Press and Information has declared:

76

The Azerbaijani side is capturing the people of Armenian nationality on the territories of the CIS and the former USSR as the hostages for the further exchange for the prisoned Azerbaijani soldiers. If Azerbaijan doesn't end the capturing actions the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will have to undertake the adequate measures.

Yerevan Denies Azerbaijani Media Reports, Updates Situation

NC1404183193 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1330 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest incidents in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Quoting Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry Press Service, the Azerbaijan mass media organs have reported that the Armenian Armed Forces have occupied several towns in Zangelanskiy and Fizulinskiy Rayons. Explaining in depth the reason why such reports have been issued is unnecessary. As usual, Azerbaijan has tried to convince the world that Armenia is the aggressor. The NKR Self-Defense Forces Command Headquarters has denied the reports that Armenian forces have occupied several towns in Fizulinskiy Rayon. The command headquarters also said that the NKR armed units are based in NKR's Gadrutskiy Rayon and along Fizulinskiy Rayon's border. They are prepared to obstruct any possible attack by Azerbaijan.

Although tension continues to prevail in Nagorno-Karabakh, the operative situation has remained unchanged during the past two days. The confrontation between the two sides on NKR's battlefields has been mainly in the form of positional fighting. However, movement in the Lachin humanitarian corridor has been maintained unimpeded. The corridor is being used to transfer medicine, provisions, fuel, and other peaceful commodities to the Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] people. Meanwhile, we welcome the fact that tens of thousands of Armenians, who were forced to emigrate from their ancestral homeland as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, are returning to Artsakh.

The latest reports say that Azerbaijan's military positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon intensely fired on Gadrut the previous night, causing damage.

Let us now report on the situation in the border area between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where a serious state of confrontation exists. There have been no significant incidents, however. Armenia's Noyemberyanskiy, Idzhevanskiy, and Gorisskiy Rayons have been fired on from Azerbaijan. The Armenian side was compelled to take retaliatory measures to silence the enemy emplacements. Meanwhile, the situation in the other parts of the border was relatively peaceful last night.

A peaceful situation is essential in the region. The existing problems can only be resolved through talks. Regrettably, Azerbaijan is not interested in holding talks. That is confirmed by the visit of an Azerbaijani delegation to Turkey and Iran. It has been ascertained that the delegation asked for arms and military experts for Azerbaijan.

CSCE Military Envoys Examine Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

OW1404192593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1839 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [14 April] a group of CSCE supervisors who arrived in Armenia on April 13 visited a section of the Armenia- Azerbaijan border to become familiar with the situation in the region of the armed conflict. Armenia's chief frontier commissar Grigor Grigoryan and acting chief of the Defense Ministry's military police department Suren Davtyan are accompanying the CSCE supervisors. The press center of the defense ministry told Interfax that following their visit to the bordering regions, on April 15 the supervisors are to present their conclusions on the conflict's settlement to the UN Security Council.

Government To Begin Work To Repair Nuclear Power Plant

OW1304165993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1627 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Armenia has resolved that primary work is to begin on launching the Armenian Nuclear power plant, Interfax was told at the Government press service. In particular, ministries and institutions are to provide the plant personnel with food, transportation and medical services.

Specialists estimate the Armenian plant will start generating electricity in no sooner than one and a half year's time.

The plant was shut down following broad public protest after the earthquake of December 1988, although it suffered no damage. The authorities decided that the controversy over its re-launch would be resolved via referendum. This March, however, parliament, following persistent requests by President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, allowed the government to settle the issue on its own.

The proponents of the launch of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant think this measure will somehow relieve the burden of an energetic crisis that hit the republic partly because of blockade by neighboring Azerbaijan.

Budgets 5 Billion Rubles for Nuclear Plant

OW1404162693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1545 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

77

[Text] The Armenian government has allocated 5 Bn. [billion] rubles from its reserve fund as initial spending to resume work at the country's moth-balled atomic power plant. Officials of the Atomtekhenergo company told Interfax that the company was now working over a programme and concept of commissioning the plant.

Energy and fuel ministry officials told Interfax that Armenia and Russia were now trying to flesh out an agreement on the resumption of work at the atomic power station. Plans were under way to strike deals with the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow and Atomteploenergoproyekt and Gidrapress companies which will be responsible for project management, design and construction.

Energy and Fuel State Minister Sepukh Tashian told Interfax that the plant would be put into commission in 18 months' time. He said a set of priorities would be set for ministries and departments in the next thirty days followed by a thorough study of the station's state. Preparations for commissioning the plant are expected to start within three to six months from then Tashian said that as a party concerned, Russia might finance the re-commissioning of the plant, supply atomic fuel and take care of how to dispose of atomic waste.

The Armenian atomic power plant was shut down under public pressure in the aftermath of the 1988 earthquake, though undamaged. Although the authorities wanted to hold a referendum on its recommissioning, Armenian deputies authorised the government to decide on the facility's future under pressure from President Levon Ter-Petrosyan in March.

Minister Says Reopening Depends on Safety

NC1404064893 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Excerpts] Based on the Armenian Supreme Soviet's decision of 18 March 1993 to annul an earlier decision on 17 April 1991, on the procedure to reopen the Armenian nuclear plant or build a new plant, the Armenian Government decided to start work on 12 April to reopen the plant.

Here is our correspondent Manuk Ter-Stepanyan:

[Begin recording] [Ter-Stepanyan] State Minister Sepuh Tashdzhyan held a brief news conference today on the government's decision. Opening the news conference, he said:

[Tashdzhyan] The reopening of the nuclear plant has been under discussion for two years. [words indistinct] Regrettably, we closed the plant four years ago without calculating the consequences. The past two winters showed us that if we had had the 819 megawatt power generated by the plant, we would have had 2.5 times more power than we generated in the past two years. The examination over the past two years and the effects of two winters forced us to seriously consider reopening and making the nuclear plant part of our energy system. It is most important for us to upgrade our country's energy complex to improve life for our people and avoid the difficulties we already experience. [passage omitted]

Work has not started in the sense that the plant could become operational today. The government's decision does not mean the plant must be reopened at all costs. It will be reopened only if its technical safety is confirmed and guaranteed and, if possible, safety is increased. Our people must rest assured that the government is taking care; if the plant's safety cannot be ensured, it will not reopen. [passage omitted]

[Ter-Stepanyan] Tashdzhyan, let us hope everything goes smoothly. When will the nuclear plant open?

[Tashdzhyan] Depending on the results of this winter's preliminary technical work, the nuclear plant could reopen in 18 months.

[Ter-Stepanyan] The state minister also replied to other questions from reporters. [end recording]

Azerbaijan

Turkey's Ozal Continues Visits, Talks With Kamberov

LD1404132193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1149 GMT 14 Apr 93

[By AZERTAC correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Baku April 14 TASS—Dealing with its vital problems, Azerbaijan draws on Turkey's historic experience in establishing its independence, Isa Kamberov, speaker of Azerbaijan's parliament, said on Wednesday during a meeting with Turgut Ozal, head of the Turkish state. Noting Azerbaijan's adherence to democratic reforms and socio-economic transformations, he urged the leadership of friendly Turkey to take more specific steps to help Azerbaijan at this time of trial.

Turgut Ozal proclaimed Turkey's readiness to support Azerbaijan on its road of reforms. At the same time he believes Azerbaijan should use more effectively its rich economic potential which, in his opinion, is an earnest of political success.

The Turkish president also met with deputies of the National Assembly.

Hints at Force To Reverse Armenian Gains

TA1404194293 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1700 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Excerpts] A joint news conference was organized by Turkish President Turgut Ozal and Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey at the end of their meetings.

At the news conference Ozal said that there is a contradiction between the reports that on the one hand Armenia is in dire hardship and on the other hand that it

is invading an independent country—disregarding completely the UN and CSCE principles.

Ozal said that the help and cooperation that Turkey can extend to Azerbaijan, taking into consideration all these events, is being investigated thoroughly and added: Turkey is declaring today that this issue will grow if in the coming days it is not solved in keeping with CSCE and UN principles. If this issue grows then the problems in the region will increase even more. Our thoughts on this issue are in accordance with those of Elchibey. In addition to economic aid, under the circumstances, it is natural that Turkey continue to increase its help to Azerbaijan regarding the existing situation. [passage omitted]

Answering journalists' questions both presidents stated that a final solution to the issue should be reached by agreement and not by war and added that to attain a solution it is necessary for Armenia to withdraw from the Azerbaijani territories it has occupied.

Ozal stated that Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territory is unacceptable and stressed that if Armenia does not pull out from the territories than Armenia will be removed from those territories.

Elchibey said that if Armenia does not pull out from the Azerbaijani territories it occupies by itself, then it will be thrown out of those territories by force in two or three months.

Ozal and Elchibey stated that Turkey and Azerbaijan did not sign any military agreements. In answer to a journalist's question as to Turkey giving Azerbaijan every kind of support and aid, and whether military assistance is included in that aid, Ozal answered: Not everything can be announced here. [passage omitted]

Ozal later met with several leaders of opposition parties in Azerbaijan. Ozal will return to Turkey tomorrow after concluding his contacts.

Views Russian Involvement in Kelbadzhar

NC1504100593 Baku TURAN in English 0924 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Text] Baku 15 April (TURAN)—Joint press-conference of presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkey took place yesterday evening.

[Azerbaijani President Abulfaz] Elchibey said in his opening address that the main theme of the negotiations with the Turkish side was the question on occupation of the region of Kelbadzhar of Azerbaijan.

[Turkish President] Turgut Ozal said touching upon possibility of military interference into Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, that "Turkey will render all kinds of support [to] Azerbaijan, but military interference is an extreme measure which can lead to global opposition in the region. That is why we come forward for settlement of this question under the CSCE and the UN".

Turgut Ozal said according to concluding of defensive alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan that this question was not discussed.

Speaking about participation of the third side in Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict the president of Turkey marked that he lacks facts which prove participation of Russia in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But on the eve of the capture of the region of Kelbadzhar, Russian transport planes IL-76 made about 60 flights from Sochi to Gumri. "I do not think that humanitarian loads were transferred from Russia to Armenia".

The president of Azerbaijan in his turn announced that he does not doubt in the direct participation of Russia in the war on the side of Armenia. So, 5 types of fighting planes, sub-units of the engineers and sub-units of mining special purpose, which Armenia lacks, took part in capture of the region of Kelbadzhar from the Armenian side. At last, materials of radio intercept show that all military activities were controlled by Russian officers from the territory of Armenia". [no opening quotation marks as received]

The president of Azerbaijan flatly disproved possibility of acception of the plan of Goble by Azerbaijan, provided the exchange of territories between Armenian and Azerbaijan.

Special Warfare Department Chief Accompanys Ozal

NC1404180993 London Kanal-6 Television in Turkish 1630 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Excerpt] Turkish President Turgut Ozal has invited the Armenians to make peace, raised the Azerbaijanis' morale by praising their patriotism, and tried to iron out differences.

Ozal continued his in-depth talks with Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey during his second day in Baku.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and Lieutenant-General Erdogan Oznal, head of the Turkish Chief of Staff's Special Warfare Department, also took part in the meetings.

Kanal-6 correspondent Metin Corabatir reports that during the luncheon given in honor of Ozal and during all his speeches in Baku, Ozal said that Turkey, state and people, supports Azerbaijan. [passage omitted]

Turkish Paper Reports First Batch of Weapons Dispatched

LD1504093693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0923 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Feoktistov]

[Text] Ankara April 15 TASS—Turkey shipped the first batch of weapons and ammunition to Azerbaijan, the HURRIYET newspaper reports this Thursday.

79

The newspaper notes that Turkish Vice-Premier Erdal Inonu indirectly confirmed military aid to Azerbaijan at a government news conference held here on Wednesday. He said: "We seek to reply positively to any request in conformity with our possibilities.

"Aid can assume any forms. We are obliged to help Azerbaijan and will never leave it alone."

The arms shipment coincided with the arrival in Baku of General Erdogan Oznal, a representative of the Turkish General Staff, who will accompany Turkish President Turgut Ozal during his visit to Azerbaijan.

The newspaper reports that Russian planes flew from the Turkish city of Adana on Wednesday with U.N. humanitarian aid for Azeri population who suffered from hostilities.

The aid consists of medicines, blankets and tents. Planes will deliver prime necessities to Azerbaijan every day till April 24.

Armenian Forces Said To Order Execution of Azerbaijani Prisoners

NC1404174193 Paris AFP in English 1715 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report by Christopher Boian]

[Text] Baku, April 14 (AFP) - Armenian troops involved in the capture of the Azerbaijani province of Kelbadzharskiy ordered the execution of prisoners and that their remains be hidden, a foreign diplomatic source said Wednesday in Baku.

The source, speaking on condition he not be identified, said foreign diplomats had been offered rare access by Azerbaijani authorities to recordings of radio transmissions between the military units involved in the offensive on Kelbadzharskiy in which the orders were given.

"Kill the prisoners then bury everybody 10 meters deep and if possible flatten the entire area", the source quoted an ethnic Armenian commander on one of the tapes as saying.

The order was given on April 7 in connection with a "senior person" identified only as Grigorovich travelling to the Kelbadzharskiy area from "the big town"—a reference to the Armenian capital Yerevan—accompanied by foreigners, the source said. The command was given in Armenian and the tapes were translated into Azerbaijani.

The numbers of prisoners involved were not known and it was unclear whether they included civilians.

The tapes however also contained Russian-language commands spoken by Russians using military codes dating from the war in Afghanistan formerly used by the Soviet Armed Forces there, the source said.

There were indications that elements of the Russian 7th Army based in Armenia had at least operational control over parts of the Armenian offensive, but it was impossible to tell if their involvement was official or on a mercenary level, the source said.

(Azeri Foreign Minister Tofik Gasymov said Wednesday in Istanbul that Russia was "behind" the Caucasus conflict "as it does not want to withdraw from the region."

(Gasymov, on his way back to Baku from a visit to the United States, said: "The main reason for the hostilities in the Caucasus is Russia's refusal to withdraw its troops from the region. Only Azerbaijan sent them back after its independence.")

The tapes also contained evidence of "deliberate shelling of civilian areas" in the Kelbadzharskiy province, the source stated.

This was in line with testimonials from refugees who fled the region over the Murov Pass to the north who have said their villages and the main road for their escape were shelled by Armenian forces.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Calls Delegation's Visit to Ukraine 'Fruitful'

OW1404135493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1342 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian leader, described the visit of a Georgian delegation which he headed to Ukraine as "fruitful." In an interview he gave journalists in Tbilisi airport on his arrival, he arrived from Kiev Tuesday [13 April], Shevardnadze said that the accords that had been signed there "laid a good groundwork for bilateral relations." Nearly 20 documents had been signed, notably a friendship and cooperation treaty.

The Georgian leader noted that President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine was willing to contribute to resolution of the Abkhazian conflict, going as far as sending Ukrainian peace keeping forces there. "I believe, Shevardnadze said, that this factor may become decisive when actual participation of UN forces in resolving the conflict becomes a realistic proposition." Tengiz Sigua, Georgian prime minister, told journalists that the sharing of the Black Sea fleet had also been discussed in Kiev. The Ukrainian negotiators promised to have Georgian interests in mind when this issue was negotiated with Russia.

Sigua emphasized that the Georgian delegation "succeeded even more than expected" in the economic field. The volume of trade between the two states will total, he said, 70 Bn [billion] this year. The Ukrainian team showed keen interest in participating in construction of the Transcaucasian road and pipeline which will link

Baku and the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti. Construction of an oil terminal, said Sigua, is to start in the environs of Odessa soon.

Shevardnadze Aide Stresses Importance of Ties With Russia

OW1404143693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents D. Voskoboynikov and I. Porshnev, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] No privileged relations with any other country can replace for Georgia normal ties with its great northern neighbor, Russia," said Teymuraz Stepanov, assistant to the Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, in an interview with INTERFAX. "It's a "question of life and death" for Tbilisi, he stressed, and relations with Ukraine "can by no means eclipse relations with Russia for Georgia. "It's impossible to replace one thing with the other," said Stepanov.

That Shevardnadze is in favor of an active policy in Georgia's relations with all the former Soviet republics is another matter, he stressed. This notion guided the Georgian leader during his recent visit to Kiev, where about two dozen agreements were signed. "However this should not be viewed as the desire to infringe on the interests of a third side," Stepanov pointed out.

According to him, Georgia's geopolitical situation induces it to maintain good relations with all its neighbors, and first of all with Russia. "Shevardnadze is a pragmatic, who realizes that relations with Russia should be normal. We would like these relations to be privileged," said the Georgian leader's aide.

He deplored the fact that Georgian-Russian relations are now "far from the state that would be the most worthy of them". According to Stepanov, the attempts to ensure Russia's geopolitical interests in the region by means of force are "doomed". In the meantime it's quite possible to resolve all problems in a civilized way.

He described the radiotechnical laboratory in Eshery and the Russian military units stationed in Abkhazia as the "Trojan horses", which are used to exert pressure on Georgia". "The Abkhazian units deployed not far from Eshery often shell Sukhumi. Any response on the part of Georgia is fraught with something "straying" into the area occupied by the laboratory. Retaliation, often far from being adequate, follows," Stepanov explained. This problem obstructs the efforts to bring Georgian-Russian relations to a new level, he added.

Another Russian-Georgian summit could be conducive to resolving this problem, Stepanov noted. "It's clear that such a summit is needed. However it's equally clear that such a meeting should have some concrete results," he stressed. To hold a Russian-Georgian summit before the referendum to be conducted in Russia on April 25 "is virtually impossible", he added.

Russian Envoy on Agreements Reached With Georgia

LD1404161393 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1251 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] Mr. Zemskiy, Russian Federation ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Georgia, held a press conference today in the Russian embassy in Tbilisi. The press conference was almost exclusively devoted to the results of the fourth round of Russo-Georgian talks in Sochi.

The ambassador commented in detail on the protocol of the talks between government delegations from the two countries, drawing particular attention to several points. In particular, Mr. Zemskiy reported that during the talks the Russian and Georgian sides spoke in favor of more active UN and CSCE involvement in trying to reach a settlement of the Abkhazian conflict. Regarding the Georgian- Ossetian conflict, the delegations agreed to support CSCE efforts to arrange a dialogue between the sides involved in the conflict with the aim of achieving total settlement.

In conclusion Mr. Zemskiy stated that the meeting in Sochi and the adoption of the document there were aimed at preparing the way for a meeting between the heads of the two states of Russia and Georgia.

Shevardnadze, Sigua Deny Israeli Arms Supply

TA1504102293 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Apr 93 p 8

[Report from Georgia by Yosef Galili]

[Text] Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and the Georgian prime minister, Professor Tengiz Sigua, have categorically denied Radio Abkhazia reports alleging that Israel had dispatched a plane with weapons through businessman Ya'aqov Nimrodi. The prime minister, who met with Israeli reporters in his office yesterday, disclosed that Nimrodi and other businessmen recently visited Tbilisi, but for business purposes only. During the visit, Nimrodi contracted to supply 25,000 tonnes of rice to Georgia, and the possibility of deals for the supply of various types of food was discussed.

In reply to a question, the prime minister noted the strong similarity between Israel and Georgia, both surrounded by Muslim countries. Israel, he said, has a lot of experience in living with them while developing a modern country marked by economic and technological achievements. For this reason, he said, relations with Israel are very important to us, and we would like to learn from it.

Noting that the Russian Army is aiding Abkhazia against Georgia, Prime Minister Sigua said that the conservative nationalistic Moscow parliament is exploiting the rivalry

with Yeltsin to extend military assistance to the Abkhas in a bid to embroil Georgia in a war with Russia—a war which is already being waged.

[Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew at 0500 GMT on 15 April carries a report by correspondent Itay Engel, adding that "despite the intention of Georgian Jewry to avoid becoming identified with any of the sides in the ethnic-territorial disputes, it appears that they are being dragged into the complex, bloody turmoil over control of the northeastern part of the republic. The Jews there are involuntarily being seen as identifying with the Georgian side." According to Jewish Agency officials in Tbilisi, "the Abkhas are preventing a Jewish couple from leaving the war zone and are keeping them under house arrest." Engel adds that "the Jewish Agency has appealed to the International Red Cross and the International Human Rights Committee, but their intervention with the Abkhas has so far been unsuccessful."]

Georgian Forces Reportedly Bombard Abkhazian Positions

LD1504092393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0759 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr—The defense ministry of Abkhazia said today that Abkhazian positions and the settlements of Eshera and Shetskvara are under artillery and mortar bombardment by Georgian troops. Two peaceful inhabitants of the village of Eshera have been killed by a direct missile hit on a house. The Georgian side is carrying out a regrouping of forces.

In the evening of 14 April, a cargo ship with equipment and ammunition arrived in the port of Sukhumi. But a situation report from the military department of Abkhazia notes that it was brought out of action by artillery fire.

According to information from the same source, during the past 24 hours, the settlements of Atara Armyanskay, Pakuash, and Labra of Ochamchirskiy Rayon were under artillery bombardment by the Georgian troops. This morning there was relatively calm on the eastern front. According to information from the Abkhazian defense ministry, the Zugdidi-Sukhumi raliroad has been closed.

Abkhazians Resume Shelling of Sukhumi

LD1504073893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0651 GMT 15 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Sochi April 15 TASS—The Abkhaz side resumed daily shelling of Sukhumi after a lull, ITAR-TASS learnt on Thursday at the press centre of the Georgian Armed Forces deployed in Abkhazia.

Twelve shells exploded in downtown Sukhumi on Wednesday. One man was killed and eight wounded. Four of them are Russian.

Rally for Gamsakhurdia Dispersed in Tbilisi

OW1404192993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1839 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the second half of the day on Wednesday [14 April] Tbilisi police dispersed a seven thousand-strong unsanctioned rally by supporters of the ousted president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

The press service of the Georgian interior ministry informed Interfax that there had been no casualties. Several Zviadists with red paint over themselves tried to stay in sight of the cameras, the press service claimed.

Parliament Appoints Advadze Ambassador to Russia

MK1504094293 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 16, 18 Apr 93 (Signed to Press 13 Apr) p A4

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Appointment"]

[Text] With just a single vote tipping the balance, the parliament of the Republic of Georgia has appointed Professor Valerian Advadze as the first ambassador to Russia.

He was born in 1931, and is an economist by training. He defended his doctoral thesis in 1970. Before that the ambassador worked as chairman of the parliamentary commission on economic reform, and as director of the Institute of Economics. He was elected a people's deputy of the USSR before the breakup of the Union. Advadze is an academician of Russia's Academy of Economic Sciences and Entrepreneurial Activities. He was Zviad Gamsakhurdia's main rival in the May 1991 presidential elections, and nearly paid for that with his life. "Zviadists" shot at his apartment and smashed up his study. The Union of National Accord and Revival of Georgia led by Advadze secured four seats in the latest parliamentary elections. Many consider him a person of a pro-Russian orientation, and close to the head of state, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Giorgadze Named Head of Permanent Delegation to Vienna

AU1304131193 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 9 Apr 93 p 2

[GIA report under rubric "According to Reports From Correspondents and Information Agencies: "A Georgian Delegation Has Been Established"]

[Text] A permanent Georgian delegation has been established at the UN European Center, the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts, and the CSCE Security Forum in Vienna.

Nodar Giorgadze, member of the Georgian Parliament, chief military adviser to the head of state, has been appointed head of the delegation.

Estonia

Foreign Minister Comments on Ties With Europe

OW1504112593 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1102 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Even though Estonia's biggest trade partners, Sweden and Finland, have become members of the European Community, Estonia must not find itself behind an iron curtain once again, this time behind a customs curtain, said Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste.

After his return from Copenhagen where he attended a conference on economic development in Central and Eastern Europe, he told reporters that prospects for Estonia's cooperation with the West were good. Although many of the western companies are making efforts to protect their markets from cheaper commodities coming from Eastern countries, including Estonia, politicians view this problem more astutely and favor broader trade and economic cooperation.

The minister also attached great importance to the preservation of the treaties on free trade with Sweden and Finland, despite of their membership in the European Community. "Through these states, our goods, most of all inexpensive and quality textiles, will gain access to a vast market," he said.

He also noted that the northern states would not like new customs barriers to separate them from the Baltic states.

European integration must not complicate long-established contacts, said the Estonian foreign minister.

Defense Minister Views Foreign Help With New Armed Forces

AU1504103293 Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 8 Apr 93 p 4

[Interview with Estonian Defense Minister Hain Rebas by Wojciech Luczak; place and date not given: "An Anakonda Please!"]

[Text] [Luczak] At what stage of being organized are the Estonian Armed Forces? Is Sweden assisting Estonia in forming an army? Are you interested in items produced by the Polish defense industry?

[Rebas] We are training about four infantry battalions. We have a Border Guard numbering about 2,000 men. We also have a 6,000-strong National Guard, and we have naval and air forces. The main headquarters of our Armed Forces has only been in existence for 15 months, and the ministry itself has only been in existence 8 months.

We are not only being helped by the Swedes, but also by the Finns. The French have been helping us most. They supplied us with out first uniforms and boots. They provided us with vehicles and communications equipment. Then the Germans came with uniforms and communications equipment. Sweden and Finland have also given Estonia economic assistance. In addition, they have ensured a good training for the future officers and non-commissioned officers of the Estonian Army.

We would like Poland to help us in training Navy officers. We are also hoping that we might be able to use equipment that Poland does not need. However, what matters most to is us political support and backing from the Polish Government in the international arena.

[Luczak] Is it true that Estonia is interested in Polish helicopters?

[Rebas] We have to patrol our borders. So, we must have multipurpose helicopters and boats. I discussed the patrolling of the coastline during my visit to Gdansk. We were also shown Polish helicopters there—the naval version of the Sokol, that is, the Anakonda. We would be interested in a smaller version of this kind of helicopter.

State Assembly Ratifies Agreements With Hungary, Poland

OW1404204993 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1841 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [14 April] Estonia's state assembly ratified a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the Estonian Republic and the Hungarian Republic.

The treaty emphasizes the linguistic and ethnic similarity of the two peoples. The document pays special attention to the expansion of contacts between political, public, and environmental organizations at different levels and in the sphere of culture and science.

The treaty envisages a more active interaction to combat organized crime, terrorism, drugs, and cooperation in the field of safe navigation and air traffic.

The same day the state assembly ratified a treaty on cooperation and good neighboring relations between Estonia and Poland in the framework of the Baltic Sea states.

The document pays special attention to regional cooperation between the Baltic Sea states. It enumerates joint efforts in case of crisis situations, including mutual support to oppose an aggressor.

The treaty also foresees to expand interaction in the sphere of economy, transport, ecology, culture, and combat with crime.

Government Signs Cooperation Agreement With Finland

OW1404173193 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1625 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Finland's Minister of Social Affairs and Health Care Jorma Huuhtanen and the Minister of Social Affairs of Estonia Marju Laurustin signed an agreement in Tallinn on Wednesday [14 April] on co-operation between the two ministries.

The document suggests exchange of specialists and information, administering joint seminars and other forms of co-operation in the spheres of social services, insurance and health care.

The annual co-operation plans will be devised by a special body.

Government Adopts Western Border Control Standards

OW1404172193 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1625 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The main task facing Estonian borderguard troops is to fight international criminal rings, terrorism, smuggling, illegal immigration and infiltration by undesirable elements, general director of the border protection department Andrus Aevel told a news conference in Tallinn on Wednesday [14 April].

Unveiling the concept of the country's border protection based on the experience gained by Finland, Germany, Poland and France, Aevel said his department must unify land, sea and air protection forces.

He put the current strength of borderguard troops at about 2000. Estonia now has ten border regions, 12 cordons, 25 checkpoints, an airforce squadron and four warships. The first five radar stations are due to be commissioned soon, but Aevel believes this is inadequate for border protection. He reckons that the strength of border troops must run from 3500 to 3800 people.

Last year, as many as 12 million people crossed the country's frontiers as well as 11,000 ships. Aevel spoke of an alarming situation in the east following attempts by criminal elements to infiltrate the country.

The Estonian official reported no incident during recent inspection of Russian warships and airforce planes. dd

Latvia

Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives in Moscow

OW1304192593 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1857 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia Maris Gailis begins a two-day visit to Moscow on April 14.

The press-service of the republic's foreign service informs that at a meeting with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation the consular and property relations between the two countries are to be discussed.

Issues related to the withdrawal of troops from Latvia shall not be raised.

Prime Minister Meets Turkish Envoy, Discusses Relations

OW1404172993 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1625 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The press-service of Latvian the government informed Baltfax that on April, 14 Ivars Godmanis, the Prime-minister of Latvia, had a meeting in Riga with Erkan Gezer, the ambassador of Turkey.

During the meeting, the ambassador told to the head of Latvian cabinet of ministers, that Turkey was going to encrease significantly the purchases of wood and beef cattle, the principle items of Latvian exort to Turkey. He also said that the government of Turkey was preparing an agreement which would be signed in Latvia and which would be concerned with the defence of investments and development of trade and economic relations between Turkey and Latvia. This agreement will also include the rejection of the dual taxation.

The ambassador hoped that such documents would be signed during the visit of Hikmet Cetin, minister of foreign affairs of Turkey. This visit will take place within two months.

Defense Minister Sees Threat From 'Alien' Russian Army

WS1404110793 Tallinn BNS in English 1044 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] Riga, Apr 14, BNS—The main threat to Latvia comes from forces acting within the country against its statehood, said Talvas Jundzis, Latvian defense minister.

The country's security is threatened by the army of the alien state which is located on its territory without any agreement, Jundzis told the Russian military newspaper GUARD OF THE BALTIC. That threat is increased by the unstable situation in Russia, he said.

Consequently, Jundzis says, Latvia's military doctrine does not determine a concrete adversary, but indicates "clear sources of threats".

But the country faces drastic shortages in manpower and money, he said. Although the military plan calls for 12 patrol cutters, Latvia has only six. The plan requires 9,000 troops, but Latvia has only 5,000. The country simply cannot afford its needs, says Jundzis.

Latvia cannot guarantee its security without help from other states, he said. That is why it cannot allow itself to

be neutral. "Even the neutrality of Finland, Austria and Sweden are rather relative," Jundzis said.

In addition to troop shortages, most Latvian officers are former Soviet Army military servicemen who the minister calls "professionals of the oriental type." In his opinion, they do not have the experience of Western armies.

But, says Jundzis, once the primary threat is removed, many of Latvia's problems may solve themselves.

"I believe that when Latvians feel themselves the real hosts in their state, when the Russian Army leaves," he said, "many problems in relations between Latvians and Russians will be removed."

Fifteen Socio-Political Organizations Registered

OW1304192893 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1857 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At present 15 socio-political organizations have been registered at the Latvian Ministry of Justice, informed "Baltfax" the Ministry representative Maris Krumins on Monday [11 April].

The following organizations have been registered as socio-political: Movement for National Independence of Latvia, "Tavzeme" National Union, "Daugavas vanaki", Popular Front, 18 November Union, Christian-Democratic Union, Unity Party, Democratic Center Party, Latvian Christian National Union, Democratic Labour Party, Liberal Party, Union for Juvenile Progress, "Green" Pparty and Social- Democratic Labour Party.

The Fools' party is to be registered April, 15.

Environmental Pollution in Kunda 'Unbearable'

WS1404092193 Riga LETA in English 1549 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] Tallinn, April 13 (LETA)—The ecological situation in Estonian city of Kunda is unbearable, Kuno Raude, a member of Estonian National Assembly, said.

The main industrial enterprise in the city is a cement production plant but its dust receivers have been out of order for several days running so that the city and its neighbourhood are covered by a thick layer of dust.

The frequency of various diseases in Kunda has increased. Research indicates that health condition of residents might deteriorate even further. The officials from Estonian Environment and Nature Protection Ministry visited the city but no solution was found.

For reconstruction of Kunda cement plant 30 million USD are needed, including 5.75 million for environment protection measures, but no source of financial means could be found to cover those expenses.

Lithuania

Russia Offers Most Favored Nation Trade Status

OW1404171193 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1624 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia is striving to sign an agreement on most favored nation regime in trade but not on free trade with Lithuania, Lithuania's Industry and Trade Vice Minister Romualdas Ramoska told our Baltfax correspondent.

In Ramoska's words, during the meeting between groups of experts held in Moscow last week, the Russian party handed over a new draft agreement though earlier the parties discussed drafts on free trade prepared by the Lithuanian party. Lithuania has been trying to sign an agreement on free trade with Russia since the middle of the last year.

Ramoska reported that Lithuania did not entirely agree to several provisions of the new draft and intended to correct it. The state delegation on negotiations with Russia is to discuss this document on Thursday. However, Vice Minister noted, the most favored nation regime is also beneficial for Lithuania because under its provisions dual taxation is supposed to be annulled.

Signing of an agreement on most favored nation regime would mean a gradual transition to free trade, to which Russia is striving as well, Ramoska said.

At the meeting in St. Petersburg on April 3 heads of the Lithuanian and Russian governments agreed to complete preparation of the agreement and to sign it this month.

Landsbergis Views Political Similarities With Russia

WS1504093993 Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 27 Mar 93 No. 58 p 4

[Article by opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis: "Russia's Parallel"; under the "Opposition Leader's Column" rubric]

[Text] Russia's troubles are ripe for a solution. The president has defined the situation in the following manner: It is the confrontation between the party functionaries ("the former bolshevik system") and the people. Different aspirations and interests were the core of the liberation movements and the historical events that have bound the two countries together—the small one and the large one.

Russia lagged behind for a year and a half, however, it is catching up with us now. Certainly, Russia could have learned something not only from building barricades—it could have followed Lithuania's example and avoided its mistakes. Other things, however, had different meanings.

Our first legal defense against our greedy USSR neighbor occured when Estonia declared sovereignty over its territory

and airspace in the fall of 1988, and Lithuania followed suit half a year later. When Russia adopted its declaration of sovereignty a year later, it became clear that the former USSR had came to an end. Russia had a choice of whether or not to pay wages to the "center" and the president hired by all 12 sovereign units. It had to either support the Army of the "center," or to seek clarification and real power, as well as to create its own Army.

In following the example of the Baltics, Russia no longer wished to be a colony of the bureaucratic administration of the "center." That is why no draft agreements on the renewed union or the federation of sovereign states, which were being so fervently prepared, could save Mikhail Gorbachev, the oppressive system of the "union," and the integral party dictatorship.

The action moved to the "republics." We should never forget that Russia was the most vocal part of the USSR, Lithuania was occupied too long, and that there were a number of evolutionary parallels between the two countries beteeen 1991 and 1993.

The Russian democracy, similar to the Lithuanian democracy, is short of people who are prepared for state work and resistant to old temptations.

We are familiar with a post-communist disease: Dyarchy or triarchy, which promotes corruption and blocks progressive reform. The Russian legislative machine is much worse and more reactionary than the former Lithuanian Supreme Council that gave a strong impetus to the restoration of the state. The process of confrontation and division, and the growing helplessness are common to both legislatures. In the beginning, the Russian Supreme Council backed the president and his government that implemented democratic economic reform. The same council later transformed itself into a new legislative majority hostile to reform (such as the old- fashioned "new legislative majority" which is also found in Central Europe). This new majority demanded new positions and the removal of reformers.

Russia has been lagging behind from the very beginning. It has one more heavy millstone around its neck—the Congress of People's Deputies—that Lithuania has managed to get rid of. Yeltsin would like to get rid of it now to prevent the nomenclature, "the people's deputies," from dragging the country into a legal quagmire. The Russian president is steering toward safe shores, namely the new Constitution. Will Russia want to rescue itself? Will the Russian people be poisoned with the "great power" ideology? (A. Volskiy: the USSR has been "temporarily" disbanded; Russian patriots: the USSR has been destroyed by the criminals Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin).

Will the electorate give up everything as lost, disappointed with any ballot? Will the communists interpret this as a vote in favor of the quagmire and Yeltsin's defeat? Will the people who want order and property understand that a vote is necessary? Will they know which competing power to vote for?

I will not compare Russia with Lithuania which has already passed this stage, although without results. Lithuania has understood that it should look after the new Constitution in any case. I could compare Lithuania with Russia of 1989 because there are a lot of similar phenomena: We have our own Gorbachev and Lukyanov who cunningly manipulate the "aggressive, meek majority," and our Ligachev and Yazov. However, let everyone stop and think independently. Psychosis passes and the people begin to reason. The Western winds are caressing Lithuania more often.

Brazauskas Continues Visit to Britain

LD1504100593 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 14 Apr 93

[Text] [President] Algirdas Brazauskas and the official Lithuanian delegation met in London yesterday with the Lithuanian community in Great Britain. The president was welcomed by the oldest Lithuanian diplomat, the ambassador in Great Britain, Vincas Balickas, who has been working in that country for almost for six decades, and the chairman of the Lithuanian community, Jaras Alkis.

Algirdas Brazauskas, speaking to the countrymen, noted that during the Seimas elections Lithuania passed a firm and genuine test of democracy. He shared his anxiety about the worsening life of the Lithuanian people. According to the president, political instability and the change of governments resulted in foreign investors being slow in coming.

Speaking to his countrymen in London about the prospects of the introduction of the litas [unit of currency], Romualdas Visokavicius, member of the delegation and chairman of the board of the Bank of Lithuania, said that the litas should be introduced within a few months but there is still much work to be done. One of the tasks being the reprinting of about one-third of the litas banknotes due to their poor quality. By the way, the program of this visit envisions a meeting with the firm which printed the Lithuanian litas before the war.

87

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